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Research and development and innovation are key drivers of economic growth and prosperity. European 
policymakers have long acknowledged their importance and, under the Lisbon Agenda, have set the 
objective of raising R&D expenditure to 3 percent of GDP. The operations of the European Investment 
Bank and its venture capital arm, the European Investment Fund, need to be seen in this context. In 
fact, a non-negligible portion of the EIB Group’s finance is directed at the knowledge economy. In 
2009, finance in support of research and development, innovation, and education and training amounted 
to EUR 14.5 billion, representing some 20 percent of the finance provided by the EIB Group.
To foster its impact on R&D, innovation, and growth, it is key that the Bank closely follow the debate 
on R&D and innovation and how they contribute to economic growth. More specifically, we must 
have a sound understanding of why investing in R&D and innovation is crucial, what drives such 
investment, what hinders it, and how possible roadblocks could be removed. The contributions to 
this volume of the EIB Papers aim at addressing these questions head on. Drawing on presentations 
made at the 2009 EIB Conference in Economics and Finance, the contributions approach the topic at 
hand from three perspectives.
Seen from a macroeconomic perspective, the underlying rationale for investing in the creation of new 
knowledge through spending on R&D and innovation is to raise future output – just as spending on 
machinery and equipment. As obvious as this may seem, the link between investing in knowledge and 
the return to this investment is far from trivial and understanding this link is still in its infancy. To begin 
with, there is the basic issue of how to measure investment in the creation of knowledge. And then, 
there is the challenge of estimating to what extent this investment results in a stock of knowledge 
capital. Once that challenge is mastered, one can turn to analysing the link between increases in 
knowledge capital and economic growth. If one accounts for knowledge capital as for other 
macroeconomic factors of production – that is, tangible capital and labour – how does one’s perception 
of the economy change? Specifically, to what extent does a too narrow definition of investment in the 
past result in underestimating the contribution of investment to economic growth? And what does 
acknowledging the rate of return of the hitherto unmeasured knowledge capital imply for where the 
resources of the economy would be put to their most productive use?
Seen from a microeconomic perspective, the key question is what drives and what impedes firms 
to invest in knowledge. Obviously, as with conventional investment, firms see investment in 
knowledge capital as an opportunity to make money. Again, as obvious as this may seem, things 
are far more complex. Knowledge capital differs from buildings, machinery and equipment in several 
important respects. The returns from knowledge are not as easily appropriated by the investor 
because some of the hard-won knowledge “spills over” to competitors, suppliers, clients and others. 
This tends to undermine the incentives of private firms to invest in its creation and, as a result, firms 
may not want to invest in knowledge capital as much as they should from society’s perspective. 
Knowledge spillovers constitute a case of market failure, raising the question of whether public 
intervention can do anything about it. And if it can: which policy instruments are available, how 
effective are they, what experience is there in using them, and which lessons can one draw when 
designing future policies?
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The third perspective considers the financing of R&D and innovation. The conference contributions 
on this theme are compiled in the companion issue (Volume 14, Number 2) to this issue of the EIB 
Papers. Suffice it to note here that these contributions focus on policies responding to the possibility 
that firms – even when they want to invest as much as they should – are unable to invest as much as 
they want because they cannot get finance for all the investment they consider profitable. 
All in all, understanding what drives and what hinders R&D and innovation and how the creation of 
knowledge spurs economic growth is essential for putting Europe on a path that ensures prosperity 
in an ageing society. I am confident that the research findings presented in this volume of the EIB Papers 
will further enhance our understanding and I am happy we can share them with you.
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R&D and the financing   
of innovation in Europe 
Stimulating R&D, innovation and growth
The 2009 EIB Conference in Economics and Finance – held at EIB headquarters in Luxembourg on 
October 22 – examined the role of investment in R&D and other intangibles for innovation and growth 
and highlighted the importance of access to finance for innovative firms. It shed light on a number of 
policy-relevant issues including fiscal measures to boost R&D spending, the role of patents as an output 
of the innovation process and as a means to secure external finance for innovative firms as well as the 
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ABSTRACT
Kristian Uppenberg (k.uppenberg@eib.org) is a Senior Economist at 
the European Investment Bank (EIB).
The  literature  on  economic  growth  has  identified 
knowledge  expansion  as  a  key  propellant.  Early 
research  derived  this  conclusion  from  the  residual 
that  remained  after  the  growth  contributions  from 
capital  and  labour  had  been  accounted  for.  Later 
modifications expanded the concept of fixed capital 
to include intangible capital. The underlying drivers 
of  innovation  have,  meanwhile,  been  explored  by 
the  endogenous  growth  literature.  Together,  these 
efforts have reconfirmed the role of knowledge and 
innovation  in  growth.  But  they  also  point  to  the 
importance of competition and firm entry and exit as 
key motivators for firms to innovate. Policies aiming 
to  boost  growth  must  therefore  look  beyond  the 
amounts invested in R&D and also provide for well-
functioning labour, product and financial markets. 
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Innovation and economic growth
1.  Introduction
The financial crisis and the ensuing economic slump have temporarily overshadowed long-term growth 
issues in the minds of policymakers. When the house is still on fire, few concern themselves with 
renovation. But economic growth will likely come back on the policy agenda with a vengeance. The 
financial crisis will leave in its wake a legacy of higher unemployment, larger fiscal deficits and a 
mountain of public and private debt. In the meantime, the longer-standing challenges of population 
ageing and climate change have not disappeared. Policies that boost environmentally and socially 
sustainable economic growth are essential to meet these challenges.
From a European perspective, the challenge of how to raise the long-term growth rate of the economy 
is closely linked to the issue of innovation. Following its impressive economic convergence towards 
the United States (US) in the early post-war decades, Europe’s ability to close the transatlantic income 
gap faltered long before the process was completed. Since the 1970s, average GDP per capita in the 
EU has been maintained at around three-quarters of the US level. Also in terms of labour productivity 
(i.e. output per hour worked), Europe’s convergence towards the US prematurely ground to a halt, and 
then reversed (van Ark et al. 2008).
European policymakers have repeatedly stated, as one of their overriding goals in the past decade, 
their aim to address the causes of Europe’s relative growth stagnation. In some areas there has been 
notable progress, such as the success in raising employment rates. Less progress is visible, however, 
in terms of innovation and productivity growth. Productivity growth in highly innovative societies is 
led by the activities of the business sector. Its motivations to innovate reflect a complex web of labour 
and product market institutions, property rights, academic research links, access to foreign and domestic 
markets, and finance. If Europe is to succeed in achieving higher economic growth by means of 
innovation, it is thus not enough to merely subsidise investment in research and development (R&D). 
A greater understanding of how to influence the different elements in this web is also needed. 
The economic literature has investigated the drivers of economic growth for decades. Although 
substantial disagreements remain, there is also emerging consensus in several key areas. This 
introduction to the literature on innovation and growth aims to sort out some of the most important 
elements. It draws on several excellent surveys, including Temple (1999), Scotchmer (2004), OeNB 
(2004), Sala-i-Martin (2002), the OECD (2006) and Aghion and Howitt (2009).
This paper addresses two key questions. First, how important is innovation and the stock of knowledge 
in the process of economic growth? Second, what are the mechanisms that make firms invest in R&D 
and the accumulation of knowledge? The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a brief 
discussion on the inherent characteristics of knowledge, and how these affect its treatment in the 
economic literature. Sections 3 and 4 draw on the neo-classical growth framework to discuss the overall 
importance of knowledge in economic growth. In Section 5 we shift the focus to discuss, with the help 
of the endogenous growth literature, why firms invest in R&D and how institutions and policies can 
influence these incentives. Section 6 broadens the perspective beyond the macroeconomic perspective 
to discuss the role of systems of innovation. Section 7 concludes, followed by an overview in Section 
8 of the other contributions to this volume of the EIB Papers.
Kristian Uppenberg
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2.  Is knowledge a pure public good or just another form of capital?
To understand the role that knowledge plays in economic growth, we must first make a couple of 
observations on the nature of knowledge itself. 
Tangible fixed investment by governments, households and firms results in a fixed capital stock 
consisting of roads, bridges, houses, machinery and equipment, computers, telecommunications 
networks, etc. Devoting part of today’s resources to such investment helps increasing future output. 
As with other factors of production such as labour, fixed capital is a rival good, which means that its 
use by one firm makes it impossible for other firms to use it at the same time. It is also excludable, since 
an owner of a piece of machinery can prevent others from using it.
Knowledge resembles tangible fixed capital in some respects but is fundamentally different in others. 
Similar to tangible fixed capital, new knowledge is the outcome of investment, in this case in the form 
of spending on R&D and other intangible capital. If a society devotes some of its resources to innovation, 
this reduces current consumption in favour of an expansion of the stock of knowledge, which can raise 
future output. In this respect the stock of knowledge is just like other forms of productive capital. But 
unlike tangible fixed capital, knowledge is typically neither rival nor necessarily excludable. Non-
rivalness means that one firm using the knowledge does not in any way diminish the ability of other 
firms to use the same knowledge. That knowledge is non-excludable means that it is difficult for one 
firm to prevent others from using it once it exists. When knowledge has these characteristics, it is a 
pure public good. 
If all knowledge had these characteristics, then no R&D would be conducted by the private business 
sector. In reality, however, more than half of R&D in most countries is in the hands of private companies. 
The main reason is that much of the knowledge generated by R&D is actually not a pure public good. 
A lot of knowledge is at least partially rival. Unlike a printed blueprint readable by anyone, some 
knowledge is “tacit”, i.e. embedded in individual researchers or organisational structures. Such 
attachment makes the knowledge somewhat rival. Similarly, knowledge is also often excludable. An 
innovator can protect the newly acquired knowledge with the help of patent protection or secrecy, 
at least temporarily. The more rival and excludable the knowledge, the more knowledge behaves like 
a private good and the greater the incentive for individual firms to invest in its creation, even if there 
are some knowledge externalities. Intellectual property protection in the form of patents has been a 
means for governments to encourage private investment in the creation of new knowledge. On balance, 
innovation in the form of commercial application tends to be more proprietary, and thus more suitable 
for private investment. Pure scientific research, at the other end of the spectrum, is less proprietary 
and therefore in greater need of public financing.
The characteristics of knowledge outlined in this section are crucial for how economists have chosen 
to treat it in their models. The early literature on economic growth started from the extreme view that 
all knowledge is a pure public good. This view has become more refined over the years, allowing for 
knowledge to take on a wider range of characteristics.
3.  The role of knowledge in economic growth: Neo-classical origins and growth accounting
Neo-classical growth theory initially treated all knowledge as a pure public good. In the modern 
literature, however, it has been recognised that at least some knowledge fits the bill of a private good, 
which can therefore be treated similarly as other forms of fixed capital. This distinction has allowed 
for a much more precise depiction of the different components of economic growth.
The characteristics of 
knowledge are crucial 
for how economists have 
chosen to treat it in their 
models.
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3.1  Knowledge in the neo-classical growth model
The realisation that “knowledge”, broadly defined, plays an important role in economic growth was 
first discovered, almost as an afterthought, by Robert Solow. Solow (1956) developed (alongside his 
contemporary, Swan, 1956) the simple neo-classical growth model, which has become the benchmark 
and starting point for modern theoretical and empirical work on economic growth. The model was 
designed for a closed economy, which was a reasonable way to characterise the US economy in the 
first half of the 20th century.
A key feature of the neo-classical production function is that gross output is a simple function of only 
two factors of production: capital and labour. These two are smoothly but imperfectly substitutable. 
As an illustration, we show this feature here simply with the standard Cobb-Douglas production 
function with constant returns to scale:
(1)  Y = AK
αL
1−α
Output (Y) is a function of fixed capital (K), labour (L) and “knowledge” (A). In essence, what this function 
says is that aggregate output can be expanded either by increasing the amount of labour or fixed 
capital used in production, or through an expansion of the stock of knowledge, which increases the 
output for any given quantity of capital and labour.
Constant returns to scale means that a doubling of both capital and labour also leads to a doubling of 
output. At the same time there are diminishing returns to individual inputs, which means that increasing 
only one factor input while holding the other constant will yield ever smaller marginal increases in 
output. This is not an unreasonable assumption. Giving a worker an ever-larger number of machines 
to operate is likely to confront him with an increasingly challenging juggling act. But this property also 
implies that long-term growth in output per worker is driven entirely by “knowledge”. Because of 
diminishing marginal returns to capital, the marginal contribution to growth from steadily increasing 
the capital stock will be smaller and smaller. At the point when it equals the depreciation rate of capital, 
growth in output per worker comes to a stand-still. Consequently, the only way for the neo-classical 
economy to keep growing is by continuously expanding the stock of knowledge, A.
The seminal contribution of Solow was his pioneering empirical work on growth accounting. Applying 
his model to US data from the first half of the 20th century, Solow (1957) could calculate the shares of 
growth that stemmed directly from the expansion of labour and fixed capital1. This led to a startling 
discovery: Solow found that some nine-tenths of US growth could not be explained by the growth in 
labour and capital. The bulk of US economic growth was left unexplained, as the residual A. 
This residual, which has remained substantial – if somewhat smaller – in later growth accounting 
exercises in the US and elsewhere, became known as the “Solow” residual. Following the interpretation 
1    In order to do this using the relatively simple neo-classical production function and the limited set of data at his disposal, 
Solow had to make a few simplifying assumptions. First, he assumed that the US economy was on its equilibrium growth 
path, not unreasonably given its long history of having a relatively free market economy. This allowed him to draw on some 
generalised properties of the production function that are only true in equilibrium and under the additional assumption of 
perfect competition. Under these circumstances, the wage rate equals the marginal productivity of labour and the rate of 
return on capital equals the marginal productivity of capital. The income shares reflect the output elasticity of each input. 
Assuming constant returns to scale, they add up to one. These are the α and 1-α shown in Equation (1). Consequently, 
while the output elasticities are not directly observable, one can simply calculate the contribution of an input to output 
growth as the growth rate of each input (capital and labour) multiplied by its own income share, which is observable.
The neo-classical growth 
model has become 
the benchmark for 
modern theoretical 
and empirical work on 
economic growth.
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of Griliches (1979), most later studies based on Solow’s methodology have related the residual to the 
accumulation of a “knowledge stock”. Since it refers to increases in output for a given combination of 
factor inputs, it is nowadays also referred to as “total factor productivity”, or simply TFP. Since modern 
economies do not in reality operate under conditions of perfect competition, this residual captures 
not only technical progress and product market innovation, but also changes in returns to scale and 
mark-ups. It also captures measurement errors and the effects from unmeasured inputs, such as human 
capital, R&D and other intangible investments. As long as one only includes fixed capital and labour 
in the production function it is difficult to interpret the remaining residual as knowledge. The solution 
to this problem has been to come up with more complete measures of capital, which then reduce the 
unexplained residual.
The first substantial expansion of capital in growth accounting has been to explicitly account for human 
capital in the production function. An early effort in this direction was by Denison (1967). An influential 
modern reference is that of Jorgenson (1995). The inclusion of human capital has reduced the size of 
the unexplained knowledge residual, but it still remains substantial. We illustrate this in Figure 1 with 
the results from a recent growth accounting exercise by Crafts and Tonioli (2008). 
Figure 1:     Contributions to annual growth in output per hour worked (percentage points)












EU 1960-1970 EU 1970-1990 EU 1990-2003 US 1960-1970 US 1970-1990 US 1990-2003
EU US
Source:   Crafts and Tonioli (2008)
Note:    The figures for the EU are our own population-weighted averages based on the country-by-country estimates of 
the authors.
In the case of the US, when human capital is included, TFP still accounts for almost half of growth in 
the period after 1990. In Europe, the TFP share has diminished over time, but has historically accounted 
for between one-third and one-half of growth in output per worker.
By and large, Solow’s results regarding the importance of the unexplained residual have stood the 
test of time reasonably well. Thus a key puzzle in economic growth remains: under reasonable 
assumptions, a substantial portion of economic growth is not the result of capital and labour inputs, 
and not even human capital, but of something else. In the neo-classical growth model this something 
else is knowledge in the form of a pure public good. But as we mentioned earlier, not all knowledge 
is a pure public good. To the extent that at least some knowledge has private good properties, we 
can reduce the Solow residual even further by explicitly accounting for this in the production 
function.
A large portion of 
economic growth is 
not the result of labour 
inputs or physical and 
human capital, but of 
something else.
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3.2  Treating knowledge as fixed capital: Investment in “intangible” capital
Efforts to widen the definition of productive fixed capital in neo-classical growth accounting have 
focused on “intangible capital”. This includes firm-specific human and organisational capital, R&D 
capital, computer software, brands, and the development of new designs. 
Intangible assets were excluded from the narrow definition of fixed capital in early growth accounting, 
partly because of measurement difficulties. Unlike physical assets, intangible assets are often 
embedded in the skilled staff of a firm and in its organisational structure and not always directly 
observable. In growth accounting, their contribution to growth was therefore captured by the Solow 
residual. But treating intangible capital just like any other form of fixed capital is consistent with its 
inherent properties, since it too increases potential future output. Focusing on the private business 
sector, researchers have typically limited estimates of intangible capital to that which can be 
appropriated by the investing firm. A large portion of knowledge, for instance that generated as a 
result of publicly funded scientific research, or arising from knowledge spillovers, remains beyond 
the reach of intangible capital estimates. Its impact on the economy thus continues to be captured 
by the residual. 
The rationale for broadening the concept of fixed capital to include intangibles has strengthened with 
the post-industrial transformation of modern economies. The wealth and incomes of firms in developed 
economies are increasingly based on intangible assets. The shift towards post-industrial societies has 
caused the ratio of tangible fixed capital – such as buildings, machinery and equipment – to fall over 
time as a ratio to GDP, especially in the US. This was a source of concern for some observers, fearing 
that future growth prospects were being short-changed by a culture of excessive consumption. But 
when the concept of productive capital is broadened to include a growing stock of intangible capital, 
this decline is no longer visible. Because of this gradual shift towards intangibles in the composition 
of fixed capital, growth accounting that relies exclusively on tangible fixed capital tends to become 
increasingly misleading over time.
One of the most influential contributions to this literature came with two papers by Corrado, Hulten, 
and Sichel (2005, 2009), henceforth referred to as CHS. With the aim of including a more complete 
measure of productive capital when accounting for growth, they broaden the concept of capital to 
include three types of intangible assets: 
Computerised information (software and databases); •	
Scientific and creative property (R&D, mineral exploration, copyright and license costs, other  •	
product development, design, and other research expenses);
Economic competencies (brand equity, firm-specific human capital and organisational structure  •	
costs).
While some of the data used by CHS comes from official government sources, the System of National 
Accounts (SNA) of most countries still treats spending on intangible assets as a current business expense, 
not as fixed investment. This includes for instance expenditures on advertising to maintain brand 
equity and employee time and additional costs for training, even though such spending contributes 
to the accumulation of human capital. The only widespread inclusion so far of intangibles in the SNA 
occurred a decade ago, with the treatment of software expenditures as investment. Also in the pipeline 
is the capitalisation of R&D expenditures, but progress on this has been slow due to measurement 
difficulties. Given these limitations, CHS rely on a combination of public and private data, as well as 
estimates. 
Growth accounting 
that relies exclusively 
on tangible fixed 
capital tends to become 
increasingly misleading 
over time.
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On this basis, they estimate that total annual investment in intellectual assets by US businesses in the 
late 1990s amounted to some USD 1.1 trillion, or 12 percent of GDP. This is a substantial figure, broadly 
similar to that of tangible investment. 
The data also suggest a dramatic increase in intangible business investment over time. The gradual 
rise in intangible investment has been of the same order of magnitude as the decline in tangible 
investment, thus keeping the ratio of total investment to GDP relatively stable over time. Not all 
segments of intangible investment have contributed equally to this expansion however. Comparing 
the time period 1973–1995 with 1995–2003, CHS find that overall intangible investment grew from 
9.4 percent of total national income to 13.9 percent. Computerised information rose the most, from 
0.8 to 2.3 percent. Interestingly, while traditional scientific R&D remained flat (increasing its share from 
2.4 to 2.5 percent), “non-scientific R&D” rose from 1 percent to 2.2 percent. Non-scientific R&D includes 
innovative and artistic content in the form of commercial copyrights, licenses, and designs, which are 
not counted in traditional R&D statistics. Brand equity rose from 1.7 to 2 percent, while firm-specific 
resources increased from 3.5 to 5 percent. In other words, while scientific R&D is traditionally seen as 
the key element in knowledge creation, it has made a negligible contribution to the ascent of US 
intangible capital investment in recent decades. 
Based on the estimates of intangible investment, CHS estimate the size of the intangible capital stock, 
which is then added to the standard growth accounting framework. As illustrated by Figure 2, the rate 
of change of output per worker increases more rapidly in the presence of intangible capital. Also, the 
inclusion of intangible capital dramatically changes the observed sources of economic growth. Capital 
deepening – increases in the stock of capital per hour worked – now becomes the dominant source 
of growth. For the period 1995-2003, intangible and tangible capital investment account for broadly 
equal shares of growth in output per worker. Though not visible in the chart, another key conclusion 
from this exercise is that scientific R&D accounts for only a small part of intangible capital deepening, 
notably less than that of software. The non-traditional types of intangibles highlighted by CHS – non-
scientific R&D, brand equity, and firm-specific resources – together account for nearly 60% of total 
intangible capital deepening in the post-1995 period.
With capital deepening explaining a larger share of growth, the contribution from the TFP residual 
becomes correspondingly smaller, falling from around half to one-third for the post-1995 period when 
intangibles are included. The Solow residual also accounts for a smaller portion of the post-1995 
acceleration in growth. When intangibles are excluded, some two-thirds of the increase in growth is 
accounted for by TFP. Its share drops to just over one-third when intangibles are included.
The CHS methodology was consequently applied by Giorgio Marrano and Haskel (2007) for the UK, by 
Fukao et al. (2009) for Japan, by Jalava et al. (2007) for Finland and by Edquist (2009) for Sweden. In all 
of these cases, total investment in intangible capital stood at around 10 percent of GDP, i.e. a similar 
order of magnitude as in the US. However, when this methodology has been applied to a larger number 
of continental European countries, a wider range of results has emerged. As shown by van Ark et al. 
(this volume), outside the Anglo-Saxon and Nordic countries, both the resources devoted to intangible 
investment and their contribution to productivity growth have typically been of a smaller 
magnitude.
This brings our discussion on growth accounting to a close. Broadening the concept of capital to include 
R&D and human capital has clearly improved the ability of the neo-classical production function to 
account for economic growth. But growth accounting by necessity rests on simplifying assumptions 
that limit its usefulness in understanding the underlying drivers of economic growth. Much of the 
modern growth literature, empirical as well as theoretical, aims at coming to terms with this issue. This 
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is essential if countries are to succeed in putting in place the institutions and policies needed to foster 
high growth in output and incomes.














TFP Labour composition  Intangibles excl. software Software
Tangible capital excl. IT equipment
Excluding intangibles Including intangibles
IT equipment 
Source:   Corrado et al. (2009)
4.  Beyond growth accounting: Cross-sectional evidence on growth
The empirical literature on growth is not confined to growth accounting. There is also a large cross-
sectional literature which, rather than imposing parameter values, estimates these on the basis of 
evidence across firms, sectors or countries. In this respect, the cross-sectional growth regression 
literature is a valuable complement to single country growth accounting. Cross-sectional evidence is 
particularly valuable in light of the limitations of time series analysis in the context of long-term 
economic growth. For many countries the availability of long time series data is limited, and many key 
determinants of growth display too little variability across time to allow for reliable conclusions from 
time series analysis regarding their impact on growth. Having said that, some argue that single country 
regressions may be the only way to go in light of parameter heterogeneity, which is to say that the 
fundamental drivers of growth are so different across countries that cross-country regressions may 
yield unreliable results. See Brock and Durlauf (2001) and Temple (1999) for further discussion on these 
issues.
The growth regression literature is enormous. It addresses many different issues, including the relative 
importance of institutional and policy drivers in the income convergence of countries, and the empirical 
validity of the neo-classical model (Barro 1991, 1995, 1997). Rather than discussing this literature in its 
entirety, however, we focus in this section on two issues: Empirical evidence for the link between 
investment in R&D and growth, and the importance of cross-border knowledge spillovers.
4.1  Empirical evidence on the importance of R&D for growth
Although the process of knowledge formation is highly complex, it is widely perceived that investment 
in R&D is a key input in its creation. Similar to human capital, there is strong microeconomic evidence 
for the importance of R&D. The link between R&D and economic performance has been demonstrated 
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in numerous firm- and industry-level studies. The rate of return on R&D can be estimated on the basis 
of either profits or output. A majority of studies using these approaches have found that the rate of 
return on R&D is somewhat higher than that of tangible fixed capital. This may reflect the relative 
riskiness of R&D investment, which warrants a higher return. It could also be, however, that greater 
barriers to entry in R&D generate excess returns. Investment in R&D at the sectoral level also seems 
strongly influenced by its private rate of return. Relatively research-intensive sectors, on average, have 
higher returns from R&D.
The presence of knowledge spillovers from R&D, however, make it difficult to draw strong macroeconomic 
conclusions on the basis of microeconomic evidence alone. Macroeconomic studies have typically 
found that social rates of return on R&D are higher than private returns, which in turn is viewed as 
evidence of positive spillovers (Griliches 1992, 1995; Hall 1996; Fraumeni and Okubo 2005; OECD 2000; 
CBO 2005; see also Mc Morrow and Röger, this volume, for a comprehensive overview of private and 
social rates of return to R&D). Many empirical studies have furthermore found a relatively strong link 
between R&D, related spillovers, and productivity growth (see Cincera and van Pottelsberghe 2001; 
Mohnen 2001; and Los and Verspagen 2007 for recent reviews of the empirical spillover literature). The 
presence of positive spillovers from R&D at the national level, combined with evidence of international 
knowledge spillovers, suggests that there is probably collective underinvestment in R&D (Griffith et 
al. 2004). This presents a case for public intervention in support of R&D, for instance in the form of 
intellectual property protection or R&D subsidies.
Similar to many institutional determinants of growth, R&D spending displays relatively little variability 
over time, which makes time series analysis difficult in many countries. Some time-series evidence 
exists for the US, however, and it poses some challenges to the notion of knowledge-driven growth. 
Griliches (1988) found that although R&D has a measurable effect on growth, the slowdown in R&D 
investment in the 1970s can account for only a small portion of the growth slowdown during this 
period. More generally, the post-1970 productivity growth slowdown has been particularly difficult to 
reconcile with the notion that the expansion of knowledge is a major engine of growth. Jones (1995a,b) 
observes that investment in knowledge has continuously risen in OECD countries during the post-war 
period, both in terms of years of schooling and in terms of R&D. Institutional factors that are known to 
foster knowledge spillovers have also shifted in a favourable way. Trade openness, for instance, has 
increased steadily over time. If growth in the stock of knowledge is key to economic growth, then the 
increased pace at which knowledge accumulates should cause productivity growth to speed up. But 
post-war growth rates in OECD countries have remained relatively impervious to such changes. Jones 
interprets this as knowledge having large level effects. If the level of output is affected by a continuous 
process of many small increases in knowledge, then the steady state path of long-term growth becomes 
very difficult to observe. What may seem like a growth acceleration caused by revolutionary innovations 
may thus be nothing more than a transitory adjustment in the level of productivity.
Recent experience has, on the other hand, strengthened the link between the development and 
application of new technologies and productivity growth. Specifically, since the mid-1990s, the US 
economy has experienced an acceleration in both. But this relationship has at the same time proven 
complex and multidirectional. Investment in new technologies contributes to aggregate productivity 
growth primarily by facilitating a more efficient organisation of production. New knowledge thus 
typically only has a substantial impact on the economy once commercially implemented on a large 
scale. For years, substantial investment in ICT seemed to have little impact on aggregate productivity, 
as first observed by Solow (1987): “You can see the computer age everywhere but in the productivity 
statistics.” But the application of new technologies for the purpose of organisational innovation entails 
substantial learning, which means that the productivity gains from major innovations can emerge with 
long lags. Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2003) estimate that the longer term productivity and output contributions 
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of computerisation at the firm-level are up to five times greater than those in the short run (also see 
Baily 2004, and Brynjolfsson and Saunders 2009, for comprehensive discussions on these issues). It is 
now widely believed that such long lags in the application of new technologies explain why high US 
productivity growth continued for years after the ICT investment wave cooled off. 
On balance, the lags and the interaction between R&D, investment in new technologies and 
organisational innovation tend to blur the distinction between capital deepening and knowledge as 
the key drivers of growth, as well as the relationship between each of these components and growth. 
What is in the end more important for policymakers is to understand which policies and institutions 
are the most conducive to high productivity growth, regardless of the exact mechanisms through 
which they operate.
4.2  International knowledge spillovers and the absorptive capacity of countries
While it may be the case that the bulk of US productivity gains stem from its own investment in R&D 
and homegrown innovation efforts, for most other countries the adoption of knowledge generated 
abroad plays an equally, if not more, important role. The cross-country literature has helped shed 
valuable light on the importance of such international knowledge spillovers, an area where single-
country growth accounting has little to say. 
One of the key observations made in the growth regression literature is that it is TFP, and not the stocks 
of capital and labour, that accounts for the bulk of income differences across countries (Easterly and 
Levine 2001). Similarly, those countries that have succeeded in converging towards high income 
countries have done so primarily on the back of a convergence in TFP and the stock of knowledge, not 
factor inputs. But while many countries have benefited from such knowledge-driven convergence, 
industrialised countries account for the bulk of the world’s investment in R&D and other intangibles. 
This suggests that the flow of knowledge across national borders is an important driver of economic 
growth and income convergence. Such international spillovers have become increasingly important 
over time, as the world economy has become more integrated. But knowledge spillovers are neither 
automatic nor costless, and they depend on many institutional factors. Those countries that have put 
in place the policies and institutions needed to benefit from knowledge spillovers have tended to 
grow rapidly, while many others have been left behind.
One of the most powerful conduits of cross-border knowledge transfer is international trade and its 
role has grown over time2. The ratio of world imports to world gross output has more than doubled 
since 1970, to 28 percent in 2005. The role of trade as a vehicle for knowledge transfers has been 
demonstrated by Coe and Helpman (1995). They investigate the influence of domestic and foreign 
R&D capital on a given country’s level of TFP under the assumption that trade helps to channel 
knowledge spillovers. Drawing on data from 22 developed countries over the period 1971 to 1990, 
they find that the positive impact on TFP from the foreign R&D stock is larger for countries that are 
more open to trade.
In the wake of Coe and Helpman, several studies have aimed to identify other domestic conditions 
that may also facilitate knowledge spillovers. Largely refuting the early predictions of Gerschenkron 
(1962) and Kuznets (1973), that poorer countries would gain more from foreign technology than richer 
countries, later research has shown that more developed countries tend to have more of those 
institutions and policies needed to benefit from foreign knowledge spillovers. Specifically, this literature 
2  Another important conduit for international knowledge transfers is foreign direct investment. See Glass and Saggi (2008) 
for a recent review of this literature.
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shows that countries that invest in human capital and R&D tend to be better placed to absorb knowledge 
generated in other countries (Cohen and Levinthal 1989; Griffith et al. 2004; Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe 
2004; Khan and Luintel 2006). There is also evidence that the most effective policies to promote 
knowledge spillovers differ depending on the “receiving” country’s distance from the knowledge 
frontier. Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) and Engelbrecht (1997, 2000) find that human capital formation 
is relatively more important for developing countries far from the technological frontier, whereas 
investing in R&D grows in importance for countries closer to the frontier. This is consistent with the 
view that it is increasingly difficult for countries to sustain high growth through adoption and imitation 
alone as they approach the technological frontier.
Also the functioning of labour and product markets affects a country’s ability to absorb knowledge 
from abroad. Parente and Prescott (2000) argue that absorptive capacity is influenced by institutional 
aspects that give rise to adjustment costs in adopting new technologies. Incumbents can for instance 
resist the adoption of better production techniques when they have monopoly rights to the current 
technology. The greater the market power of incumbents, the greater the amount of resources that 
potential entrants with superior technology have to spend in order to enter the industry.
There is also a crucial geographic constraint to cross-border knowledge spillovers. Because some 
knowledge is tacit, i.e. embedded in individual researchers and organisational structures, knowledge 
spillovers tend to diminish with geographic distance (Bottazzi and Peri, 2003). Finding ways to benefit 
from such “localised” spillovers is therefore an important complement to building up the absorptive 
capacity at home. Griffith et al. (2006) illustrate this point using data on R&D in UK and US manufacturing 
firms. They find evidence of substantial R&D spillovers from US manufacturing to UK firms, but UK 
firms that also undertake R&D in the US benefit the most. This suggests that policies promoting R&D 
in the home country alone may be counterproductive, since this fails to take into account the importance 
of proximity to fully benefit from foreign knowledge spillovers. While many governments have expressed 
fear of losing business R&D activities to foreign innovative clusters, they may have no choice but to 
allow some global repositioning of business R&D if their innovative sectors are to stay competitive.
5.  Endogenous growth theory: Explaining innovation-led growth
The neo-classical model has provided the benchmark for empirical growth research ever since first 
conjured up by Solow and Swan. As a result of improved data availability covering a larger number of 
countries, the validity of the model has been continually tested. This has both led to the reconfirmation 
of the model’s key qualities but has also brought out some major shortcomings. In particular, the neo-
classical growth model cannot theoretically explain the underlying drivers of growth, insofar as growth 
is propelled by an exogenous expansion of the knowledge stock. Over the past quarter-century, a new 
strand of “endogenous” growth theory has evolved to address these shortcomings. This literature has 
been essential for our deeper understanding of the incentives of individual firms to invest in knowledge, 
and how institutions and policies may influence these incentives.
5.1    The shortcomings of the neo-classical model paved the way for endogenous growth 
theory
There are two features of the neo-classical model that fail to reflect what we know about the role of 
knowledge in economic growth. Ignoring for now knowledge that has private good properties, i.e. 
private intangible capital, the first is that shared knowledge does not arise as a consequence of the 
actions of economic agents, but exogenously. The second is that the exogenous expansion of this 
knowledge stock is the sole engine of economic growth in the long run. 
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That knowledge grows exogenously in the neo-classical growth model follows from two of its 
underlying assumptions: that knowledge is a pure public good and that the economy operates under 
conditions of perfect competition. As we mentioned earlier, while fixed capital is rival, knowledge 
is not. Once knowledge exists, its use by one firm does not preclude others from using it. With the 
same amount of labour and capital inputs, another firm can use the existing stock of knowledge 
and still achieve exactly the same output as the first one. This characteristic of knowledge implies 
that the concept of constant returns to scale can only apply to capital and labour. Meanwhile, the 
assumption of perfect competition means that firms pay rental prices for capital and labour that are 
equal to their respective marginal products, and that the total output of the firm equals what the 
firm pays for these inputs. Perfect competition ensures that any profit is competed away, which 
means that there are no resources left for investment in knowledge with pure public good properties. 
Not that the firm would have any reason to invest in such knowledge if it could. Doing so gives the 
investing firm no advantage over competing firms that simply free-ride on the knowledge created 
by others. In Solow’s world, if knowledge exists, it must therefore be exogenous to the model. It 
cannot arise as a resource-using output in a competitive equilibrium, i.e. the model itself cannot 
explain how it comes into existence. This is consistent with a world-view where the inventors exist 
entirely in the confines of a scientific community separate from the market economy. But this property 
does not fit comfortably with what we know about knowledge. Inventors and researchers draw 
extensively on the resources of the rest of the economy and a large portion of R&D is conducted 
inside the business sector.
The second weakness of the neo-classical growth model is that long-term growth is entirely driven by 
the exogenous expansion of knowledge, which makes long-term growth impervious to the actions of 
economic agents and to government policies and institutions. This result follows the assumption of 
diminishing marginal returns to capital. If a country raises its investment rate, growth temporarily 
speeds up since the productive capital stock expands. But as a result of diminishing returns, the 
acceleration in output slows down as the capital stock rises. Meanwhile, depreciation of the fixed 
capital stock rises proportionally to the capital stock. At some point, the marginal output increase from 
higher investment is again only enough to offset the now higher level of capital depreciation. Higher 
investment has succeeded in permanently raising the level of output, but not its growth rate. The only 
source of steady-state growth is therefore exogenous growth in knowledge.
The shortcomings of the neo-classical growth model encouraged a number of prominent economists 
to approach the issue of growth from a new perspective in the 1980s. In the models of “endogenous” 
growth, as the name suggests, knowledge-driven long-term growth is the outcome of the actions of 
the various players in the economy. Designing such models with realistic properties has not been 
entirely straightforward, however. In essence, the literature has come up with two solutions for how 
knowledge can grow endogenously. Knowledge can arise as a spillover from fixed investment, which 
allows it to arise without the use of additional resources. Alternatively, resources for investment in 
knowledge are made available by deviating from the perfect competition assumption, which creates 
a surplus that firms can use to invest in knowledge.
5.2  Knowledge as an unintended spillover effect of investment
Early forerunners of modern endogenous growth models of the spillover type are the “AK-models”, by 
Harrod (1939) and Domar (1946). Unlike the Solow-Swan framework, the AK model made output strictly 
proportional to capital. With no diminishing marginal returns to capital, steady-state growth simply 
depended on the rate of saving. Frankel (1962) provided an early modification of this model, with 
substitutable factors similar to the Solow-Swan model.
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The most influential modern AK-model is that by Romer (1986). This model is typically regarded as the 
starting point of modern endogenous growth theory. In Romer’s model, individual firms face diminishing 
returns to investing in knowledge. This means that the model can still be described as competitive. 
But because of knowledge spillovers, the economy-level rate of return to knowledge can be constant 
or increasing. While Romer’s model has many attractive properties derived from utility maximising 
behaviour, its core ideas mirror those of Arrow (1962a). For simplicity, we use this to illustrate the main 
points. 
A key feature of Arrow’s model is that technological progress is the unintended and unremunerated 
side-effect of producing new capital goods. Such “learning by doing” is external to the firms doing it. 
In an economy with many small firms, each firm takes the knowledge as given, even though each of 
them contributes to its creation. The stock of knowledge is assumed to be a non-linear function of the 
aggregate capital stock:  A=K
φ, where φ>0. This expression can be substituted for A in the neo-classical 
production function:








In the case where α+φ=1, there is now constant returns to capital as a result of knowledge spillovers. 
So long as there is an incentive to invest, long run growth is positive in this model, without any 
requirement for exogenous knowledge expansion. A key policy implication of Arrow’s and Romer’s 
models is that the competitive equilibrium growth rate is below what would be socially optimal, since 
firms do not take into account the positive external effects that their investment has on the rest of the 
economy. This provides a strong theoretical argument for subsidising R&D, which is common practice 
in many countries.
5.3  Knowledge creation under imperfect competition: Horizontal innovation
While the AK model succeeds in explaining knowledge as an outcome of the investments of economic 
agents, it suffers from some shortcomings with respect to empirical observation. One is that knowledge 
occurs merely as the unintended side-effect of investment. No firm deliberately devotes resources to 
its creation, contrary to what we observe in reality. Also, despite knowledge spillovers, the primary 
driver of growth in this model is capital accumulation. Hence, it does not really succeed in explaining 
growth as the outcome of knowledge, which we have observed in the large role that TFP has played 
in growth, historically.
The ensuing branches of endogenous growth theory aimed at coming to terms with these shortcomings. 
A key challenge was to design a model where knowledge is the deliberate aim of those contributing 
to its formation. In order to achieve this, the assumption of perfect competition had to be dropped.
One influential contribution to this literature is that of Romer (1990). Romer defines productivity growth 
as the outcome of an expanding variety of specialised intermediate products, also referred to as 
“horizontal” product innovation. In this model, R&D aimed at the creation of new product varieties 
incurs a fixed up-front cost. Unlike the AK model, this fixed cost makes product markets monopolistically 
competitive rather than perfectly competitive, with the resulting monopoly profits used exclusively 
to finance innovation. The monopoly rents from innovation are also what give firms the incentive to 
invest in innovation and develop new product varieties. 
While taking a step in the right direction, also this approach to endogenous growth has been challenged 
by empirical evidence. As observed by Jones (1995a), endogenous models of the product variety type 
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give rise to strong scale effects, where larger economies should grow faster than small economies3. 
This prediction enjoys little support in empirical observation. A perhaps even greater challenge to the 
product variety models is that firm exit, which reduces product variety, also reduces productivity. This 
runs counter to the notion of creative destruction introduced by Schumpeter (1942), whereby new 
innovations destroy the results of earlier innovations by making them obsolete.
5.4    Knowledge creation under imperfect competition: Schumpeterian theory and vertical 
innovation
Schumpeterian growth theory confronts head-on some of the most serious empirical challenges to 
early endogenous growth models. It does so by turning the innovative process discussed so far on its 
head. Rather than leading to a horizontal expansion of product varieties, innovation here replaces 
obsolete with new and improved technology. This is known as “vertical” innovation. The Schumpeterian 
growth model emphasises the exit and entry of firms as a key element in growth, and its modern 
descendants provide a framework for analysing the relationship between product market competition 
and innovation (Aghion and Howitt 2009).
The relationship between competition and innovation was first introduced by Schumpeter (1942), who 
argued that large, monopolistic firms have a greater incentive to innovate than small competitive ones. 
Schumpeter’s hypothesis suggests that innovation may be hampered by too strong competition and 
that mergers should be tolerated even when reducing competition. 
Schumpeter’s predictions have been tested in numerous empirical studies. While the overall result is 
mixed, there is some evidence in support of Schumpeter’s conclusions. More competition is not always 
good for innovation. A number of studies have found that market power (i.e. less competition) raises 
the rate of return on R&D for the investing firm (Hall and Vopel 1996; Blundell et al. 1999; Greenhalgh 
and Rogers 2006). To the extent that a higher rate of return encourages spending on R&D, these studies 
seem to suggest that more competition may actually harm innovation.
Evidence based on the profitability of R&D is, however, not providing a convincing picture of the 
macroeconomic effects of competition. A casual comparison between the degree of product market 
competition in Europe and the US shows that it is the more competitive of the two that also invests 
more in R&D. The US economy is also the one where TFP growth has been sustained as the main engine 
of productivity growth. But reconciling the two facts requires some tricky modelling. How can one 
show that more competition fosters more innovation, even as it squeezes profit margins?
Arrow (1962b) made a valuable early contribution to this discussion by showing how cost-reducing 
innovation can give monopolistic market power to the innovator even when initially operating in a 
perfectly competitive market. In sharp contrast to Schumpeter, Arrow thus demonstrated that 
competition can encourage innovation as a means of protecting monopoly profits. This view stands 
at the core of modern “neo-Schumpeterian” growth theory, which has helped frame modern thinking 
on the interaction between competition and innovation.
Building on these insights, Aghion and Howitt (1992, 1998) have become the modern standard-bearers 
of the neo-Schumpeterian school of growth. In their framework, which was further developed and 
3  Since product variety has a positive impact on productivity growth, it also follows that market integration leading to 
greater variety has a positive impact on productivity. This is demonstrated by Grossman and Helpman (1991), who use the 
product variety framework in an international context.
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tested empirically in Aghion et al. (2005), firms invest in R&D to improve the quality of existing products, 
rendering the previous generation of products obsolete. Firms on the technology frontier invest in 
innovation in order to obtain temporary monopoly rents. Firms that are behind the technology frontier 
also invest in R&D, as a means to learn and to improve their productivity, but without pushing out the 
technology frontier itself.
In the model by Aghion and his collaborators, the incentive to invest in R&D is generated not by the 
absolute post-innovation rents, but by the difference between post- and pre-innovation rents, i.e. 
between the profits a firm stands to make when it chooses to innovate, compared to when it doesn’t. 
Thanks to a minor modification to the Schumpeterian model, where also the incumbent firms earn a 
profit, more competition can now encourage innovation. Even though competition squeezes the rents 
that a firm stands to make from innovating (i.e. post-innovation rents), the rents of non-innovation (i.e. 
the pre-innovation rents) diminish even more. In essence, in a competitive environment, continuous 
innovation becomes necessary to retain at least some rents.
More competition does not boost innovation under all circumstances in this model, however. There 
is a difference between industries where firms are operating on a similar technological level – so-called 
“neck-and-neck” industries – and those where firms are more technologically uneven. In neck-and-neck 
industries, innovation becomes a means by which the firm can break away from the constraints of 
intense competition with a close technological rival. Aghion et al. call this the “escape competition” 
effect. When industries compete “neck-and-neck”, more competition tends to encourage 
innovation.
On the other hand, in industries where firms are technologically diverse, more competition can actually 
reduce innovation. If the technological leader feels sufficiently unthreatened by the follower, it will 
feel no need to innovate more regardless of the competition policy. The follower, on the other hand, 
will have less incentive to catch up with the leader through more intense innovation if stiffer competition 
reduces the post-innovation rents that it can earn from catching up. This the authors refer to as the 
“Schumpeterian effect”. Adding up the innovation of the two firms, the sum total is less innovation 
than before.
Thus, one important prediction of the neo-Schumpeterian model is that product market competition 
should have a greater positive effect on innovation and productivity growth in industries where firms 
are more neck-and-neck, where the “escape competition” dominates over the “Schumpeterian effect”. 
Another prediction is that the relationship between competition and innovation is non-linear. At lower 
levels of competition, the “escape competition” effect dominates, so that more competition leads to 
more innovation. But at some point, competition becomes so fierce that the Schumpeterian effect 
becomes the dominant one, and the relationship turns negative. The result is an inverted-U shaped 
relationship between competition and innovation.
These are testable predictions. As illustrated by the chart below, Aghion et al. (2005) find evidence of 
the predicted inverted-U relationship when using data on patenting rates for UK manufacturing firms 
as a proxy for innovation. Also in line with the model they find that the shape of this relationship is 
different for firms that are close to the technological frontier and those that are not. The upward sloping 
section of the competition-innovation relationship is steeper for firms that are closer to the frontier 
than for the full sample. In other words, at moderate levels of competition, more competition has a 
stronger positive effect on innovation for firms engaging in more “neck-in-neck” competition with 
each other than for those further from the technological frontier. 
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Source:   Simplified chart based on Aghion et al. (2005)
5.5  Neo-Schumpeterian growth theory: Implications for Europe, part 1
Aghion et al.’s distinction between firms that are on the technology frontier and those that are behind 
it is particularly useful in order to understand Europe’s continuing innovative and productive gap vis-
à-vis the US and the role that competition may play as a driver of this gap. 
Europe was for a long time successful in narrowing its productivity gap with the US. In 1945, Europe’s 
stock of physical capital was partially destroyed and its technological knowledge was well behind that 
of the US. At that time, what Europe needed to grow was essentially to accumulate capital and adapt 
existing technologies by means of a high investment rate. The economic institutions and policies 
needed to foster economic convergence in this environment was limited product market competition, 
expansion of secondary education and an economy dominated by large bank-financed firms. Labour 
market flexibility and firm turnover were of secondary importance, since productivity depended on 
the accumulation of experience within existing firms.
For decades, Europe’s convergence towards US productivity was impressive, but the catching-up 
process stumbled before it was completed. As Europe’s technology gap to the global leader narrowed, 
its imitation-driven growth model became less and less capable of sustaining high growth. By the 
late-1980s, the advanced European countries had largely caught up with the world’s leaders in terms 
of capital intensity and productivity. They were closing in on the world technology frontier and it 
became increasingly important to innovate rather than imitate or adopt to achieve productivity gains. 
But for this, the European economic model was not well-tailored (Aghion 2006). 
Empirical evidence is supportive of this story. Acemoglu et al. (2006) draw on sectoral evidence to show 
that R&D intensity tends to be higher for countries that are closer to the technological frontier. An 
interesting observation is that R&D intensity increases in all industries when an economy gets closer 
to the technological frontier. This is not surprising, since all industries have to compete for the same 
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scarce resources, such as skilled labour. In a high-cost, high-productivity economy, the survival of all 
industries – and not just the most R&D intensive ones – depends on innovation. For each country and 
industry, distance to the frontier is here measured as the TFP gap vis-à-vis the global leader in that 
industry.
If there is sufficient competition we should also expect European countries to invest more in R&D, as 
they have over time moved closer to the world technological frontier. Also, within the EU we would 
expect the most advanced countries to invest more in R&D. But while the latter is true, the former is 
less so. Aggregate business spending on R&D remains remarkably constant over time. On average, the 
EU-15 countries spent around 1.9 percent of GDP on R&D in 1998-2007, compared with 3.2 percent in 
Japan and 2.6 percent in the US. Most of these differences are accounted for by business R&D, not by 
government or education sectors. R&D spending by the EU-15 business sector averaged 1.2 percent 
of GDP over the ten-year period, compared with 1.9 percent in the US and 2.4 percent in Japan.
On the basis of the previous discussion, one likely explanation for such non-convergence in business 
R&D spending is a lack of product market competition. As observed by the OECD (2009), product-market 
competition is less intense in Europe than in the US. This represented no impediment to growth so 
long as European firms were predominantly technological laggards. More intense competition would 
only have reduced European innovation rates during this period, by squeezing post-innovation rents 
that firms would earn from innovation. As Europe converged towards the global technological frontier, 
more industries became characterised by neck-and-neck competition between European firms and 
their US counterparts. In this situation, Europe’s less competitive environment began to weigh down 
on innovation (Aghion 2006).
5.6  Neo-Schumpeterian growth theory: Implications for Europe, part 2
Schumpeterian theory allows for a unique effect on innovation from the entry and exit of firms. The 
idea here is that increased entry, and increased threat of entry, enhance innovation and productivity 
growth because the threat of being driven out by a potential entrant gives incumbent firms an incentive 
to innovate in order to escape entry, through an effect that works much like the escape-competition 
effect discussed earlier. For this result to hold, it is necessary that new entrants replace incumbent 
firms, in other words that entry be associated with firm turnover.
The entry-threat effect is not equal for all firms, however. An increased threat of entry discourages 
innovation by incumbents that lie initially far behind the frontier. Under the assumption that new 
entrants come with a high level of technological sophistication, there is no way for relatively backward 
incumbents to match the entrant even if they do innovate. Firms close to the frontier, on the other 
hand, may be able to beat or scare off the potential entrant if they successfully innovate.
Aghion et al. (2005) test this hypothesis empirically on the basis of UK manufacturing data for the 
1980-93 period. They find that a higher entry-rate at the industry level indeed boosts average 
productivity growth of incumbent firms. They also confirm the model’s prediction that increased firm 
entry has a more positive effect on productivity (which here stands in as a proxy for innovation) in 
industries where the incumbents are close to the technological frontier.
As European firms are now closer to the global technology frontier, the positive effect on incumbent 
innovation and productivity from the threat of entry is greater than it used to be. By the same token, 
neglect of entry considerations has over time had an increasingly depressing effect on European 
growth. Evidence of firm turnover in Europe and the US suggests that there is room for improvement. 
For example, 12 percent of the largest US firms by market capitalisation at the end of the 1990s had 
been founded less than twenty years before, against only 4 percent in Europe (Aghion, 2006). 
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There is a wealth of empirical evidence that good management and productivity benefit from higher 
firm entry and exit (Bloom and Van Reenen 2005; Scarpetta et al. 2002; Brandt 2004). Existing firms are 
burdened by organisational rigidities that hamper their adoption of superior technologies. New firms 
seem particularly adept at exploiting new technological opportunities and responding to changing 
market needs. The beneficial role played by young innovative companies has been particularly notable 
in the ICT sector. Empirical evidence also shows that entry and exit of firms made a sizeable contribution 
to multifactor productivity growth in many OECD countries. Carree and Thurik (1998) found that a 
higher share of SMEs in the economy (proxying for young innovative companies even though the 
overlap is far from perfect) is robustly associated with higher growth in subsequent years. But the ease 
and speed with which new firms are created and grow varies substantially across OECD countries. 
While firm turnover plays an important part in US productivity growth, most productivity gains in 
Europe take place within existing firms (Nicoletti and Scarpetta 2003). This difference likely weighs 
down on Europe’s overall productivity growth.
5.7    Fostering innovation: the interaction between competition policy and intellectual 
property rights
Schumpeter pointed to the inherent conflict between competition and the need to make firms willing 
to invest in R&D. The goal of competition policy is to limit the market power and monopolistic profits 
of firms, yet some of the empirical evidence suggests that those profits are needed to encourage firms 
to invest in R&D. The solution to this conflict has essentially been to encourage competition in product 
markets while giving innovators proprietary rights to their inventions through patents and other 
intellectual property (IP) rights. In effect, market power that derives from IP is partly exempt from 
competition law. As stated in a recent US Supreme Court ruling: “[t]o safeguard the incentive to innovate, 
the possession of monopoly power will not be found unlawful unless it is accompanied by an element 
of anti-competitive conduct.”4 
This illustrates the complementary nature of competition policy and IP. Without competition policy, 
IP protection would give innovators free rein to sustain monopolistic positions, using R&D to create 
impenetrable barriers to entry. Competition without IP rights, on the other hand, would allow copying 
to undermine profits from innovation to the point where firms may have little reason to innovate. It 
should be said, however, that IP is not the only way to protect the rents from innovation. Lead time 
and secrecy can sometimes be more effective, depending on the nature of the industry and the 
innovation. Some have even argued that today’s patent laws survive primarily because of strong vested 
interests and a strong historical legacy, while their true economic value is unproven. The problem is 
that the long history and pervasiveness of IP has deprived the world of examples of the counterfactual. 
We do not really know how much innovation would occur in a world completely without IP.
6.  National innovation systems
Much of the theoretical and empirical literature discussed up to this point has taken the macroeconomic 
perspective. Also the policy prescriptions that emerge from this literature have to do with getting the 
big picture right. Innovation is stimulated in competitive, flexible and open economies with sound 
macroeconomic policies and a high level of human capital. But this is not necessarily enough. The 
process of innovation entails a highly complex interaction between a number of different elements. 
One important link in this process is the interaction between academic research and product market 
innovation. While many productivity-enhancing innovations have their origins in academic research, 
4    Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, US Supreme Court 2004.
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it is only through commercial application that this research has been able to affect the wider economy. 
Even with the broad macroeconomic frameworks in place, economies may still fail to reach their full 
innovation potential unless there are institutions in place that facilitate technology transfer from 
academic research to commercial innovation. Here there is a role for well-tailored IP rights protection 
that encourages the creation of new scientific knowledge and its commercialisation.
The literature on “national innovation systems” looks at this complex set of issues, with a particular 
focus on the character and intensity of the interactions between the different elements of the system 
(Freeman 1987; Cohen and Levinthal 1989; Lundvall 1992; Nelson 1993; Edquist and Chaminade 2006). 
According to this view, innovation depends crucially on the ability to combine new knowledge produced 
elsewhere with existing knowledge. New and commercially useful knowledge is not only the result of 
the conscious action of creative individuals but also of the interaction and learning processes among 
various actors in innovation systems, i.e. producers, users, suppliers, public authorities and scientific 
institutions, which David and Foray (1995) term the “knowledge distribution power” of the innovation 
system. These interactions represent the process through which knowledge spillovers influence 
economic growth, as detailed in the endogenous growth theory literature.
From the national innovation systems perspective, country differences with respect to innovation and 
growth might reflect not just different endowments in terms of labour, capital and the stock of 
knowledge, but also the efficiency of the innovation system. This is not that easy to measure empirically, 
however. Indicators may include measures of interactions, such as cooperative R&D agreements among 
firms, between firms and universities or the availability of venture-backed financing (see for example, 
Stern et al. 2000). The OECD (2004) has also made some attempts at linking economy-wide growth to 
policy and institutional variables.
7.  Concluding remarks
This paper set out to answer two key questions: How important is R&D and innovation for economic 
growth and what are the mechanisms that make firms invest in the accumulation of new knowledge? 
The empirical growth literature has confirmed that growth of the knowledge stock accounts for a large 
portion of growth in output per worker. Treating some of the knowledge stock as intangible capital 
that is proprietary to the investing firms does not fundamentally change this conclusion. At the same 
time the mechanisms that lead to the generation of this knowledge stock are complex. Policymakers 
in Europe recognise that sustained growth has become increasingly dependent on innovation as the 
economy has converged towards the global technological frontier. But efforts to boost Europe’s R&D 
have so far met with limited success and a substantial gap remains vis-à-vis Japan and the US. Even 
though the macroeconomic literature has acknowledged that R&D subsidies are justified to compensate 
for knowledge externalities, such incentives are likely of second order importance for the innovative 
business sector. 
It is becoming increasingly clear that the pace of innovation and the rate of productivity growth in 
Europe are unlikely to budge unless the incentives for innovation change fundamentally in the business 
sector. Such changes would have to take into account the role played by competition, the exit and 
entry of firms, and the ability of new innovative firms to expand quickly when successful. Innovation 
generates productivity gains primarily by allowing for a more efficient organisation of the economy, 
often combined with a reallocation of resources towards industries with higher growth prospects. An 
inflexible economy thus stands to squander many of the potential economic benefits stemming from 
the creation of new knowledge and innovation.
Country differences with 
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8.  An overview of this year’s EIB Papers
The contributions to this year’s volume of the EIB Papers reflect on key elements in the role of R&D 
and innovation in economic growth. These fit into three broad groups. The first looks at macroeconomic 
issues: investment in intangible capital and its impact on economic growth. The second analyses the 
microeconomics of innovation and the role of public policy. The third group, finally, focuses on the 
financing of innovation.
Starting off the macroeconomic discussion on the role of intangible capital and innovation in economic 
growth, Christian Helmers, Christian Schulte and Hubert Strauss, provide a review of R&D capital 
stock estimates in Europe, including new estimates for seven countries. While much of the policy 
debate on R&D has focused on the ratio of R&D expenditures to GDP, as with other types of productive 
capital it is the stock of knowledge that is an input in production. The R&D capital stock is the result 
of many years of R&D investment. Japan and the US have notably larger R&D capital stocks than the 
EU, relative to GDP, as a result of their consistently higher levels of R&D investment over many years. It 
would thus take many years of R&D expenditures on par with the Lisbon target before the bulk of the 
EU/US gap in R&D capital stocks was closed. The authors point to a dispersion in R&D capital stocks 
across individual European countries that is wider than for other factors of production. There is also 
little evidence of convergence in these R&D capital stocks over time. At the industry level, the authors 
highlight the positive correlation between R&D capital intensity and conventionally-measured TFP.
While R&D capital is a non-negligible component in total intangible capital, the latter is a broader 
concept. Bart van Ark, Charles Hulten, Janet Hao and Carol Corrado present a comprehensive 
perspective on the state of the art in the measurement of intangible capital and its contribution to 
economic growth. Building on earlier estimates of intangible capital for the US and several European 
countries, they extend the estimates of intangible investment and capital to five additional European 
countries: Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Greece and Slovakia. In addition to R&D, intangible 
investment here includes architectural designs, brand equity, organisational capital and firm-specific 
human capital. A key finding of this exercise is that the level of total intangible investment to GDP 
varies markedly across countries. In the US and some of the most advanced EU countries, investment 
in intangible capital in the business sector is broadly on par with investment in conventional tangible 
capital. Intangible investment is the highest in the US, at 11 percent of GDP, followed closely by the 
UK. In many European economies, however, investment in intangible capital remains far below 
investment in tangible capital. Properly accounting for intangible investment allows for a more accurate 
portrayal and understanding of the drivers of economic growth. Through its impact on the productive 
capital stock, intangible investment has made a substantial contribution to productivity growth in the 
US and a few other leading economies, though less so in many others.
Kieran Mc Morrow and Werner Röger take as their starting point the existing empirical literature on 
rates of return on R&D. These estimates are then used to interpret the economic significance of R&D 
in a calibrated semi-endogenous growth model. The main question addressed is to what extent 
different policy options could help narrow Europe’s productivity gap vis-à-vis the US. They find that 
stimulating R&D investment directly through subsidies is not nearly enough to achieve this goal, due 
to declining marginal efficiency in knowledge investment. Additional “framework policies” are therefore 
needed. Specifically, raising R&D subsidies and the supply of high skilled labour, and lowering entry 
barriers for start-ups, would reduce the EU-US productivity gap by around half. Additional measures 
to further narrow the transatlantic productivity gap would include improvements in the quality of 
higher education and liberalising Europe’s non-manufacturing sectors, such as services and 
agriculture.
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Turning to microeconomic issues and public policy support for innovation, Dirk Czarnitzki shows 
how cooperative R&D agreements can help foster more investment in R&D in the presence of knowledge 
spillovers. Cooperation in R&D allows the investing firms to internalise such spillovers, while also 
exploiting the economies of scale and scope of R&D. A pooling of risk and fixed costs can also broaden 
the research horizon of cooperating firms. This is particularly true for research that is closer to basic 
science, where the rents are typically harder to appropriate. On the basis of the existing empirical 
literature and new original results for Belgium and Germany, Czarnitzki finds that private firms 
collaborating with academia invest more in R&D than firms collaborating with other firms – even in 
the absence of subsidies – and that subsidies of such science-industry collaborations would boost R&D 
investment even further. However, Czarnitzki also points to the opportunity cost of these vertical 
collaborations and the subsidies that are used to foster them. To the extent that government funding 
is reallocated from basic research to subsidising science-industry collaborations, this could steer 
academic research in a more applied direction, thus undermining the complementarity between 
science and industry that made such collaboration valuable in the first place.
Continuing the policy discussion, Damien Ientile and Jacques Mairesse review the effectiveness of 
the R&D tax credit, whereby a company deducts part of its R&D expenditure from its tax bill. A number 
of studies estimating the direct effects of the tax credit on R&D investment point to mixed effects of 
such policies. While business R&D investment increases in all cases reviewed, one euro of taxpayer 
money sometimes leads to less than one euro of additional R&D. Specifically, there is notable variability 
across countries. The survey article also shows that the R&D tax credit increases the likelihood of firms 
starting own R&D activities and that it is conducive to higher innovation output such as the number 
of new products or their share in a beneficiary firm’s total sales. They point out that the best evaluation 
of the R&D tax credit would take into account the additional GDP generated by the additional R&D as 
well as all direct and opportunity costs of the measure.
The third type of policy support for R&D is through intellectual property rights. Patents have for a long 
time been used to strengthen the ability of innovative firms to appropriate the rents from their R&D 
investments. Since patents aim at the protection of existing scientific discoveries, they can and are 
often used as a proxy for the output of R&D.
Jérôme Danguy, Gaétan de Rassenfosse and Bruno van Pottelsberghe investigate the relationship 
between R&D expenditures and patent applications at the industry level. This relationship reflects 
both a productivity channel – i.e. R&D leads to inventions – and a “propensity-to-patent” channel, 
whereby firms in different countries and industries differ in their eagerness to protect their inventions. 
Firms seek patent protection either as a means (among others) to appropriate income from their IP or 
to make life difficult for competitors (“strategic propensity”). Danguy et al. find that more R&D does 
lead to more patents, but this relationship is not very strong. This suggests that the propensity to file 
for patent protection, as expressed by the stringency of IP rights protection and exposure to international 
markets, matters more than the productivity of R&D. Countries with strong IP rights rely more on the 
patent system, as do industries with high international exposure. Yet, a significant part of the dramatic 
increase in patent filings worldwide remains unaccounted for. The authors disentangle which countries 
and industries contribute most to this surge. They also demonstrate that the “global patent warming” 
reflects firms’ growing desire to extend national patents to the world market rather than an increase 
in national patent filings.
In addition to knowledge spillovers, public intervention to support R&D may also be justified by market 
failure in finance. Bronwyn Hall discusses the main theories and empirical evidence regarding the 
financing of innovation. Key questions addressed are whether new and/or innovative firms are 
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fundamentally different from established firms and whether they therefore require a different form 
of financing. She points to a large literature suggesting that this is indeed the case. First, intangible 
assets typically account for a larger portion of total assets in innovative firms. Such assets are less easily 
used as collateral when seeking external finance. Second, in the case of young innovative firms, these 
tend to be inherently riskier and have less of a track record. The particularly severe asymmetric 
information and agency problems that characterise such firms tend to make external finance costlier 
and more difficult to obtain. By addressing the information and incentive issues directly through better 
monitoring and risk sharing, equity financing in general – and venture capital in particular – tends to 
be the preferred form of external financing for such firms.
Laura Bottazzi expands the discussion on financing innovation with a review of the role of venture 
capital in financing new dynamic firms in Europe. Bottazzi finds that venture capital in Europe is not 
associated with particularly dynamic or successful companies, whether one looks at sales growth or 
employment. This stands in contrast to US experience, where venture capital has tended to accompany 
the formation and growth of dynamic companies. A key factor in the effectiveness of venture capital 
appears to be its own human capital. Human capital affects the level of activism of venture capitalists 
and thus the value added that they bring to the firms they invest in. This points to the importance of 
postgraduate education for the level of professionalism in the European venture capital industry. In 
the last decade, however, Europe has experienced new entrants in the industry, which seem to operate 
in a manner closer to the US investment style.
It is only through commercial application that most technological discoveries can affect the productivity 
of the wider economy. To the extent that scientific research is conducted in universities and specialised 
research institutions, successful commercialisation of technological discoveries requires linking scientific 
research to the wider business sector. This is what is commonly known as technology transfer. Jacques 
Darcy, Helmut Krämer-Eis, Dominique Guellec and Olivier Debande provide a mapping of the 
specific financial constraints, risks and asymmetric information problems that may impede such 
technology transfer. The scaling up of scientific research for commercial application requires large 
amounts of capital typically not available in the research community itself. But similar to venture capital, 
the financing of technology transfer entails more than just the provision of funds. If technology transfer 
is to take off in Europe, there is a need to tailor both intellectual property rights and financial instruments 
in such a way that the incentives, risks and rewards are optimally aligned between universities, inventors, 
entrepreneurs and investors.
The commercialisation of new technological discoveries in part suffers from a shortage of financing 
because intangible capital is more difficult to use as collateral. These problems would be alleviated 
with the development of a better market for technology. If patented knowledge could be bought and 
sold in a marketplace, then it would also become more attractive as collateral when seeking external 
finance. Dietmar Harhoff focuses on this issue. A key condition for patents to serve not only as 
intellectual property protection, but also as collateral, is that they have a residual market value outside 
the investing firm. European experience in this area has so far been mixed. Some intermediaries have 
attempted to provide external finance to innovative firms based on their patent portfolios. Patents 
have been used either as collateral, or as assets in patent funds seeking to commercialize the patent 
rights. Patent auctions are indicative of a nascent market for patented technology. Supported by 
changes in valuation techniques and accounting regulation, it seems likely that patent rights will 
increasingly be used as collateral in debt finance. The development of a liquid market for technology 
and the use of patents as collateral are complementary, but they depend crucially on an appropriate 
design of patent systems. Uncertain and questionable patent rights tend to hamper the development 
of markets for technology and the use of patents as collateral, which in turn drives up the cost of 
innovation finance.
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This study presents new estimates of business R&D 
capital  stocks  for  22  countries  at  the  aggregate 
and  industry  levels.  At  9  percent  of  GDP,  the  EU 
business  R&D  capital  stock  falls  short  of  its  US 
and  Japanese  counterparts.  Within  the  EU,  R&D 
capital  stocks  are  much  lower  in  the  southern  and 
the new member states, reflecting large and persistent 
disparities  in  R&D  expenditure.  There  was  hardly 
any  convergence  over  the  past  decade.  The  R&D 
capital  stock  is  concentrated  on  three  technology-
intensive manufacturing industries and is positively 
correlated  with  growth  in  total  factor  productivity 
across  countries  and  industries.  Finally,  the  ratios 
between  the  stocks  of  R&D  capital  and  tangible 
capital suggest marked differences in how R&D and 
tangible capital are combined in production. 
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Business R&D expenditure  
and capital in Europe
1.  Introduction
The economic literature has long recognized the importance of innovation and its organized production 
in the form of research and development (R&D) in fostering productivity (Arrow 1962; Griliches 1979; 
Romer 1990; Grossman and Helpman 1991; for an overview see Uppenberg 2009a, in this issue). One 
specific feature of knowledge is that it has public-good characteristics: non-excludability and non-
exhaustibility. This means that knowledge, whose producers incur private costs, can “spill over” to 
other private entities (Arrow 1962). In the presence of spillovers, increasing returns to scale can be 
achieved in production, translating into long-run economic growth (Romer 1990). 
Considering the eminent role attributed to R&D in promoting productivity growth, a country’s total 
R&D expenditure is widely regarded as an informative measure of its technological innovation capacity 
and, hence as one of the determinants of its long-run growth. Moreover, there is evidence for own 
R&D being important for the absorption of new knowledge produced by others (Cohen and Levinthal 
1989; Griffith et al. 2004). Thus a country’s own R&D expenditure is also regarded as a measure of its 
ability to benefit from international knowledge spillovers.
Conceptually, R&D is an input measure of innovation and does not necessarily reflect the actual amount 
of innovation produced. Indeed, producing an invention and turning it into a commercial success 
usually involves a considerable time lag and is subject to uncertainty. This means that the relation 
between R&D expenditure and resulting innovations – let alone productivity advances – is not easily 
identifiable. The economic literature has nevertheless extensively looked at the input side when 
assessing innovation activities of countries, industries and firms because finding good empirical 
measures of innovation outputs is challenging. R&D expenditure is the most precise and best-researched 
innovation input measure available so far, albeit not the most comprehensive one.1 
When firms develop new products and processes, they do not only build on knowledge acquired in 
the current year but use a large stock of knowledge accumulated inside and outside the firm over many 
years through basic research, experimental development, prototypes, and learning from past failures. 
Hence, just as for tangible capital, it is the size of the R&D capital stock rather than the last vintage of 
R&D expenditure that determines output in a given year. The R&D capital stock may be interpreted as 
the value of the business sector’s aggregate scientific and engineering knowledge. 
The principal motivation for measuring the stock of R&D capital is to assess its widely-recognised 
contribution to GDP growth. Yet, knowing the R&D capital stock requires treating R&D expenditure as 
an investment in the first place. The fundamental shift away from treating R&D as an intermediate 
input for firms towards treating it as an investment represents one of the major changes to the System 
of National Accounts agreed internationally in 2008 (European Commission et al. 2009, p. 206). The 
move has consequences for the estimated levels and growth rates of GDP, labour productivity and 
factor income shares.
1    For broad estimates of intangible capital, which also include brands, novel designs, firm-specific human capital and 
efficiency-enhancing innovations of firms’ organisational structures, and their role in productivity growth see van Ark et 
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This study gives a broad-brushed overview of R&D in Europe, the US and Japan, thereby zooming in 
on the business sector and focusing more on R&D capital stocks than on R&D expenditure. Acknowledging 
the conceptual and measurement problems surrounding the construction of R&D capital stocks, we 
present updated and new estimates of business R&D capital stocks for 22 countries at the industry2 
level. 
We uncover substantial variation in R&D capital stocks even across relatively homogenous industrialized 
economies. Differences exceed by far those in tangible capital and labour. There is hardly any sign of 
convergence in R&D capital stocks, both within the EU and between the EU, the US and Japan (the 
so-called triad). Throughout the triad, R&D capital stocks are concentrated on three broad manufacturing 
industries: Chemicals and pharmaceuticals, Transport equipment, and ICT and other equipment. 
Furthermore, we examine to what extent differences in estimated R&D capital stocks help understand 
diverging productivity dynamics across countries and industries. Finally, we illustrate how countries 
and industries differ with respect to how they blend R&D capital and tangible capital in producing 
output.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of trends and broad patterns 
of R&D expenditure in Europe. Section 3 presents estimates of R&D capital stocks and discusses their 
evolution over time as well as industry patterns. Section 4 illustrates factor input ratios by relating R&D 
capital stocks to the stocks of total tangible capital and of specific types of tangible assets. Section 5 
summarises the main findings and discusses some policy implications. Since the concepts presented 
in this article are quite technical, readers find a glossary of technical terms in Annex 1. 
2.  Business R&D expenditure in Europe: Trends and patterns
2.1  Total and business R&D: Stable over time and below target
At the summit in Lisbon in 2000, EU heads of state launched an ambitious strategy for growth and 
jobs, which has since been known as the Lisbon strategy. The main objective is to close Europe’s gap 
in productivity growth vis-à-vis the US and to make the EU economy the most productive and competitive 
economy in the world. To help governments reach this overarching goal, the strategy sets a number 
of quantifiable objectives in a wide range of policy fields relevant for GDP growth such as labour 
markets, product market competition, entrepreneurship, higher education, and research and 
innovation. 
One of the most visible Lisbon targets is that of increasing total R&D expenditure to 3 percent of GDP, 
with 2 percent of GDP coming from the business sector. It is also one of the targets that have been 
missed most markedly. Economy-wide, the EU has spent, on average, only 1.8 percent of GDP on R&D 
this decade, compared with 2.7 percent for the US and 3.2 percent for Japan (Figure 1). The breakdown 
of these figures by institutional sector indicates that the gap is in the business sector whereas R&D by 
governments and higher-education institutions is on par with the US and Japan. In 2007, Business 
expenditure on R&D (BERD) represented close to 1.2 percent of GDP. An increase by 70 percent would 
be required to meet the Lisbon objective of 2 percent of GDP. This is why we focus on business R&D 
from Sub-section 2.2 onwards. 
2    In this paper, “industry” refers to the branches of the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) or regional 
variants thereof (e.g. the NACE for Europe) and, hence, may refer to services as well as to manufacturing. By contrast, 
“sector” relates to institutional sectors of the national accounts such as households, non-financial corporations and the 
government. 
This study gives an 
overview of R&D in 
Europe, the US and 
Japan and presents new 
estimates of business 
R&D capital stocks.
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Figure 1.  R&D expenditure by sector (percent of GDP), 2000-07
EU US JP









Source:  Eurostat, own calculations
Not only was the EU missing the 2-percent target for BERD in the late 2000s but there is no sign that 
the Union has started moving towards the target over time. BERD in the EU has been stuck at about 
1.2 percent of GDP for more than a decade and there is no catching up with the US and Japan (Figure 2). 
On the contrary, Japan is speeding ahead. 
Figure 2.  Business R&D expenditure (percent of GDP), 1995-2007










Among the EU member states, only Finland and Sweden have total R&D expenditure above 3 percent 
of GDP, followed by Austria, Denmark and Germany at around 2 ½ percent (Annex 2). The apparent 
stagnation of R&D expenditure in the EU masks remarkable increases in some countries. For example, 
BERD has sharply increased in Austria and Denmark. Starting from a much lower level, Spain, Portugal 
and the Baltic countries have also recorded significant growth in BERD even though their total R&D 
expenditure is still at or below 1 percent of GDP. 
2.2  The EU is less R&D intensive than the US and Japan also at the industry level3
A natural question to ask in further diagnosing Europe’s comparatively low BERD is whether it persists 
at the level of individual industries. Indeed, Europe’s low overall BERD could reflect (i) low R&D intensity 
3    This section draws on and updates Uppenberg (2009b). 
The EU has not 
moved closer to the 
Lisbon target for R&D 
expenditure.
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– defined as BERD relative to value added – in most or all industries (R&D intensity effect), (ii) an industry 
composition effect whereby Europe might be specialised in industries relying less on formalized R&D, 
or (iii) a combination of (i) and (ii). 
In answering this question, it is useful to start by showing which industries spend most on R&D. Figure 3 
gives this information for the three economic zones of the triad. Three main insights emerge. First, 
three broad manufacturing-industry groups account for the brunt of R&D: Chemicals and pharmaceuticals 
(ISIC 24), Transport equipment (ISIC 34 and 35) and ICT and other non-transport equipment (ISIC 29 to 
33). These industries make up three quarters of aggregate BERD in the EU and even 80 percent in Japan 
although they produce less than one-tenth of GDP.4 Second, within these three leading industry groups, 
Japan’s R&D is more concentrated on ICT equipment than R&D in the EU and the US while Europe has 
a stronger focus on Transport equipment. Third, outside the three leading manufacturing industry 
groups, the US records a significant share of BERD – almost one third – in services whereas Japan spends 
a lot on other manufacturing.
Figure 3.  BERD by industry groups, EU, 2005
Transport equipment Chemicals and pharmaceuticals
Other industries Services Other manufacturing
ICT and other non-transport equipment
US Japan EU
Source:  OECD ANBERD, own calculations
However, a strong caveat must be put on international comparisons of BERD at the industry level. 
According to international conventions, R&D statistics should allocate each R&D activity to the targeted 
product field (e.g. a new computer) rather than the main activity (measured by turnover) of the R&D-
performing company. Moreover, R&D activities by specialised R&D service firms (ISIC 73) should be 
allocated to the industries purchasing these services. Countries differ as to whether they follow these 
conventions. This matters for the reported industry breakdown of BERD (Box 1). 
We therefore distinguish between three groups of countries by decreasing degree of comparability 
when comparing individual EU countries and their industry-level R&D data. Country group 1 comprises 
countries that follow the product field approach in collecting R&D data. These are Belgium, Finland, 
France, Sweden and the UK. We also include Germany and the Netherlands which, albeit following the 
main-activity approach, break down the R&D expenditure of their biggest R&D-performing companies 
by product field. The other countries collect BERD by companies’ main activity. Country group 2 
comprises countries that reallocate part or all of the BERD by R&D service firms to the consuming 
industries, most often located in manufacturing. All other countries are in Country group 3. The bulk 
of BERD in the EU is done in group-1 countries whereas the US and Japan fall into group 3. 
4    Because of their high R&D intensity, the individual industries in the three broad groups are all labelled as either high-
technology or medium-to-high-technology in the OECD’s classification of technology intensities in manufacturing while 
the remaining manufacturing industries are “low-technology” or “medium-to-low technology”. See Table A1 of Danguy et 




and ICT and other 
equipment industries 
account for three 
quarters of business 
R&D in the EU.
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Box 1.  Cross-country comparability of R&D data at the industry level
As stated in the main text, the comparability of industry-level R&D data is limited across countries 
because countries differ as to whether they follow the main-activity or the product-field approach 
in collecting R&D data from companies and compiling BERD at the industry level. 
How to treat the R&D activity of a large multi-product enterprise in the compilation of R&D statistics by 
industry? Consider the example of a corporation which achieves 75 percent of its sales in steel production 
(ISIC 271) whereas the remainder of its sales constitutes special purpose machinery (ISIC 292). R&D 
expenditure can now either be allocated entirely to the main activity of the company (ISIC 271) or be 
divided between its two activities according to the actual R&D expenditure in both fields. In practice, 
both ways of allocating R&D expenditure across industries exist. Another problem is how to allocate 
the activity of the R&D services industry (ISIC 73). In a number of countries, the practice has changed 
over time. Furthermore, data may not be available on an annual basis and for all industries in certain 
countries (e.g. Austria), for example due to a lack of annual surveys or confidentiality issues (OECD 
2009b).
While most of the R&D heavyweights among EU countries follow the product field approach, Japan 
and the US apply the main-activity approach. For the US, this leads to significant amounts of R&D 
expenditure being recorded in service industries. For example, the main activity of IBM is business 
services because it achieves most of its turnover in that industry. But since most of its R&D is devoted 
to developing new ICT equipment, the current practice gives a misleading picture of the kind of R&D 
carried out. 
The Czech Republic is the only country to publish data by product field and main activity (as from 
2004). Figure B1 shows the ratio of R&D expenditure by product field to that by main activity for 
2005. For example, the economy spends seven times as much on R&D in the field of transport, storage 
and communication than the R&D expenditure by firms mainly active in this industry (ISIC 60-64) 
suggests. Turning to the most R&D-intensive industries, the differences are small for Chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals and Transport equipment. In industry group ICT and other equipment, the main-
activity approach under-reports R&D in Electrical machinery and Medical and optical equipment 
(ratio above 1) while it over-reports R&D in Radio and TV, Machinery n.e.c. The difference is very large 
in Office and computing-machinery, the smallest industry in this group. All in all, differences are 
large for individual industries but using main-activity R&D numbers is relatively unproblematic for 
R&D-intensive industry groups. However, there is no guarantee that these conclusions from the 
Czech example hold for other countries. 
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With that caveat in mind, we now look at industry-level R&D intensities and industry composition in order 
to understand what accounts for Europe’s gap in overall BERD. In doing so, we focus on the three most 
R&D-intensive manufacturing industry groups. Figure 4 shows that the lower overall R&D intensity in the 
EU compared with the US and Japan applies to all three industry groups. The chemical and pharmaceutical 
industry of Japan spent 23 percent of its value added on R&D in 2005, compared with 18 percent and 
13 percent for their US and EU counterparts, respectively. Europe’s gap is even larger in ICT and other 
non-transport equipment industries. By contrast, it is small in Transport equipment where R&D intensities 
are broadly the same throughout the triad at between 15 and 18 percent. The first conclusion therefore 
is that the R&D intensity effect is at work in key industries. Arguably, this accounts for a good part of 
Europe’s gap in overall R&D expenditure vis-à-vis the US and Japan. 
Figure 4.  R&D intensity in technology-intensive industries in the triad, 2005








0 5 10 15 20 25
Source:  OECD ANBERD, Eurostat, own calculations
Nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean that lower R&D intensity accounts for all of the gap because 
differences in specialization might matter, too. This would be the case if the output of technology-intensive 
manufacturing industries were smaller in the EU compared with the US and Japan. Figure 5 shows the 
share of each industry group’s value added in aggregate value added for the EU, the US and Japan. When 
measured at current prices – as is done in the left half of Figure 5 – technology-intensive manufacturing 
contributed 8 percent to aggregate value added in the EU, more than in the US (6 percent) but less than 
in Japan (10 percent). Thus, it seems that the EU is more specialized in technology-intensive manufacturing 
production than the US and, hence, that the gap vis-à-vis the US is entirely due to lower industry R&D 
intensities.
However, things look different when basing the analysis on real value added. The right half of Figure 5 
depicts each industry’s contribution to real value added, i.e. value added in prices of 1995. From this 
perspective, the EU is less specialized than the US in technology-intensive manufacturing (share of 9 percent 
compared with 12½ percent) while Japan continues to be most specialized (16 percent). The difference 
between real and nominal shares stems from ICT and other non-transport industries and is particularly 
pronounced in the US and Japan but small for the EU. This is because within this broad industry group, 
the US and Japan are specialized on ICT-equipment production where prices decline much faster than in 
other industries such as machine-tools and optical instruments. Since these price declines are themselves 
to a large extent technology-driven and, hence, dependent on R&D, it makes sense to assess the industry’s 
contribution to the level of GDP on real value added.5 Closer inspection of the right half of Figure 5 suggests 
that the share in real value added of ICT and other non-transport equipment is significantly smaller in the 
EU than in the US and in Japan, pointing to an industry composition effect alongside the R&D intensity 
effect mentioned above. 
5    By contrast, nominal value added is more appropriate to assess the resource cost of R&D as compared to other inputs.
Lower R&D intensity in 
individual industries 
accounts for a good part 
of Europe’s R&D gap vis-
à-vis the US and Japan...
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Note:    In the left half of the figure, the share of each industry is defined as the ratio of the industry’s nominal value added to 
aggregate value added. In the right half of the figure, the share of each industry is defined as the ratio of the industry’s 
real value added to aggregate real value added. 
All in all, this section has shown that R&D expenditure in the EU lags behind that in the US and Japan, 
which is attributable to the business sector rather than the government sector. There has been no sign 
of the EU catching up with the other areas of the triad over the past 15 years. BERD is heavily concentrated 
on three technology-intensive manufacturing industry groups: Transport equipment, ICT and other 
equipment, and Chemicals and pharmaceuticals. The lower R&D intensities in the latter two and the 
modest size of Europe’s ICT-producing industries account for most of the shortfall in overall BERD. 
3.  Business R&D capital stocks: New evidence at the country and industry levels
As stated in the introduction, deriving R&D capital stocks from annual investment flows allows to 
approximate a country’s or an industry’s scientific and engineering knowledge with a single number. It 
is a necessary step in using R&D in the analysis of economic growth.6 This section first presents estimates 
of R&D capital stocks for the business sectors of 22 countries and illustrates how they have evolved over 
time. It then discusses how the stocks are distributed across industries and to what extent productivity 
is associated with R&D capital. 
3.1  Estimates of aggregate business R&D capital stocks
In general terms, the capital stock (K) is a function of all past and current investment (I) and of depreciation. 
Specifically, the capital stock today equals the part of last year’s capital stock that survives – that is, the 
part that has not depreciated – plus current investment – here the R&D expenditure of the current year. 
This is the intuition of the perpetual-inventory method, which can be written as:
Kt=Kt−1 1−d ( ) + I t
where d denotes the depreciation rate and subscripts t and (t-1) stand for the current and previous year, 
respectively. The computation of R&D stocks is conceptually straightforward but it is fraught with practical 
challenges (Box 2).
6    Ideally, the analysis should go one step further. As with capital services (OECD 2009a), the ideal input indicator for GDP 
accounting is R&D capital services. Their use is complicated by varying estimates of returns to R&D. In using R&D capital 
stocks, we assume that they are proportional to R&D capital services, thereby abstracting from cyclical fluctuations and 
assuming a geometric depreciation pattern. 
…but the smaller 
scale of ICT equipment 
production also plays a 
role.
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Box 2.  Assumptions made in computing R&D capital stocks
The construction of R&D capital stocks raises the same practical questions and difficulties that are 
known from the construction of tangible capital stocks. First, should all R&D expenditure be treated 
as investment? Second, the choice of the depreciation rate has an impact on the level of the R&D capital 
stock but little is known about the “service lives” of industrial R&D projects. Third, the initial R&D capital 
stock is unknown. A final problem is deflation: R&D investment of different years can only be added if 
adjusted for changes in the price of R&D over time. This box discusses these four issues in turn. 
Capitalization rate. It is assumed that 100 percent of R&D expenditure represents investment. At first 
glance, this seems to be a bold assumption. Nevertheless, business R&D is carried out mainly to increase 
profits in the medium and long term. R&D expenditure therefore fits the definition of investment as 
“any use of resources that reduces current consumption in order to increase it in the future” (Corrado 
et al. 2005, p. 19). Assuming that all R&D expenditure is undertaken to generate an economic benefit 
to the firm, it is justified to fully capitalize R&D expenditure. This is also in line with the guidelines of 
the System of National Accounts 2008.
Depreciation rate. There is no consensus about the appropriate depreciation rate. We use a 12 percent 
rate that is constant across industries, countries and time. This assumption implies that if a country 
completely stopped investing in R&D, its R&D capital stock would be halved within five and a half years. 
We opt for this depreciation rate to be consistent with the existing R&D capital stock estimates of 
EUKLEMS on which we build (O’Mahony et al. 2008, p. 12). Indeed, the choice of an appropriate rate is 
not straightforward as only few and divergent studies are available. A depreciation rate of 12 percent 
lies at the lower end of rates used in the literature. In an overview, Mead (2007) finds plausible rates 
between 12 and 20 percent. Van Ark et al. (2009) quote a range between 11 and 26 percent and use a 
rate of 20 percent in their estimates. The high variation in depreciation rates partly stems from different 
methods (e.g. patent renewal or market valuation models), none of them being completely satisfying. 
Moreover, in line with O’Mahony (2008) and van Ark et al. (2009), we do not account for potential 
differences in depreciation across industries, countries or over time because estimates in the literature 
are not converging. If anything, some tentative evidence is available for differences across industries. 
Starting in 2007, the US statistical authority has been writing off R&D capital in Transport equipment 
somewhat faster (18 percent) and that in Chemicals and pharmaceuticals somewhat more slowly 
(12 percent) than R&D capital in other industries, for which a rate of 15 percent is applied (Mead 2007). 
Initial capital stock. The initial capital stock is calculated by extrapolating R&D expenditure growth of 
the initial years back to the past. Ideally, one should use a long time series and assume an initial capital 
stock of zero. Since time series of R&D expenditure are relatively short, we follow the strategy used by 
EUKLEMS. We calculate the average expenditure growth rate of the first seven years with available data 
and assume that this growth rate prevailed in the past. Taking depreciation into account, an initial 
capital stock is calculated for the first year of available data. The impact on the initial capital stock of 
violating this assumption diminishes over time. To illustrate, assume that (i) the initial capital stock 
obtained through the described procedure is 100, (ii) the true (but unknown) initial stock is 120, and 
(iii) R&D expenditure is equal to 12 in every year with available data. In year 7, the measured R&D capital 
stock is still 100 while the true one has come down to 108, converging to 100 over time. To be on the 
safe side, we do not show the R&D capital stocks obtained from the first seven years of R&D expenditure 
data. 
Deflator of R&D expenditure. As EUKLEMS, we use the GDP deflator. Alternatively, one could combine 
labour costs and output price indices of relevant industries in order to account for extraordinary 
productivity gains in “producing” R&D. For an overview and practical problems, see Fraumeni and 
Okubo (2005).
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This study covers all OECD countries with available data. In terms of cross-country comparability, the 
best data source for R&D expenditure at the industry level is the OECD’s Analytical database on Business 
expenditure on R&D (ANBERD). This data source has also been used by the EUKLEMS project in the 
computation of R&D capital stocks up to 2003 (EUKLEMS 2008). We use these R&D capital stocks and 
extend them to 2005 for some countries and to 2006 for others, thereby taking advantage of the most 
recent release of ANBERD (OECD 2009b). Moreover, we estimate R&D capital stocks for seven more 
countries: Austria, Greece, Hungary, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Turkey. In total, we get estimates 
for 22 countries: the US, Japan, Turkey as well as 19 EU countries. The latter cover about 95 percent of 
EU GDP and an even higher share of EU BERD, allowing for the calculation of EU aggregates. Further 
details about the data sources are given in Annex 3. 
Figure 6 below illustrates the results in their most aggregate way. The business R&D capital stock in 
the EU was equal to 9 percent of total real value added7 in 2005 against 11½ percent in the US and 
16 percent in Japan. Put differently, production is more R&D capital intensive in the US than in the EU 
and is even more R&D capital intensive in Japan. Akin to R&D intensity in Section 2, we refer to R&D 
capital intensity when expressing the R&D capital stock as a ratio of the size of the economy, notably 
of value added (also see Annex 1). 












Source:  EUKLEMS, OECD ANBERD, own calculations
Europe’s low R&D capital intensity masks dramatic cross-country differences, which are shown in 
Figure 7. Overall, R&D capital is thinly spread throughout the southern and eastern parts of the EU. In 
2005, the business R&D (BERD) capital stock represented 20 percent of value added in Sweden, around 
15 percent in Finland and Austria but only 1 to 2 percent in Poland and Greece. A range from 1 to 20 
is clearly in excess of the range of international differences in the use of other factors of production 
such as tangible capital and labour. As to the countries for which we present first estimates ever, 
business R&D capital stocks in 2005 were below the EU average in all of them except in Austria: 
5.9 percent in Slovenia, 5.1 percent in the Czech Republic, 3.2 percent in Slovakia, 2.5 percent in Hungary, 
1.8 percent in Portugal and 1 percent in Turkey. Another finding of our analysis is that more than 
90 percent of the EU R&D capital stock is located in the western and northern EU countries. 
7    In relating aggregate business R&D capital stocks to the size of the economy (i.e. output), we use aggregate real value 
added rather than real GDP in order to be consistent with the industry detail presented in Figure 4 and in Sub-sections 
3.3, 3.4, 3.5 and 4.2. The two concepts are slightly different and, hence, the numbers of aggregate value added and GDP 
are not the same. For one thing, value added is evaluated at basic prices, GDP at market prices. What is more, the deflators 
used to obtain real measures are not the same for value added and GDP. As capital stocks are a real concept, we always 
divide them by real value added when discussing R&D capital intensities.
We present first 
estimates ever of 
R&D capital stocks 
for Austria, Greece, 
Hungary, Portugal, 
Slovakia, Slovenia  
and Turkey.
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Source:  EUKLEMS, OECD ANBERD, own calculations
3.2  Convergence and divergence of R&D capital stocks in the EU
To illustrate how persistent differences in the level of R&D expenditure translate into diverging R&D 
capital stocks, Figure 8 sets each country’s business R&D capital stock equal to 100 in 1995, thus 
abstracting from its size relative to the economy or to other countries’ stocks. For selected EU countries, 
the figure shows how the index evolves over time compared to each country’s own starting position. 
Countries that swiftly increased their R&D expenditure saw their R&D capital stocks expand over the 
past decade, sometimes by 100 percent or more (Finland, Denmark, Spain and Sweden). However, R&D 
capital stocks have expanded only by 20 to 30 percent in the EU’s largest economies, with the pace of 
expansion falling slightly short of the EU average in France and Germany and staying more significantly 
behind in Italy and the UK. 
Figure 8.  R&D capital stocks of EU countries, 1995-2006



















Source:  EUKLEMS, OECD ANBERD, own calculations
Note:    For each country, the R&D capital stock in 1995 is set equal to 100.
It takes a combination of the two views presented above – the size of the R&D capital stock relative to 
the economy and the evolution of R&D capital stocks over time – to make statements about whether 
EU countries converge or diverge in terms of R&D capital intensity. This is done in Figure 9, which 
depicts the R&D capital stock as a share of value added in 1995 on the horizontal axis and the change 
The low EU R&D capital 
stock masks huge 
differences: Sweden is 
20 times as R&D capital 
intensive as Greece.
VOL_1_02_EIB_Papers_Vol_14_Nr_1_STRAUSS.indd   46 23/12/09   14:48:30EIB  PAPERS           Volume14  N°1   2009            47
in that ratio during the subsequent decade on the vertical axis. The cross-lines represent the EU average 
for each dimension. They cut the figure into four areas. Countries in the upper-left area (e.g. Belgium) 
are catching up. They had below-average R&D capital stocks in 1995 but stocks have since grown faster 
than the EU average. Countries in the upper-right area are speeding ahead. A drastic example is Sweden. 
Already in 1995, it had Europe’s largest R&D capital stock. Nevertheless, it recorded one of the strongest 
increases in that stock during the following decade. Below the horizontal line are countries with R&D 
capital stocks expanding more slowly than the EU average in the past decade, either because they are 
losing steam from a strong position (lower-right area) or because they are falling further behind the 
EU average (lower-left area). If all dots were aligned on a downward sloping line or at least situated in 
the upper-left and lower-right areas of the figure, countries would be converging. Conversely, all dots 
being aligned on an upward-sloping line would signal divergence. 
There has been hardly any convergence in R&D capital stocks between EU countries since 1995. True, 
six out of 13 EU countries are in the catching-up area while four are in the divergence zone with two 
speeding ahead (Germany and Sweden) and two falling behind (Italy and the UK). France, Greece and 
the Netherlands expanded their R&D capital stocks in line with the EU average and, hence, were neither 
converging nor diverging. Yet, a closer look at the countries in the catching-up area calls for a distinction 
between countries close to the average and those far behind. The close followers (Belgium, Denmark 
and Finland) overtook the EU average during 1995-2005 and are now actually speeding ahead. 
In contrast, the true laggards’ progress has been so slow that at the current pace it will take decades 
before they reach the EU average. Besides, the new EU member states are not shown in this picture 
due to missing data for 1995 but they further increase the number of countries far behind the EU 
average, for which convergence to the EU’s average R&D capital intensity cannot be taken for granted 
and would, in any case, be a matter of decades, not years. Finally, the figure shows that the EU as a 
whole has fallen behind compared to Japan but has marginally caught up with the US. 
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Source:  EUKLEMS, OECD ANBERD, own calculations
Note:    The vertical line represents the R&D capital stock of the EU in 1995 (13 countries with available data) and the horizontal 
line the cumulative change of this stock. The intersection of the lines represents the data point for the EU.
There is hardly any 
convergence in R&D 
capital stocks within  
the EU.
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As R&D capital is deemed an important input in production in advanced economies, one would expect 
marked cross-country differences in the size of R&D capital stocks to shape countries’ comparative 
advantage in technology-intensive manufacturing. This should especially be the case if higher R&D 
intensity of a given industry in one country is conducive to higher productivity of that industry compared 
with its counterparts in other countries. The connection between R&D capital and productivity will be 
shown in Sub-section 3.4 below. 
A comprehensive policy discussion on whether it is sensible to design policies that speed up 
convergence in national R&D capital stocks and whether governments in lagging EU countries are 
doing enough to that end is beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it here to note that full 
convergence is unlikely to happen by itself because of the spillovers implied by knowledge-intensive 
activities and the resulting tendency for these activities to cluster in space. As a consequence, aiming 
at full convergence by all means would be very costly. Nevertheless, the economic literature on R&D 
stresses that R&D capital is not only needed in the most advanced economies to push the technology 
frontier further out. It is also required for lagging countries to catch up with the frontier since 
understanding and imitating new technological developments requires at least some domestic R&D 
activity (Griliches and Lichtenberg 1984; Griffith et al. 2003 and 2004; Cameron et al. 2005; Acemoglu 
et al. 2006). In line with these considerations, recent policy simulations find that countries with low 
R&D capital intensity would benefit the most from R&D-promoting and skill-upgrading policies 
(D’Auria et al. 2009).
3.3  The distribution of R&D capital stocks across industries
This section has so far taken a bird’s eye view on R&D capital stocks. We now ask where in the economy 
the R&D capital stock is actually located, as it was done for R&D expenditure in Sub-section 2.2 above. 
We answer the question for the EU as a whole before considering intra-EU differences. 
Figure 10 depicts the estimated R&D capital stocks for the three zones of the triad and breaks the total 
down by large industry groups. There are two main insights, both broadly in line with Figure 3 above. 
First, about three quarters of the total R&D capital stock are located in three industries: Chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals, Transport equipment and ICT- and other equipment. 
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Other industries Services Other manufacturing
ICT and other non-transport equipment Transport equipment Chemicals and pharmaceuticals
Source:  EUKLEMS, OECD ANBERD, own calculations
Convergence is unlikely 
to happen by itself as 
knowledge-intensive 
activities tend to 
cluster in space due to 
spillovers.
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Second, the comparison between the EU and each of Japan and the US suggests that only one industry 
group accounts for the differences in economy-wide R&D capital intensities. In particular, the difference 
between the EU and Japan is mainly due to Japan’s high stock of R&D capital in ICT-producing industries. 
In turn, the difference between the EU and the US seems to be due to higher R&D capital stocks in the 
US services industries. This latter result, however, should be taken with a pinch of salt due to the 
comparability issues of industry-level R&D data discussed in Sub-section 2.2 above. Redistributing 
some of the US R&D capital stock from services to manufacturing would bring the industry breakdown 
in line with that in the EU. This suggests that the EU-US gap results from higher R&D capital intensity 
throughout the US economy. 
Turning to intra-EU differences, countries differ not only with respect to the overall size of their R&D 
capital stocks but also with respect to the industry structure of these stocks. Figure 11 depicts the ratio 
of the total R&D capital stock to real value added (height of the bars) like Figure 7 above. In addition, it 
shows how much each industry group contributes to that ratio (height of the individual colour segments). 
Countries are sorted into two groups whereby data comparability is highest in Country group 1 and lower 
in Country group 2, as described in Sub-section 2.2 above. The other countries (group 3) are not shown 
since their industry-level R&D data are hardly comparable with those of countries in groups 1 and 2. 












JP US EU-27 
Real GVA 
(prices of 1995)
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Other industries (up to 100%) Business services Other manufacturing
ICT and other equipment Transport equipment Chemicals and pharmaceuticals
Other industries Services Other manufacturing
ICT and other non-transport equipment Transport equipment Chemicals and pharmaceuticals
Country group 1 Country group 2
Source:  EUKLEMS, OECD ANBERD, own calculations
Note:    Country group 1 contains countries with high degree of international comparability of industry-level R&D data. 
Countries in Country group 2 are less comparable but comparability is higher than for group-3 countries, which 
are not shown. See Sub-section 2.2 and Box 1 for details.
The seven countries in Country group 1 cover the lion’s share of the R&D capital stock in the EU and 
are therefore fairly representative for the EU total in terms of industry structure. The frontrunners 
Sweden and Finland have huge R&D capital stocks in industries producing ICT and other non-transport 
equipment, both compared with R&D capital stocks in other industries and with the size of the overall 
economy. They also display larger R&D capital stocks in services. While R&D in Finland is concentrated 
on ICT equipment, Sweden has a more balanced industry composition of R&D capital. Sizeable R&D 
capital stocks in ICT-equipment industries are observed for France and Germany, too, but they are 
matched by the R&D capital stocks in Transport equipment. In Belgium and the Netherlands, in turn, 
the chemical and pharmaceutical industry is the most important and second-most important host of 
R&D capital, respectively, alongside ICT and other non-transport equipment. 
The difference between 
the EU and Japan is due 
to Japan’s high R&D 
capital stock in ICT-
producing industries.
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Denmark is the only R&D-capital-intensive EU country in group 2. Chemicals and pharmaceuticals is the 
largest contributor in manufacturing. Services seem to be important, too, even though part of this might 
just be due to the main-activity approach in R&D data collection. Finally, we find that the broad industry 
structure of R&D capital in Hungary resembles that of Belgium, with Chemicals and pharmaceuticals 
being the main and ICT and other non-transport equipment the second contributor. 
One should bear in mind that the industry contributions to aggregate R&D capital stocks shown in 
Figures 10 and 11 might be affected by industry-composition effects: if a given industry is equally R&D 
capital intensive in two countries but is larger (relative to GDP) in country A than in country B, the industry 
contributes more to the total R&D capital stock in country A than its counterpart in country B. 
3.4  R&D capital stocks and productivity
As R&D capital is arguably an important factor of production in advanced economies, the marked 
cross-country differences both in the size and the industry composition of R&D capital stocks could 
shape countries’ comparative advantage in technology-intensive manufacturing. We now look at the 
association between productivity and R&D capital stocks to see whether the latter could be a source 
of dynamic comparitive advantage. 
Accounting for labour and tangible capital alone leaves a significant part of GDP growth unexplained 
(Solow 1956). The growth-accounting literature documents that the contribution to labour productivity 
growth of total factor productivity (TFP) is indeed large (see Uppenberg 2009a). TFP is a summary 
index of the overall efficiency with which capital and labour are combined in producing output and, 
hence TFP growth measures the gains in this efficiency. When TFP is estimated in a conventional 
growth-accounting framework featuring only labour and tangible capital, the resulting TFP levels are 
likely to be correlated with factors omitted from the accounting. R&D capital stocks are one of these 
factors. For example, firms that obtain an innovative production process from investment in R&D may 
enhance their productivity without a need to increase labour or tangible capital. 
Figure 12 illustrates that there is indeed a positive link between R&D capital and conventional TFP at 
the industry level. It plots average annual TFP growth over the 15-year period 1991-2005 (vertical axis) 
against R&D capital intensity (horizontal axis) at the beginning of that period for 13 manufacturing 
industries and nine countries for which TFP data are available: Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the UK and the US. The scatter plot suggests a positive association between 
initial R&D capital intensity and subsequent TFP growth at the industry-level across countries. The 
correlation coefficient of 0.34 is significant, based on a country-industry sample cleaned for a few 
extreme outliers, i.e. country-industry pairs with average annual TFP growth rates larger than 20 percent 
or less than -5 percent. But the graph also suggests considerable heterogeneity across countries and 
industries, both in terms of TFP growth and of initial R&D capital intensity. A number of industries 
achieve rapid TFP growth while some others are characterised by a decline in TFP over the sample 
period.8 R&D capital intensities are also strongly dispersed, with R&D capital stocks ranging from near 
zero to the equivalent of two years’ value added.9 Overall, TFP growth tends to be higher in more R&D 
capital intensive industries. 
8  The industry with the sharpest drop in TFP is Coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuel in Japan and the US. The fastest 
growing industries in the sample are ICT and other non-transport equipment in Japan, Wood and products of wood and 
cork in Finland and Chemicals and pharmaceuticals in Germany.
9  The lowest R&D capital intensities are in Wood and products of wood and cork and in Textiles and leather products in 
Italy. The highest R&D intensities are in Transport equipment and in ICT and other equipment in the Netherlands, the US, 
France and the UK.
There is a positive 
correlation between the 
R&D capital stock and 
subsequent TFP growth 
at the industry level.
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The positive correlation between R&D capital intensity and TFP growth comes as no surprise in light 
of a large body of theoretical endogenous-growth models attributing knowledge a key role in generating 
long-run growth. It has also been confirmed in the empirical literature assessing the link between R&D   
capital stocks and TFP growth at the industry level. A classic reference is the study for the US by Griliches 
and Lichtenberg (1984) that examines the relation between privately funded R&D capital intensity and 
TFP for the manufacturing industry in the 1960s and 1970s. Notably, they find average TFP growth to 
be higher in relatively more R&D-intensive industries.10 
Figure 12:  The connection between R&D capital stocks and productivity


























R y = -0,0375x + 0,2
R￿ = 0.16;  p-value of slope coefficients = 0.13





























































R&D capital intensity, 1991
Source:  EUKLEMS, OECD ANBERD, own calculations
Note:    Each dot represents a country-industry pair from a sample of 13 manufacturing industries in nine countries with 
available data from 1991 to 2005. TFP is taken from EUKLEMS’ growth accounting results based on double-deflated 
value added and accounting for hours worked, labour quality and various types of tangible capital. R&D capital 
intensity is the industry-specific ratio of R&D capital stock (our estimates) to real value added (from EUKLEMS).
3.5  Summing up
This section has presented new and updated estimates of business R&D capital stocks for 22 countries. 
The EU business R&D capital stock at 9 percent of GDP falls short of its US and Japanese counterparts, 
mostly due to much lower R&D capital intensity in industries producing ICT and other non-transport 
equipment. What is more, the R&D capital stock is geographically concentrated in the western and 
northern EU countries but scarce in southern EU countries and in the new member states. While all 
countries with above-average overall R&D capital stocks have substantial R&D capital in ICT and other 
non-transport equipment, some of them are R&D-intensive in Transport equipment or in Chemicals 
and pharmaceuticals, too. These marked cross-country differences are likely to shape countries’ 
comparative advantage in technology-intensive manufacturing.
This section has discussed R&D capital intensities, that is, the ratio of R&D capital to output in an industry 
or in the economy at large. Further insights are gained by relating R&D capital stocks to the stocks of 
tangible capital, i.e. to other inputs. This is done next. 
10  Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2004) compute industry capital stocks differentiated by sources of their funding (private 
domestic, public and foreign) and compare their impacts on TFP. For a derivation of TFP measures in country-industry 
growth regressions accounting for labour, tangible capital and our estimates of R&D capital stocks and controlling for 
cross-sectional dependence see Eberhardt et al. (2010).
The R&D capital stock 
is concentrated in the 
western and northern 
EU countries but scarce 
in southern EU countries 
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states.
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4.  R&D capital and tangible capital
We now change the perspective and analyze the R&D capital ratio, which we define as the ratio of 
the R&D capital stock to the stock of tangible capital. By tangible capital, we refer to all asset types 
for which gross fixed capital formation is reported in the national accounts. It includes transport 
vehicles, ICT equipment, other machinery and equipment, residential constructions and non-
residential structures, and some assets that are, strictly speaking, intangible such as software and 
expenditure on mineral exploration. R&D capital ratios are presented both for total tangible capital 
and for selected asset types. Again, we first look at countries as a whole and then take an industry 
perspective. 
4.1  Economy-wide R&D capital ratios
Figure 13 shows that the EU business R&D capital stock is equal to 3 percent of its total stock of tangible 
capital. The EU has the lowest R&D capital ratio within the triad. This is as expected given the gap in 
R&D capital discussed above. More surprisingly, however, the US R&D capital ratio is virtually at par 
with Japan’s 4½ percent. This is because Japan’s considerably higher R&D capital stock (relative to 
value added) is matched by a higher stock of tangible capital. Indeed, in 2005, Japan’s aggregate output 
was produced with a tangible capital stock roughly 3½ times the size of GDP, compared with 2½ times 
GDP in the US. 
Figure 13.  R&D capital ratios (percent of total tangible capital), 2005
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Source:  EUKLEMS, OECD ANBERD, own calculations
Note:    Total tangible capital refers to all asset types for which gross fixed capital formation is reported in the national 
accounts.
Again, there are considerable cross-country differences within the EU, too. The range of R&D capital 
ratios spans from 0.5 percent in Portugal to 8.2 percent in Sweden and, hence, broadly matches that 
of R&D capital intensities. Nevertheless, there are notable differences in the ranking of countries from 
the one shown in Figure 7 above. For instance, the UK is now a close neighbour to Germany, which 
spends considerably more on R&D but also on tangible capital. In addition to the ranking, some of the 
cross-country differences in the size of the R&D capital ratios are surprisingly large, others surprisingly 
small. Take the two European R&D frontrunners, Sweden and Finland, for example. Sweden has almost 
twice the R&D capital ratio of Finland because it uses less tangible capital in production. All in all, the 
connection between total business R&D capital stocks and total tangible capital appears to be rather 
loose. 
The EU R&D capital stock 
is equal to 3 percent of 
the aggregate stock of 
tangible capital.
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Breaking down total tangible capital into several asset classes and looking at specific R&D capital ratios 
(i.e. R&D capital ratios with respect to each asset class) delivers further evidence that a given stock of 
R&D capital might be associated with any stock of tangible assets. To see this, we divide the R&D capital 
stock by the aggregate stocks of certain types of tangible assets. We consider the following three asset 
types:11 ICT and software, other machinery and equipment and non-residential structures.12  It is 
important to note the change in perspective. This is not about R&D in the industries producing certain 
capital goods (as in Section 3) but about the economy-wide stock of a certain type of tangible asset 
such as ICT and software. 
Figure 14 depicts the R&D capital ratio with respect to these three asset types. The following insights 
emerge. First, the EU business R&D capital stock is equal to 40 percent of its aggregate stock of ICT and 
software, about one quarter of its stock of other machinery and equipment and some 8 percent of its 
stock of non-residential structures. Second, there are deviations from the familiar R&D ranking “Japan 
first, US second and Europe third”. On the one hand, the US economy uses ICT so intensively that the 
US R&D capital ratio with respect to ICT and software is less than half that of Japan and even lower 
than that of the EU. On the other hand, the US stocks of other machinery and equipment and of non-
residential structures are so small relative to the US economy that the US R&D capital ratios with respect 
to each of these two asset types are higher than their counterparts in Japan despite Japan’s considerably 
higher R&D capital intensity. 
Figure 14.  R&D capital ratios with respect to specific types of tangible capital (percent), 2005
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Source:  EUKLEMS, OECD ANBERD, own calculations
Note:    Each bar represents the ratio of a country’s R&D capital stock in percent of the stock of a specific tangible asset.
Third, also within the EU, the pattern of specific R&D capital ratios differs from what is expected given 
the distribution of R&D capital stocks alone. As far as the R&D capital ratio with respect to ICT and software 
is concerned, Germany is at par with the more R&D-capital-intensive countries Finland and Austria, 
suggesting that production in Germany is less ICT-intensive. Moreover, we find an unlikely similarity in 
R&D capital ratios between the UK on the one hand and Denmark and Italy on the other, which in 
comparison to the UK points to higher ICT intensity in Denmark but lower ICT intensity in Italy. 
11    EUKLEMS  distinguishes  the  following  asset  types:  information  technology,  communication  technology,  software, 
transport vehicles, other machinery and equipment, residential constructions and non-residential structures. We lump 
the first three into “ICT and software”. We exclude residential constructions, which are not part of the productive capital 
stock. We also omit the stock of transport vehicles. 
12    Non-residential  structures  include  buildings  (warehouses,  industrial  and  commercial  buildings,  hotels,  restaurants, 
educational and health buildings etc.) and other structures (e.g. highways and roads, railways, airfield runways, tunnels, 
waterways, harbours, long-distance pipelines and cables). 
The EU business R&D 
capital stock is about 
40 percent the stock 
of ICT and software, 
one quarter that of 
machinery and 8 percent 
that of non-residential 
structures.
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Turning to the R&D capital ratio with respect to other machinery and equipment, the first interesting 
comparison is once more between Sweden and Finland. The ratio is lower in Sweden, suggesting that 
Sweden’s higher R&D capital intensity is more than reversed by its much larger stock of other machinery 
and equipment: the latter was equal to half of total value added in 2005, compared with one quarter 
in Finland. As a consequence, it is Sweden’s comparatively low stocks of non-residential structures and 
ICT and software that account for its higher overall R&D capital ratio shown above in Figure 13. A second 
comparison is among countries with lower R&D capital ratios. The ratios are equal for Denmark and 
the Netherlands as Denmark’s larger R&D capital stock is matched by a larger stock of machinery and 
equipment. By contrast, Slovenia’s ratio of 11 percent is half that of the UK reflecting Slovenia’s strong 
manufacturing base and its correspondingly larger stock of machinery. 
Finally, there are marked cross-country differences in the R&D capital ratio with respect to non-residential 
structures, for example between Sweden on the one hand and Finland, Austria and Germany on the 
other. Sweden’s relatively lower stock of non-residential structures results in a higher bar in Figure 14. 
In a similar vein, the stock of non-residential structures relative to the economy is also lower in the UK 
than in both the Netherlands and Slovenia. All in all, the discussion of economy-wide R&D capital ratios 
suggests that the cross-country differences with respect to the stocks of various types of tangible 
assets are not systematically aligned with those in R&D capital stocks. 
4.2  Industry-specific R&D capital ratios
We conclude this section by illustrating R&D capital ratios with respect to total tangible capital13 in the 
EU for selected groups of industries. In addition, we show how these ratios compare with the pattern 
of R&D capital intensities. This is done in Figures 15a and b. Figure 15a presents the results for technology-
intensive manufacturing industries and Figure 15b those for other industry groups. Figure 15b also 
recaps Europe’s economy-wide R&D capital intensity and R&D capital ratio, illustrating that the latter 
is equal to about one third of the former at the aggregate level. 
The following facts are worth noting from Figure 15. First, technology-intensive manufacturing is 
characterized by higher R&D intensity (by a multiple of about 10) and higher R&D capital ratios (multiple 
of about 30) than the economy as a whole. Among the three industry groups, Transport equipment is 
the most R&D capital intensive with an R&D capital stock of 110 percent of value added in 2005, followed 
by Chemicals and pharmaceuticals (80 percent) and ICT and other equipment (close to 60 percent). By 
contrast, the R&D capital ratios are about the same in all three industry groups. This means that the 
same hierarchy applies for R&D capital intensities as for tangible-capital intensities, with Transport 
equipment having the largest tangible capital stock relative to value added, Chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals the second-largest etc.
Second, other manufacturing is still considerably more R&D intensive than other parts of the economy 
such as services. A final – albeit indirect – insight from Figure 15 is that the tangible capital stock in all 
manufacturing industry groups by and large corresponds to about one year of value added whereas 
it is three years of value added in services.
13    The even finer analysis of industry-specific R&D capital ratios with respect to specific assets is not presented in this article. 
We find that across countries and industries, R&D capital stocks are slightly correlated with the stocks of ICT and software 
but only in the sub-sample of high-tech manufacturing industries. No such correlation is found between R&D capital and 
tangible capital other than ICT. Results are available from the authors upon request. 
Sweden’s economy 
is more R&D- and 
machinery-intensive 
than Finland’s but has 
lower stocks of ICT and 
software and of non-
residential structures.
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Source:  EUKLEMS, OECD ANBERD, own calculations
Notes:    The left bar represents the ratio of the R&D capital stock to the total stock of tangible capital in an industry. The right 
bar represents the ratio of the R&D capital stock to real value added in an industry.




















Source:  EUKLEMS, OECD ANBERD, own calculations
Notes:    The left bar represents the ratio of the R&D capital stock to the total stock of tangible capital in an industry. The right 
bar represents the ratio of the R&D capital stock to real value added in an industry.
All in all, the comparison of R&D capital ratios in this section has highlighted marked differences across 
countries and industries in how R&D capital and (specific types of) tangible capital are blended together 
in producing goods and services in the economy. As a consequence, the ranking of countries in terms 
of R&D capital ratios differs from that in terms of R&D capital intensities. For the R&D capital ratio with 
respect to particular asset types, we discover notable deviations from the familiar pattern “Japan first, 
US second, EU last”.
Compared to the overall 
economy, technology-
intensive manufacturing 
is ten times as R&D 
intensive and has  
25 times the R&D  
capital ratio.
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5.  Conclusions
R&D capital stocks are an important economic variable. Since it is the R&D capital stock rather than 
annual investment flows that matters for growth, this article has set out to compute R&D capital stocks 
for all industrialized countries with available data and has discussed how these stocks are linked to the 
flows that contribute to them. 
Section 2 has shown that R&D expenditure in the EU lags behind that in the US and Japan, which is 
attributable to the business sector rather than the government sector. EU business R&D expenditure 
did not start increasing to get closer to that in the other countries of the triad over the past 15 years. 
Business R&D is heavily concentrated on three technology-intensive manufacturing industry groups: 
Chemicals and pharmaceuticals, Transport equipment and ICT and other equipment. It is lower R&D 
intensity in the latter two as well as the small size of Europe’s ICT-producing industries that account 
for most of the shortfall in overall business R&D expenditure. 
New estimates of business R&D capital stocks for 22 countries have been presented in Section 3. They 
show that the EU business R&D capital stock at 9 percent of GDP falls short of its US and Japanese 
counterparts, mostly due to much lower R&D capital intensity in ICT and other non-transport equipment-
producing industries. The section has also highlighted the strong geographical concentration, especially 
the scarcity of R&D capital in the southern periphery and in the new member states of the EU. Using 
our R&D capital stock estimates, we have found a positive correlation, across industries and countries, 
between the initial stock of R&D capital in the early 1990s and the growth in TFP in the subsequent 
decade. 
Section 4 has put R&D capital stocks in relation to tangible capital (R&D capital ratio), thus providing 
insights that cannot be gained from looking at R&D capital intensities alone. It has revealed pronounced 
differences in the way R&D capital and tangible capital are combined in production across the triad 
but also within the EU. Put differently, variations in the intensity of tangible-capital use are not strongly 
aligned with variations in R&D capital intensity. 
As far as Europe’s gap vis-à-vis the US and Japan in business R&D is concerned, the estimates in this 
study suggest that there is so much inertia in these capital stocks that reaching the Lisbon target of 
2 percent of GDP spent each year on business R&D (and 3 percent economy-wide) is just a necessary 
but by no means sufficient step to close the EU-US gap in R&D capital any time soon. To allow for 
convergence in R&D capital stocks within the triad, significant increases in R&D expenditure need not 
only to happen but to be sustained for a long period of time. 
Finally, our discussion of the geographic concentration within the EU has also shown that there is hardly 
any sign of convergence in business R&D capital stocks. A sharp geographical division of labour into 
R&D-intensive and less R&D-intensive areas might be efficient given the spillovers implied by knowledge-
intensive activities and the resulting tendency for these activities to cluster in space. However, countries 
with very low R&D capital stocks need to ensure that they have sufficient technological absorption 
capacity to avoid getting disconnected from growth in productivity and living standards in the most 
advanced economies.
Even if the EU met 
the Lisbon target, 
convergence to the US 
R&D capital stock would 
take a long time.
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Annex 1.  Technical terms used in this article
Table A1.  Glossary of technical terms
Term Definition
R&D investment  The part of a year’s R&D expenditure that lives longer than one 
year and, hence becomes part of the R&D capital stock. Broadly 
in line with the new convention of the 2008 System of National 
Accounts, this ratio is assumed to be 100 percent
R&D capital stock The part of last year’s capital stock that has not depreciated plus 
R&D investment of the current year
R&D intensity Ratio of R&D expenditure to value added (industry level or 
aggregate)
R&D capital intensity Ratio of R&D capital stock to value added (industry level or 
aggregate)
Gap in R&D Fact that one country has lower R&D intensity or lower R&D 
capital intensity
R&D capital ratio (with respect to 
total tangible capital)
Ratio R&D capital stock to total tangible capital stock
R&D capital ratio with respect to i Ratio R&D capital stock to stock of tangible asset i
Triad Countries consisting of the EU, the US and Japan
Industries
Chemicals and pharmaceuticals ISIC 24
Transport equipment ISIC 34-35
ICT and other (non-transport) 
equipment
ISIC 30-33 (or 29-33 in Figure 12)
Sector Institutional sector
Industry ISIC industry (one-letter, two-letter or two-digit)
ISIC International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic 
Activities
Asset types
Tangible capital Stock of all assets recorded in existing national accounts, which 
includes ICT and software, transport vehicles, other machinery 
and equipment, residential structures, non-residential structures 
and other assets (e.g. live stock of plants and animals)
ICT and software Computing equipment, communication equipment and software
Other machinery and equipment Any equipment other than ICT and transport vehicles
Non-residential structures Any building or infrastructure for non-residential use
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Table A2.  R&D expenditure in EU countries by institutional sector, 1995-2007 (percent of GDP)
Total Business
Government and  
Higher education
1995-99 2000-03 2004-07 1995-99 2000-03 2004-07 1995-99 2000-03 2004-07
Belgium 1.8 2.0 1.9 1.3 1.4 1.3 0.5 0.6 0.6
Denmark 2.0 2.4 2.5 1.2 1.7 1.7 0.7 0.8 0.8
Germany 2.3 2.5 2.5 1.5 1.7 1.8 0.7 0.7 0.8
Ireland 1.3 1.1 1.3 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.4 0.3 0.4
Greece 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.4
Spain 0.8 1.0 1.2 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.5
France 2.2 2.2 2.1 1.4 1.4 1.3 0.8 0.8 0.8
Italy 1.0 1.1 1.1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6
Luxembourg .. 1.7 1.6 .. 1.5 1.4 .. 0.2 0.2
Netherlands 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.7
Austria 1.7 2.1 2.4 1.1 1.4 1.7 0.6 0.7 0.7
Portugal 0.6 0.8 0.9 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5
Finland 2.7 3.4 3.5 1.8 2.4 2.5 0.9 1.0 1.0
Sweden 3.5 4.0 3.6 2.6 3.0 2.7 0.9 1.0 1.0
United Kingdom 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.2 1.2 1.1 0.6 0.6 0.7
EU-15 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.2 1.2 1.2 0.7 0.7 0.7
Bulgaria 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.4
Czech Republic 1.1 1.2 1.4 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.4 0.5 0.5
Estonia 0.6 0.7 1.0 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6
Cyprus 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3
Latvia 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3
Lithuania 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.6
Hungary 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.5
Malta .. 0.3 0.6 .. 0.1 0.4 .. 0.2 0.2
Poland 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.4
Romania 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2
Slovenia 1.4 1.4 1.5 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.6
Slovakia 0.9 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3
EU-27 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.1 1.2 1.2 0.7 0.7 0.7
United States 2.6 2.7 2.6 1.9 1.9 1.9 0.7 0.8 0.8
Japan 2.9 3.1 3.3 2.0 2.3 2.5 0.9 0.8 0.8
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Our main data source for the construction of R&D capital stocks is the ANEBRD database of the OECD 
(2009b), henceforth ANBERD. This dataset contains R&D expenditure by industry performed in the 
business enterprise sector classified according to ISIC revision 3.1. ANBERD data are based on official 
data of business expenditure on R&D (henceforth OFFBERD), provided by national statistical authorities. 
In contrast to OFFBERD, ANBERD includes estimates for missing years as well as for industries that were 
suppressed for confidential reasons. The industry breakdown is quite detailed but must be used 
cautiously as there is some over- and underestimation in some countries where R&D expenditure data 
are not available on a product field basis (see Sub-section 2.2). This problem is relevant especially with 
respect to lower industry aggregates. The potential bias becomes smaller with aggregation over 
industries provided a bottom-up approach is applied (see below). In this paper we only show aggregates 
of the main ISIC industries (one- and two-letter industries). 
This aggregation over industries is also necessary in order to ensure compatibility with EUKLEMS data 
for R&D capital stocks up to 2003, which represent our second main data source. For a general description 
of the EUKLEMS project and databases see O’Mahony and Timmer (2009). EUKLEMS offers data for 13 
EU countries (Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, 
Poland, Spain, Sweden and UK), the US and Japan. EUKLEMS also used ANBERD data as their primary 
source. We replicate their methodology by using the Perpetual Inventory Method (described in Box 2) 
for the construction of capital stocks out of current R&D expenditure, using the GDP deflator to obtain 
real expenditure. 
With respect to data coverage, R&D capital stocks of EUKLEMS are available from 1980 onwards for all 
countries except Belgium (1994), the Czech Republic (1999) and Poland (2001). We update the EUKLEMS 
estimates using the newest ANBERD edition (covering years up to 2005 or 2006). Moreover, we add 
seven additional EU countries not available in the EUKLEMS database: Greece, Hungary, Austria, Portugal, 
Slovenia, Slovakia and Turkey. The time coverage of our additional, countries is more limited due to 
the requirement of consistent R&D expenditure data for a sufficient period. More precisely, we have 
estimated an initial capital stock as early as possible (e.g. 1993 for Slovenia). As done by EUKLEMS, we 
suppress the first seven years due to their sensitivity to the estimated initial stock (see Box 2). As a result 
of this suppression, our R&D capital stock estimates have the following starting years: 1995 for Greece 
and Portugal, 2000 for Slovenia, 2001 for Hungary, 2004 for Turkey and 2005 for Austria and Slovakia. 
For Slovakia, the limitation is that the R&D expenditure data of OECD (2009b) are in fact OFFBERD data 
with relatively low industry coverage. 
As far as the aggregation of single industries to higher aggregates is concerned, we apply a bottom-up 
approach whenever sufficient industry information is available in order to avoid aggregation bias in 
the computation of initial capital stocks. Specifically, we calculate initial R&D capital stocks of two-letter 
ISIC industries to aggregate them to one-letter industries. Moreover, we use R&D capital stocks of 
one-letter industries in the computation of “total manufacturing” and “total services” but not for the 
overall computation of “total industries”.
Finally, EU aggregates are computed as follows. For non euro area members, all relevant variables (R&D 
capital stocks, tangible capital stocks and value added) at the aggregate and industry levels are 
converted into euros using average market exchange rates of the year 1999. Then the euro values for 
the available countries of EU-27 are added together separately for each variable, thereby ensuring that 
the same sample is used for the component variables of ratios. For example, the EU R&D capital stock 
used in computing the EU’s R&D capital ratio comprises fewer countries than that used for the R&D 
capital intensity because tangible capital stocks are available for fewer countries. 
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intensity  and  intangible  capital  deepening  among 
eleven  advanced  economies.  By  employing  a  broad 
measure  of  intangibles,  including  computerized 
information,  innovative  property  and  economic 
competencies,  we  find  a  relatively  large  impact  on 
growth. Intangible capital explains about a quarter 
of  labour-productivity  growth  in  the  US  and  larger 
countries of the EU. The continental West-European 
countries show a distinction between countries with 
significant  contributions  from  intangible  capital 
deepening  and  a  group  of  laggards.  Catching-up 
countries  such  as  the  Czech  Republic,  Greece  and 
Slovakia  show  much  larger  contributions  from 
tangible capital deepening than from intangibles, and 
also  larger  multi-factor  productivity  (MFP)  growth 
rates related to the restructuring of those economies. 
VOL_1_03_EIB_Papers_Vol_14_Nr_1_VAN_ARK.indd   62 23/12/09   14:49:00EIB  PAPERS           Volume14  N°1   2009            63
Measuring intangible capital and   
its contribution to economic  
growth in Europe
1.  Introduction
The recent economic downturn has changed the current debate on economic growth from one that 
emphasizes the long-run need for productivity and innovation to one that stresses economic recovery, 
particularly in employment. The focus on job growth is an inevitable aspect of any recession, and the 
deeper the recession, the greater the concern. This recession, however, is somewhat different because 
it has unfolded against the backdrop of the job losses and labour force restructuring brought about 
by the globalization of the world economy. One way to accomplish both short- and long-term objectives 
is to promote investment where the high-wage economies of Europe and the US have their greatest 
comparative advantage – the creation of knowledge. As the knowledge-content of the products and 
services that economies produce gradually increases, investment in knowledge production becomes 
the key source of economic growth. Moreover, the creation of knowledge both raises investment 
opportunities in the short run while creating the rewards of higher income and productivity growth 
in the future.
Knowledge creation is part of a wide-ranging process of investment in intangible capital. This investment 
includes expenditures for human capital, in the form of education and training, public and private 
scientific research, and business expenditures for product research and development, market 
development, and organizational and management efficiency. These are strategic investments in the 
long-run growth path of individual companies and of the economy as a whole. They are increasingly 
seen by policy makers as essential for the sustained economic health of the economy as witnessed, 
for example, by the European Lisbon Strategy to revitalize growth, competitiveness and sustainable 
development and the America Competes Act in the United States. 
In order to manage intangibles both as a source of growth at the macroeconomic level, and as a driver 
of value creation for individual firms, it is important to measure them well. While nobody would disagree 
with their long-lasting benefits, the costs of most intangibles are still expensed in company financial 
statements and in national income and product accounts, implying that they detract from value-added 
growth rather than increasing it. To paraphrase Solow’s quip about the computer revolution, one could 
say that today “the knowledge economy is all around us, but where can we see it in the official statistics?”1 
One answer is that much of the activity we associate with knowledge creation, especially by businesses, 
isn’t there. Conventional measures of investment in the accounts consist primarily of tangible assets 
such as plant and equipment, vehicles, office buildings and other commercial structures. In reality, as 
the reported estimates in this article show, investment in intangibles in many advanced economies 
approaches the value of investment in tangible assets, and in some cases (such as in the United Kingdom 
and the United States) it even exceeds tangible investment.
In recent decades, the accounting treatment of intangibles has begun to change, with the decision to 
capitalize software expenditures and treat the result as a contribution to GDP. Software is a major 
category of intangibles and a primary means of transforming knowledge (or “blueprints”) into 
computerized information. More recently, it has been proposed to extend the capitalization of 
intangibles to expenditure on research and development (R&D). For example, the US Bureau of Economic 
1  The Solow productivity paradox states that “you can see the computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics” 
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Analysis will count R&D as investment in its headline GDP measure in 2013, and in a satellite account 
until then. These moves are supported by recent decisions by the United Nations to do likewise in its 
System of National Accounts. 
Still, the full range of value-building intangible assets is not likely to be accorded the same treatment 
as software and R&D in the national accounts, even though economic research and surveys show that 
assets such as management capability, marketing and employee-training expenditures are important 
co-investments with R&D and information and communication technologies (ICT). The challenges 
concerning the conceptualization of intangible capital, its measurement on the input and output sides, 
and their integration into a production function or growth accounting framework are substantial 
indeed (van Ark 2002; van Ark and Hulten 2007).
In this study we discuss the state of the art in the measurement of intangible capital and its contribution 
to economic growth, with a focus on international comparisons currently available. In Section 2, we 
discuss some of the conceptual and theoretical issues in relation to the capitalization of intangible 
capital. Section 3 provides a brief overview of the methodology used to obtain measures of intangibles, 
and reports estimates for a wide range of European countries and the United States. We combine 
estimates from a new study by Corrado and Hulten (2009) that updates previous studies by Corrado, 
Hulten and Sichel (CHS 2005; 2009) for the United States with updated figures from Marrano, Haskel 
and Wallis (MHW 2007; 2009) for the United Kingdom, estimates from The Conference Board’s previous 
empirical study for Germany, France, Italy and Spain (Hao et al. 2009) and new estimates for five 
additional European countries (Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Greece and Slovakia). In Section 4 
we integrate these measures in a growth accounting framework. Finally, as we gradually grow the 
number of countries for which intangible capital can be measured and integrated in growth analysis, 
Section 5 provides a first attempt to study the role of intangibles from a broader perspective of economic 
growth and development using the results for our eleven countries in combination with estimates for 
five other countries from alternative studies, including Jalava et al. (2007) for Finland, van Rooijen-
Horsten et al. 2008) for the Netherlands, Edquist (2009) for Sweden, Barnes and McClure (2009) for 
Australia and Fukao et al. (2007 and 2009) for Japan. In the concluding section we identify some key 
issues for further reflection and research.
2.  Why capitalize intangibles?
Empirical studies of economic growth have traditionally focused on the contribution of capital in terms 
of plant and equipment, vehicles, and buildings. These are tangible assets that can be seen and touched, 
and their historical role as sources of economic growth is beyond dispute. Their status as capital is 
indisputable because they are created using current resources in order to increase future production 
and consumption. However, CHS (2005; 2009) point out that this criterion applies equally to all 
expenditures on product and market development (that is, including, but not limited to, R&D), 
worker training, and organizational development, which also aim to increase future output and 
consumption.
CHS (2009) formalize how intangible may be incorporated into the conventional GDP/GDI national 
accounting identity. The key to this extension is that the flow of new intangibles must be included 
both on the product side of the accounts and on the input/income side via the flow of services from 
the intangible stock (a point sometimes missed in the literature on R&D): 
(1)  PQ(t)Q(t) = PC(t)C(t) + PI(t)I(t) + PN(t)N(t) = PL(t)L(t) + PK(t)K(t) + PR(t)R(t)
The full range of 
spending on intangibles 
is not likely to get 
treated as investment in 
the national accounts.
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Here, aggregate output is denoted by Q, consumption by C, tangible investment goods by I, intangibles 
by N, and their respective prices by P with the appropriate superscript. On the input side labour L, 
tangible capital K, and intangible capital R represent the inputs that are allocated to the production 
of all three output components. This formulation is distinctly different from the current national 
accounts’ definition of GDP, which treats N as an intermediate input to the production of C and I. 
Treating intangible expenditures as investment also makes economic sense from a business strategy 
point of view. Outlays on software, R&D, advertising, training, organizational capital etc., are critical 
investments that sustain a firm’s market presence in future years by reducing cost and raising profits 
beyond the current accounting period. For example, the development of software for on-line banking 
has provided customers with 24/7 financial services and hence massively reduced labour cost in retail 
banking. Similarly, R&D is carried out with the expectation that it will increase the future profit of a 
firm, an expectation that is validated on average by the positive correlation between R&D and patents, 
on the one hand, and stock prices, on the other (Hall 1999). Moreover, marketing intangibles (brand 
equity, customer satisfaction) determine whether or not a firm is competitive in the long run.2 The 
value of these intangibles is reflected in the market value of a company. In a sample of 617 companies 
drawn from the COMPUSTAT data base for the year 2006, Hulten and Hao (2008) find that the book 
value of conventionally reported equity explains only a small fraction of its market value (around 
30 percent), but this fraction increases to 75 percent when the capitalized cost of intangibles is added 
to the balance sheets of these companies.
Capitalizing intangibles is thus an important step in its own right. It is also an important step towards 
measuring its contribution to economic growth. CHS (2009) expand the conventional Solow-Jorgenson-
Griliches sources-of-growth (SOG) model to include intangible input and output. The expanded model 
leads to the following equations:
(2)  gQ(t)  =  sC(t)gC(t) + sI(t)gI(t) + sN(t)gN(t)
    =  sL(t)gL(t) + sK(t)gK(t) + sR(t)gR(t) + gA(t)
This formulation links the growth rate of output gQ(t) first to the weighted contributions of the growth 
of consumption (gC(t)), tangible investment (gI(t)) and intangible investment (gN(t)), and second, to the 
supply-side of the economy where gQ(t) equals the weighted contributions from the growth in labour 
(gL(t)), tangible capital (gK(t)) and intangible capital (gR(t)) and multifactor productivity (gA(t)). In both 
cases the weights sum up to one.
The inclusion of intangibles in the gQ(t) framework means that the labour share is smaller than in the 
traditional growth accounting equation because of the expanded capital base. CHS also note that 
when intangible investments are increasing as a share of output, the measured multifactor productivity 
residual will tend to be smaller than the corresponding MFP estimate calculated without 
intangibles.3
2  A survey of manufacturing firms in the UK identifies eight marketing practices that determine long-run competitiveness, 
including  the  use  of  the  experience  curve-concepts  in  marketing  and  the  ability  to  offer  superior  quality  products 
(Brooksbank et al. 2003). Training has reduced the cost of introducing flexible production systems in automobile firms 
across the world (McDuffie and Krafcik 1992). And apprentice training contributes to the productivity of a firm during 
and beyond the apprentice period, according to a survey of Swiss firms (Wolter et al. 2006). Management practices also 
appear highly correlated with firm-productivity. For example, Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) link the intangible of corporate 
management practices to productivity and show significant cross-country differences, with US firms on average better 
managed and more productive than European firms. In particular, it is suggested that US multinationals are organized in 
a way that allows them to use new technologies such as ICT more efficiently than non-US firms (Bloom et al. 2009)
3  However, the smaller MFP residual is not an inevitable consequence of adding intangibles. See the recent survey of growth 
accounting by Hulten (2009a) for further discussion.
Taking intangible assets 
into account eliminates 
most of the large 
discrepancy between 
market- and book values 
of listed companies.
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Despite the evident need to capitalize intangible assets, estimating the magnitude of the investment 
flows (the PNN), separating these flows into price (PN) and quantity (N) components, and determining 
the service lives of the assets to enable the compilation of net asset stocks (R), are formidable 
measurement challenges. Moreover, all relevant assets must be identified and measured. The literature 
has discussed these measurement and identification challenges from alternative points of view: some 
regard the challenges as a wall that is virtually impossible to scale (perhaps even fraught by theoretical 
impossibility), while others stress the importance and policy-relevance of updating empirical growth 
accounts to reflect modern business realities.4 All told, and as indicated by CHS (2009), “the real issue 
of whether intangibles should be classified as intermediates or as capital depends on the economic 
character of the good … and not on the ease with which it can be measured” (p. 667). In the remainder 
of this section we discuss these challenges – both measurement and theoretical – as they pertain to 
the growth accounting framework and its implementation.
First, with regard to the scale and scope of intangible investment (PNN) their presence is primarily 
recognized by the resources the firm spends to acquire the knowledge-based assets through, for 
example, R&D, licenses, patenting, etc., as well as their spending on co-investments to R&D and ICT 
(including those related to changes in business models and practices). There are various ways of getting 
at these investments. For example, measures of organizational capital used in this article are based on 
estimating managers’ time devoted to organizational innovation tasks and expenses on external 
management consultancy contracts. A more precise measurement would translate firms’ documentation 
in performance tracking, target time horizon, human-capital management, and the rewarding of high 
performance, etc., into dollar values. From a practical point of view, the emerging survey work on 
measuring intangible investment in the United Kingdom (Clayton et al. 2009) and business activity by 
business function in the United States (Sturgeon and Gereffi 2009; Brown 2008) offers promising 
methods for greatly improving the measurement of intangible investment.
Second, intangible investment and capital in real terms – the measurement of N – is the most vexing 
challenge: Units of knowledge cannot be defined per se, a problem akin to defining prices for business 
or medical services and for which no consensus solution exists.5 Other than for software and some 
other small items already included in the national accounts, CHS (2005; 2009) used the overall output 
price as the price for intangible investment. The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) has offered an 
R&D-specific output price in its preliminary R&D satellite account. In this study we maintain the CHS 
assumptions, but note, as they did, its “place-holder” nature until a more satisfactory solution emerges 
(see also Annex 1).
Third, both the measurement and conceptualization of net stocks of intangibles (R) is complicated by 
the fact that intangibles are largely non-rival and returns on investment are not fully appropriable. 
Patent protection and business secrecy may give the innovator a degree of protection, but the value 
of the investment to the innovator is limited to the returns on the investment that can be captured, 
which in turn provides the conceptual basis for measuring depreciation and calculating net stocks 
(Pakes and Schankerman 1984). The decision to invest a dollar in an innovation is presumably based 
on the expectation that, on average, at least a dollar’s worth of value can be appropriated. This is not, 
however, a precise calculation. In fact, the return on a specific intangible dollar may be zero or a 
multitude of output dollars. Innovation usually involves experimentation and uncertainty, in which 
4  For discussions of these issues, see for example, Howitt (1996), Lev (2001), Nakamura (2001), van Ark (2002), van Ark and 
Hulten (2007) and CHS (2005; 2009).
5  Corrado and Lane (2009) consider the measurement of innovation within firms and suggest that the “project” be the unit of 
analysis and measurement. Notwithstanding practical issues, such an approach opens potential for measuring productivity 
of a business function, much as Diewert (2008) suggests that productivity for certain medical services can be measured by 
isolating “procedures” as a unit of analysis. 
The need to capitalize 
intangibles is evident 
but there are formidable 
measurement 
challenges.
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winners and losers are sorted out over time in a Schumpeterian process of “creative destruction”. 
Ultimately, the benefits from an innovation diffuse to other users. This process of knowledge diffusion 
is the source of at least a part of MFP growth at the aggregate level. Indeed, MFP measures the costless 
gains in the efficiency of production. The diffusion of knowledge from the original investor/innovator 
is one way the costless gains are achieved. For example, estimates of the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
suggest that somewhere between a fifth and a quarter of the growth rate of MFP in the US non-farm 
business sector is due to R&D spillovers. 
Fourth, several theoretical considerations are central when using available measures to obtain estimates 
of the contribution of intangibles to economic growth. Intangibles are often not a direct or continuous 
input to current production but represent an upfront cost to the production process with substantial 
uncertainty whether or not they will actually produce an output in terms of a new product or service 
delivery. Uncertainty does not only apply to the R&D going into a new product (which may or may not 
lead to an actual decision to manufacture the product) but also to the marketing of, in particular, a 
service output.6 Adding these indirect inputs to the SOG model shifts it away from a purely production-
function model of growth in which technology improves the processes of production to a more 
Schumpeterian approach that puts emphasis on the actual product or service output created. Hulten 
(2009b) develops a model that reconciles the technology-oriented nature of the Solow residual with 
the broader innovation-based nature of intangible inputs at the firm level. This research also highlights 
the fact that measured MFP growth may come through improvements in quality of products and 
services, which can be integrated in the accounting framework by linking the intangible investment 
to prices on the output side. Thus, while intangibles may not necessarily refer to technology-oriented 
processes, they can be handled in the current SOG accounting framework, provided data are available 
to develop adequate measures of quality change in inputs and outputs.
Finally, the assumptions behind the version of the Solow residual in Equation (2) are not necessarily 
applicable to a world in which intangibles are important. The assumptions of perfect competition and 
foresight do not easily apply to the situation in which a firm’s intangible assets create market share 
and in which control over the property rights is associated with an innovation. One result is that the 
factor shares in Equation (2) do not necessarily equal the output-elasticity as required by the Solow 
framework. However, Hulten (2009b) shows that this is not necessarily a disabling problem when 
passing from the micro to the macroeconomic level of activity. Deviations in capital and labour 
compensation shares from their required theoretical values may cancel out when passing from the 
micro to the macroeconomic level of analysis. In any event, van Ark and Hulten (2007) note that growth 
accounting remains essentially the only game in town as far as a comprehensive empirical growth 
analysis involving all inputs and output in production is concerned, and that the inclusion of intangibles 
does not diminish that claim.
3.  Measures of intangible investment
Various definitions of intangible capital are possible, but most definitions are offshoots of Schumpeter’s 
classification, which includes product and process development, organizational change, management, 
marketing and finance (Schumpeter 1934). Some studies focus on structural characteristics of particular 
types of intangibles related to innovation, human resources or organizations (Lev 2001) or to the 
6    For example, Campbell-Kelly (1995) describes the example of Lotus 1-2-3 which was the dominant spreadsheet program 
in the 1980s, developed by Mitch Kapor in 1982. The biggest challenge was the marketing of Lotus 1-2-3. Kapor spent   
USD 1 million developing the software and USD 2.5 million marketing it. With the successful launch, 850,000 copies of 
Lotus 1-2-3 were sold, making it the most popular spreadsheet software. The price of Lotus 1-2-3 was USD 495, and 40% 
of that price covered marketing. 
MFP measures the 
costless gains in the 
efficiency of production, 
notably through the 
diffusion of knowledge 
from innovators.
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investment characteristics of intangibles (Nakamura 2001). Other studies use functional characteristics 
on the output side, such as the measurement of the stock market value of output (Hall, 2001) or the 
projected future value of output (van Bekkum 2009). The approach adopted here follows the work of 
CHS (2005; 2009), which uses a combination of structural characteristics combined with functional 
(investment-related) characteristics on the input side, i.e. the value of investment at cost and 
distinguishing between business investment in three categories, i.e. (1) computerized information, (2) 
innovative property, and (3) economic competencies:
(1) Computerized information is already largely included in the national accounts, as computer software 
for both purchased and own-account components. However, this category also includes databases 
which are often not included in the national accounts today. 
(2) Innovative property includes both scientific property and “non-scientific” R&D.7 Until recently, 
neither scientific nor non-scientific R&D has been included in national accounts, although this will 
change in 2013 with the implementation of the 2008 System of National Accounts in most countries, 
which recommends the inclusion of (mainly) scientific R&D. Non-scientific R&D is a somewhat “under-
defined” category in the R&D statistics because it is unclear whether it belongs to R&D and what is 
actually included in this category.8 The estimates of this study follow CHS (2005; 2009) and include the 
cost of developing new motion picture films and other forms of entertainment, investments in new 
designs, and a crude estimate of the spending for new product development by financial services and 
insurance firms. CHS report that, by the late 1990s, investment in non-scientific R&D was as large as 
investment in scientific R&D.
(3) Economic competencies are the largest category and include two sub-categories, brand equity and 
firm-specific competencies. Investment in brand names is measured as a fraction of advertising spending 
to reflect that not all advertising may be seen contributing to the building of brands. We adopt the 
estimate by CHS (2005; 2009) that about 60 percent of total advertising expenditures has long-lasting 
effects rather than short-term expenditure focused on, say, “this week’s sale”. Investment in firm-specific 
capital and human resources includes the costs of employer-provided worker training and an estimate 
of management time and expenditure on external consultants devoted to enhancing the productivity 
of the firm. The estimates for firm-level training are based on a mix of data from statistics on vocational 
training and cost data from employment statistics. Expenditure on organizational changes is derived 
from revenues for the management consultant industry in combination with trends in the cost and 
number of persons employed in executive occupations. It is assumed that managers spend 20 percent 
of their time on improving organizational structures. While these numbers are imprecise, even on the 
basis of this modest assumption they represent the largest type of business intangible investment. 
We use the same methodology as CHS (2005; 2009) for the United States and MHW (2007; 2009) for 
the United Kingdom to examine intangible investment in continental European countries. In Hao et 
al. (2009), we estimate intangible investment for France, Germany, Italy and Spain. For the purpose of 
the current article, we develop five additional estimates for other European countries, including Austria, 
Denmark, Greece, Czech Republic and Slovakia. Those countries include both old and new member 
7  Innovative property should not to be confused with intellectual property which refers to creations of the mind, including 
inventions, literary and artistic works, symbols, names, images, and designs used in commerce. There is a significant overlap 
between the two concepts, but the innovative property exclusively focuses on the investment and output characteristics. 
The labelling of “non-scientific” R&D is somewhat misleading because the development of new financial products and 
architectural modelling is mostly conducted by personnel with scientific degrees.
8  The Frascati Manual on the collection and use of R&D data explicitly includes social science R&D and Eurostat explicitly 
includes it. The United States launched a new R&D survey in which data on social science R&D will be collected for 2008 




property and economic 
competencies, valuing 
them at investment cost.
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states of the European Union (EU), so we can learn the patterns of intangible investment in economies 
at different stages of development.9 
Table 1 shows the investment in the market sector of the economy as a percentage of total GDP in the 
US and the UK as well as for the four large continental European countries. In the continental European 
countries the market sector results were obtained by excluding the entire government, health and 
education sector. Real estate activities are also excluded due to the problems in measuring their 
productivity (EU KLEMS 2008). In the US, the private non-farm business sector invested 11.5 percent 
of conventionally measured GDP in intangible assets in 2006. In the same year, the private sector 
invested 10.5 percent of GDP in intangibles in the UK, 7.2 percent in Germany, 7.9 percent in France, 
5.0 percent in Italy and 5.5 percent in Spain. 
Table 1.  Intangible investment in the market sector in Germany, France, Italy, Spain, UK and US 
(percent of GDP, 2006)
Type of Investment Germany France Italy Spain UK US
2006 2006 2006 2006 2006 2006
1. Computerized information 0.73 1.42 0.64 0.79 1.55 1.61
  a) Software 0.71 1.37 0.63 0.76 0.00
  b) Databases 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.00
2. Innovative property 3.59 3.18 2.21 2.78 3.16 4.37
  a) R&D, including social sciences and humanities 1.72 1.30 0.58 0.63 1.07  2.25
  b) Mineral exploration and evaluation 0.01 0.04 0.09 0.04 0.04
  c) Copyright and license costs 0.21 0.31 0.10 0.18 0.22
 2.12   d) Development costs in financial industry 0.75 0.60 0.58 0.52 0.07
  e) New architectural and engineering designs 0.90 0.93 0.86 1.41 1.74
3. Economic competencies 2.84 3.30 2.19 1.90 5.84 5.50
  a) Brand equity 0.56 0.99 0.71 0.42 1.15 1.47
    Advertising expenditure 0.41 0.73 0.47 0.19 0.91
    Market research 0.15 0.26 0.24 0.23 0.24
  b) Firm-specific human capital 1.29 1.51 1.02 0.81 2.54
 4.03
    Continuing vocational training 0.65 1.25 0.71 0.71
    Apprentice training 0.64 0.26 0.32 0.10
  c) Organizational structure 1.00 0.81 0.45 0.68 2.14
    Purchased 0.54 0.32 0.15 0.27 0.51
    Own account 0.46 0.49 0.3 0.41 1.63
Total Investment 7.16 7.90 5.04 5.47 10.54  11.48
pro memoria
Total Spending 7.55 8.51 5.43 5.70 11.56
Sources:    Hao et al. (2009) for Germany, France, Italy and Spain; CHS (2009) for the US and MHW (2009) for the UK. They all 
have updated their results to 2006.
Notes:    60 percent of expenditure on advertisement, 80 percent of expenditure on own-account organizational structure and 
100 percent of all the other expenditure are considered as investment (CHS 2005).  GDP here is conventionally-measured 
GDP (including software and mineral exploration but excluding other intangibles). MHW (2009) estimate item 2(d) using the 
wages of research occupations of financial industry, and estimate item 2(e) using the wages of designers and engineers.
9    Other recent studies include intangible intensity measure for Finland (9.1 percent of GDP according to Jalava et al. 2007), 
the Netherlands (8.3 percent of GDP between 2001 and 2004; van Rooijen-Horsten et al. 2008), Sweden (10.6 percent of 
GDP according to Edquist 2009), Australia (9.6 percent of market-sector value added in 2005-2006; Barnes and McClure 
2009) and Japan invested 7.5 percent of GDP from 1995 to 2002 (Fukao et al. 2007; 2009).
Intangible investment 
exceeds 10 percent of 
GDP in the US and the 
UK, is below that mark 
in France and Germany 
and hovers around  
5 percent in Italy  
and Spain.
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Table 2 shows the new results for five smaller European economies in 2006. The estimate for Denmark 
(7.9 percent) is comparable to that of Germany and France but considerably lower than in three other 
small countries, Finland, Sweden and the Netherlands. The estimates for Austria are lower than for 
France and Germany, but still above those for Italy and Spain. The Czech Republic and Slovakia are also 
closer to the lower end, with the former more intensive in intangibles than the latter. The big outlier 
is Greece, which suggests intangible investment is only 1.6 percent of GDP, much lower than in any 
other country. While the results for Greece require more research, the outcome is surprisingly close to 
the estimate from Jona-Lasinio et al. (2009), which also shows Greece as extraordinarily low in terms 
of intangible investment intensity. The difference between Greece and the other countries is largest 
in all areas of economic competencies.
Table 2.    Intangible investment in the market sector in Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Greece and Slovakia (percent of GDP, 2006)
Type of Investment Austria Czech 
Republic
Denmark Greece Slovakia
2006 2006 2006 2006 2006
1. Computerized information 0.89 0.71 1.87 0.34 0.37
  a) Software 0.85 0.71 1.85 0.33 0.37
  b) Databases 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00
2. Innovative property 3.14 2.8 3.06 0.62 1.76
  a) R&D, including social sciences and humanities 1.74 1.03 1.68 0.18 0.21
  b) Mineral exploration and evaluation - - - - -
  c) Copyright and license costs 0.10 0.04 0.16 0.02 0.04
  d) Development costs in financial industry 0.63 0.55 0.54 0.16 0.37
  e) New architectural and engineering designs 0.66 1.18 0.69 0.27 1.15
3. Economic competencies 2.42 2.93 2.93 0.63 2.39
  a) Brand equity 0.25 1.37 0.63 0.15 1.04
    Advertising expenditure 0.15 0.94 0.36 0.08 0.46
    Market research 0.11 0.43 0.27 0.06 0.59
  b) Firm-specific human capital 0.79 0.63 1.49 0.19 0.51
    Continuing vocational training 0.46 0.63 1.07 0.17 0.51
    Apprentice training 0.33 0.00 0.42 0.02 0.00
  c) Organizational structure 1.38 0.93 0.81 0.29 0.83
    Purchased 0.93 0.26 0.45 0.06 0.25
    Own account 0.44 0.67 0.36 0.23 0.58
Total Investment 6.46 6.45 7.86 1.59 4.53
pro memoria
Total Spending 6.67 7.24 8.19 1.70 4.98
Sources:  See Annex 1
Notes:    60 percent of expenditure on advertisement, 80 percent of expenditure on own-account organizational structure 
and 100 percent of all the other expenditure are considered as investment (CHS 2005).
      GDP is conventionally measured (including software and mineral exploration but excluding other intangibles).
We present new 
estimates for Austria, 
Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Greece and 
Slovakia.
VOL_1_03_EIB_Papers_Vol_14_Nr_1_VAN_ARK.indd   70 23/12/09   14:49:01EIB  PAPERS           Volume14  N°1   2009            71
The results of Table 2 are portrayed graphically in Figure 1b along with the updated time series for the 
countries from previous studies (Figure 1a). Interestingly, while we generally find a slowdown or 
stabilization in the intensification of intangibles in the countries included in previous studies (notably 
in the US, but also in the UK, France and Germany), we find a continuation or even a slight pickup in 
the trends for Austria and Denmark, though less so in the other countries. 
Figure 1a.    Intangible investment in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the UK and the US  
(percent of GDP)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006









Source:  See Table 1 
Note:    GDP is conventionally measured (including software and mineral exploration but excluding other intangibles).











1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Austria Slovakia Czech Republic Denmark Greece
Source:  See Table 2 and Annex 1
Note:    GDP is conventionally measured (including software and mineral exploration but excluding other intangibles).
Table 3 provides the time series dimension associated with Table 2. It shows that the shares of economic 
competencies in the Central European countries have in fact been relatively high for the whole period 
1995-2006, which might also reflect the legacy of a less-technology intensive economy leading to 
lower shares of computerized information and innovation property.
Intangible investment 
is trending up in Austria 
and Denmark.
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Table 3.  Composition of intangible investment (percent of total intangible investment) 































1995 8 49 44 10 47 44 16 39 45 10 44 46 8 43 50
1996 8 46 46 10 45 45 18 38 44 15 40 45 9 48 42
1997 10 51 40 7 40 52 21 37 42 18 39 43 8 50 41
1998 12 49 38 9 43 48 22 38 40 20 40 40 9 44 48
1999 13 50 37 13 40 48 24 37 39 20 41 39 8 41 52
2000 14 49 36 14 40 47 22 39 38 24 38 37 8 40 53
2001 17 48 36 14 40 46 20 42 38 25 39 37 10 39 52
2002 16 51 33 14 40 46 23 41 36 19 40 41 8 40 53
2003 16 52 32 12 41 47 22 42 36 18 41 41 10 39 51
2004 15 52 32 13 41 47 25 39 36 19 41 40 9 41 50
2005 14 54 32 11 43 46 23 40 38 19 40 40 9 40 51
2006 14 49 37 11 43 45 24 39 37 22 39 39 8 39 53
Average 13 50 37 12 42 47 22 39 39 19 40 41 9 42 50
Sources:  See Annex 1 
Note:  The average is the simple average of percentages from 1995 to 2006.
The bottom-line results of Tables 1 and 2 are shown graphically in Figure 2. The US and UK are the clear 
leaders by this metric, with intangible investment of the US almost double that of the median country 
in the comparison (Austria). There is also substantial variation in the composition of intangible assets. 
The differences in GDP shares are smallest for computerized equipment, where the US and Germany 
have a relatively high share (perhaps related to a relatively large contribution of high and medium-tech 
manufacturing industries). The UK shows a particularly strong result for economic competencies, which 
may be related to the large share of business services in the UK. 
Perhaps the most striking result is shown in Figure 3, which compares the ratio of intangible investment 
(including software and other intangibles already included in the current national accounts) as 
percentage of GDP relative to tangible capital (excluding software and other intangibles already 
included in the current national accounts). Two countries, the United States and the United Kingdom, 
show a higher GDP intensity for intangibles than for tangibles. In the lower-income countries (Czech 
Republic, Spain, Italy, Slovakia and Greece) where intangible investment is still relatively low, the ratio 
of tangible capital to GDP is the highest.
Finally, it should be stressed that the capitalization of intangibles not only creates more capital input, 
but also leads to more output. After adjustment for intangibles, the size of GDP is larger by the intangibles 
investment rates, which range from 1.59 to 11.69 percent of GDP conventionally measured. The inclusion 
of intangible investment also increases the growth rate of GDP when intangible investment is expanding 
rapidly, and decreases it when intangible investment is slowing down. From 1995 to 2006 – a period 
during which intangible investment was expanding rapidly in most countries – GDP growth rates were 
about 0.1-0.2 percentage points higher due to the inclusion of intangibles for all countries in our 
sample.
The US and the UK spend 
more on intangible than 
on tangible capital.
VOL_1_03_EIB_Papers_Vol_14_Nr_1_VAN_ARK.indd   72 23/12/09   14:49:02EIB  PAPERS           Volume14  N°1   2009            73











































































Source:    See Table 1
Note:    GDP is conventionally measured (including software and mineral exploration but excluding other intangibles).










































































Source:  See Table 1 
Note:    GDP is conventionally measured (including software and mineral exploration but excluding other intangibles).
Before looking at the effects of intangible capital on growth, we stress that the investment measures 
in the tables and figures presented in this section are still relatively unrefined, and that there is much 
room for further improvements. Since this is a relatively new research field, statistical offices and other 
agencies often do not have comprehensive data on various intangible assets, and research is still scarce 
in most areas. For example, it is because of limited evidence that CHS (2005) assume that the financial 
industry spends 20 percent of their intermediate costs on developing new products and that managers 
The estimates are partly 
based on assumptions, 
leaving room for future 
improvements.
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spent 20 percent of their time improving organizational structure.10 At this point we have no corroborating 
evidence that those percentages would hold in other countries, and once more detailed sources 
become available for individual countries we may see adjustments to these measures. Our estimates 
also lack information on imports and exports of intangible assets. Jalava et al. (2007) use imports and 
exports of R&D to adjust the business expenditure on R&D for Finland in 2005. They estimate that 
Finland invested EUR 4,275 million in R&D in 2005, which was EUR 399 million more than their unadjusted 
estimation. The updated estimates for the United States included here use the R&D investment estimates 
developed by the US Bureau of Economic Analysis, which defines R&D investment as domestic R&D 
investment plus imports minus exports.
It is also important to note that some of the national studies summarized in Tables 1 and 2 use more 
details from nationally available sources than others. Another distinction is the intensity by which use 
is made of national accounts-related sources. For example, Marrano and Haskel (2006) and Van Rooijen 
et al. (2008) rely heavily on the data from national accounts for the UK and the Netherlands, respectively. 
In contrast, the US estimates rely more strongly on survey data from the Census Bureau (for services 
industries), the Bureau of Labour Statistics (for training), as well as on trends in managerial and 
professional employment.11 In this comparative study we use the widest possible range of data sources 
including national accounts and other surveys from national or international statistical offices (e.g. 
Eurostat). But we also intensively use data from trade associations which are often more broadly 
available across countries and for which no equivalents can be directly obtained from national 
accounts. 
Our results can also be compared with those from a preliminary study by Jona-Lasinio et al. (2009) 
which provides a comparison of intangible investment for all EU-27 member states. While that study 
applies similar principles as the current one (exhaustiveness, international comparability, etc.), it creates 
more or less “point-in-time” estimates that rely very heavily on national accounts sources, and aim 
(as much as possible) to create maximum consistency with current national accounts measures. Then, 
intangibles are expressed in per-capita terms (per worker or per employee) or as a percentage of a 
national accounts variable (e.g. as a share of output or as a share of labour costs), and subsequently 
“worked back” using their employment, output and cost shares. A tentative comparison suggests that 
this approach leads to overall somewhat lower measures of intangible investment by about 
1.5 percentage points of GDP on average.12 
4.  Intangible assets contributed to labour productivity
Our results suggest that intangibles are an important component of output, and that their omission 
biases the GDP estimates that are important for the formulation of economic policy. In this section, 
we show that they are also an important source of economic growth. Using the investment estimates 
developed in the preceding sections, we now proceed to implement the modified Solow sources-of-
growth model set out in Equation (2) of Section 2.
10  See Annex 1 for further details. Currently, with support from the National Science Foundation, The Conference Board is 
conducting research and designing a survey to determine the validity of these assumptions for the finance and insurance 
industry. 
11  At the time the US estimates were developed, the industry accounts were undergoing a shift in classification systems and 
sufficient and up-to-date information was not available.
12  With thanks to Mary O’Mahony for sharing this comparison with us.
We use a wide range of 
data sources including 
national accounts and 
surveys from statistical 
offices and trade 
associations.
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A number of steps are needed to transform the data on intangible investment into the capital stocks 
and capital service prices needed for Equation (2). First, we use a perpetual-inventory method to 
measure the stocks of intangible capital (a proxy for the flow of capital services). This step involves 
adding each year’s investment in each type of intangible to the depreciated amount of the preceding 
year’s capital stock. Unfortunately, relatively little is known about depreciation for intangibles, so we 
follow the assumptions by CHS (2005; 2009), which use an annual rate of 33 percent for computerized 
information, 15 percent for R&D, 60 percent for advertising and 40 percent for firm specific resources 
(see Table A.2 in Annex 2). In each case, we create initial capital stocks in the beginning year, which in 
our case is 1995, by cumulating investments over previous years.13 Given the relatively high depreciation 
rates, most of each investment is depreciated away within five years, so it is sufficient to extrapolate 
the investment series back to 1990.
The next step is to calculate the user cost of each asset type, including intangibles. The user cost is 
made up of the rate of return, the depreciation rate and a capital gains term. For the rate of return we 
may assume the same rate for intangible capital as for tangible capital, assuming that businesses 
arbitrage their investments across all types of capital, investing in each type until the rate of return for 
all assets is equal (CHS 2009, p. 677). The income accruing to each type of capital in each year is then 
found by multiplying the quantity of stock by the corresponding user cost, and the cost shares can 
then be calculated.
Table 4 summarizes the contributions of intangibles to the growth rate of labour productivity growth 
in the market sector for the eleven countries included in this study. The updated US estimates show 
that the growth in intangible capital per unit of labour (“intangible capital deepening”) contributed 
an average 0.8 percentage points to the annual growth of US labour productivity from 1995 to 2006.14 
In the UK, intangible-asset deepening increased labour productivity by an average of 0.7 percentage 
points per year, from 1995 to 2006 (MHW 2009). In Germany, intangible assets contributed to labour 
productivity growth by 0.4 percentage points per year on average from 1995 to 2006, in France by 
0.5 percentage points, in Italy and in Spain by 0.1 percentage points.
Table 4 also shows the estimates for the contribution of intangible assets to labour productivity growth 
in the market sectors of Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark and Greece. In Denmark and the Czech 
Republic intangible assets contributed to 0.7 percentage points to labour productivity growth, compared 
to 0.6 percentage points in Austria and only 0.2 percentage points in Greece.15 
13  The starting year is 1995 for most countries, but 1997 is the first year for the Czech Republic given available estimates on 
capital gains, and 2000 is the first year for which a stock of tangible capital could be produced for Slovakia.
14  Unlike the original CHS (2009) estimates and official MFP estimates for the United States, the estimates in Table 4 do not 
include contributions from land and inventory capital. We do this to strengthen the international comparisons made in 
this paper, as estimates of multi-factor productivity for most countries generally do not account for land and inventory 
capital. 
15  For Slovakia, the growth accounts estimates start only in 2006, showing a contribution of about 0.2-0.3 percentage points 
to labour productivity growth
A number of steps are 
needed to make the 
intangible investment 
series usable in growth 
accounting.
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Figures 4a and 4b reproduce the results from Table 4 graphically. In Figure 4a, we show that the average 
contribution of intangibles ranges from less than 10 percent of labour productivity growth in the case 
of Greece to 40 percent in Italy. However, overall labour productivity growth has been very low in Italy 
(as well as in Spain) due to a strong negative contribution from a decline in MFP. In Denmark, intangible-
capital deepening accounts for 34 percent of labour productivity growth.


































































Source:  See Table 4 
Note:    GDP is conventionally measured (including software and mineral exploration but excluding other intangibles).
Figure 4b.   Contribution of sub-components of intangibles to labour productivity growth, annual 


































































Source:  See Table 4 
Note:    GDP is conventionally measured (including software and mineral exploration but excluding other intangibles).
The contribution of 
intangibles to labour 
productivity growth 
ranges from about  
10 to 40 percent.
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Figure 4a also shows that in most Europeans countries the growth contributions from intangible 
capital deepening are smaller or at best close to the growth contribution of tangible capital (which 
includes ICT capital excluding software, and non-ICT capital which are mainly equipment and 
structures). Except for the United States, only one other European country (Denmark) is showing a 
much larger contribution from intangible capital deepening. Non-ICT capital tends to be dominated 
by traditional types of “brick and mortar” capital used in the manufacturing sector, suggesting the 
importance of structural differences in the economies in the comparison, although some of the 
brick-and-mortar capital may in fact be rather high in technology (e.g. advanced machine tools). 
Figure 4b compares the absolute contributions of intangible capital to labour productivity as well 
as the breakdown into contributions from computerized information, innovative property and 
economic competency. The figure reveals that the largest differences in contributions are due to 
economic competencies. The countries are ranked in the same way as in Figure 2, that is, according 
to the share of intangible investment in GDP (“intangible intensity”) in 2006. The comparison suggests 
that there is no perfect relationship between intangible intensity (as in Figure 2) and the growth 
contribution from intangible capital deepening (as in Figure 4). In particular, Denmark (showing a 
relatively high contribution from computerized information) and the Czech Republic (showing a 
large impact from innovative property) are among the most important outliers. 
All in all, one may distinguish between four groups of countries in terms of their intangibles 
contribution to output and productivity growth: (1) the US and the UK, which show rapid labour 
productivity growth and high contributions of intangibles; (2) France, Denmark, Germany and 
Austria, which still show significant contributions against the backdrop of smaller growth rates of 
labour productivity; (3) catching-up countries such as the Czech Republic and Greece (and also 
Slovakia) which show much larger contributions from non-ICT-capital deepening than from 
intangibles, and – in some cases – also larger MFP growth rates related to the restructuring of those 
economies; and (4) laggard economies, such as Italy and Spain, which show small absolute 
contributions of intangibles coupled with slow growth of labour productivity and even negative 
contributions from MFP growth. 
5.  Intangible investment and levels of economic development
A look at international data on R&D spending and brand equity, as well as the location of the largest 
non-financial non-resource companies, suggests a high concentration of intangible capital in the 
richest countries of the world. For example, today five countries – the US, Japan, Germany, France 
and the UK – account for 75 percent of R&D spending in the world in 2005 (OECD 2008). One reason 
for this concentration may be that high-income countries tend to have more of everything that is 
economically valuable, including this particular kind of capital. However, there are other reasons 
for intangibles to be concentrated in these countries.
First, less-developed countries may be less likely to invest in intangibles because of their industrial 
structure. To the extent that they specialize in sectors where low wages provide a competitive 
advantage, they may be able to make do with technology developed elsewhere. Technology transfer 
and diffusion is less costly for them than domestic development programmes in R&D, knowledge 
creation and other intangibles. However, this tends to change as their production moves up the 
supply chain to higher-value-added activities. For example, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2002) 
distinguish three groups of countries, of which only the first small group develops leading-edge 
R&D which accounts for most of the R&D spending in combination with the highest growth rates 
Intangible investment 
is concentrated on the 
world’s richest countries, 
arguably because…
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of output. The second group of countries primarily uses technology developed elsewhere, using a 
pool of skilled workers to absorb it. The third group is unable to develop their own technologies or 
even use other countries’ technologies as they lack absorption capacity. Another factor is the larger 
share of service industries, which tend to rely more strongly on intangibles (van Ark et al. 2003).
A second reason for a concentration of intangibles and a strong intangible effect on growth is that 
lower-income countries may not be able to afford risky upfront investment in activities with an 
uncertain outcome, such as R&D or huge advertising expenses with uncertain results in the longer 
term. In a Schumpeterian competition environment (which has been identified earlier as relevant 
to the discussion on intangibles), there is often a “winner takes all” outcome (e.g. in packaged 
consumer software) or a few major rivals (e.g. in pharmaceuticals). In such an environment, small or 
under-resourced economies may lack the incentives to invest in intangible capital. 
Third, innovations often require a mature and sizeable stock market and ample venture capital. 
Stock markets and venture capital are key financial sources of innovation. While traditional financial 
instruments, such as regular loans, often favour long-term tangible investment, using building and 
machines as collaterals, they tend not to finance risky R&D. In contrast, stock markets and venture 
capital are typically friendlier toward intangible investment. Investors in stock markets value R&D 
and other intangible investment. Hall (1999) shows that R&D and patents are strongly related to 
stock prices. Venture capital is seeking investment with high risk and high return. 
Finally, innovations driven by intangible investment might require a flexible labour market. Innovation 
projects are risky, and innovation programs are often discontinued because of a competitor’s success 
or the programme’s failure. In such cases, researchers may face layoffs, and require wage premiums 
or job guarantees in order to accept employment. These premiums and guarantees are less important 
when the market for researchers is relatively thick and flexible, giving an advantage to larger, richer, 
countries with bigger pools of highly-educated people and a tradition of job switching.16
Unfortunately, our sample is at this point not large or broad enough to fully address this issue. 
Despite important differences, the eleven countries we have dealt with so far are among the richest 
in the world. Nevertheless, we can have a look at our sample to see if there is evidence of a correlation 
between intangible investment and the level of income per capita and labour productivity. To do 
this, we combine our estimates for the eleven countries included in this study with the results on 
intangible investment analysis for five other countries, including Australia (Barnes and McClure 
2009), Finland (Jalava et al. 2007), Japan (Fukao et al. 2007; 2009), the Netherlands (van Rooijen-
Horsten et al. 2008), and Sweden (Edquist 2009). Figure 5a shows the relation between the relative 
levels of income per capita converted into purchasing power parities (PPP) and intangible investment 
as a percentage of GDP, for the period from 2001 to 2004. The figure shows a positive association 
between the two variables. As an additional control, Figure 5b shows the link between relative 
levels of income per capita (PPP-converted) and the ratio of intangible to tangible investment as a 
percentage of GDP, revealing a positive correlation, too. The latter confirms that the positive 
association appears to be limited to intangibles and does not apply to income and capital more 
broadly. However, the correlations are far from perfect, as the cases of Japan, Finland, and the UK 
show. 
16  If a firm has to offer employees long-term employment contracts, it may be more likely to develop incremental technology 
than high technology. For example, it has been argued that the relatively rigid labour market in Germany has led to more 
success in traditional chemical industries rather than high-technology industries (Streeck 1992 and Katzenstein 1989). 
…they can afford risky 
upfront investment and 
have large high-skilled 
labour markets, deep 
stock markets and 
ample venture capital.
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Source:  See Figure 5b
Notes:  See Figure 5b.






















































GDP per capita (EKS PPP $)
Source:    GDP per capita is from the The Conference Board, Total Economy Database, version June 2009. For intangible 
investment, sources are Jalava et al. (2007) for Finland, Fukao et al. (2009) for Japan, Edquist (2009) for Sweden, 
Van Rooijen-Horsten et al. (2008) for the Netherlands and Barnes and McClure (2009) for Australia. For the other 
countries see Figures 1a and 1b.
Notes:    The 16 countries are Australia (AU), Austria (AT), Czech Republic (CZ), Denmark (DK), Finland (FI), France (FR), 
Germany (DE), Greece (EL), Italy (IT), Japan (JP), the Netherlands (NL), Slovakia (SK), Spain (ES), Sweden (SE), the UK 
and the US. Intangible investment is the average investment from 2001 to 2004 for all countries, except the US 
(2000-2003), Finland (2000 and 2005) and Sweden (2004).
Figures 6a and 6b show that the correlation is weaker when the per-capita-income variable is 
replaced with the level of labour productivity. However, if the relationship between the ratio of 
intangible to tangible investment and a living-standards variable is fit with an exponential trend, 
the strength of the relationship does not vary substantially according to which measure of living 
standards is used.
Intangible-investment 
intensity is correlated 
with the level of 
economic development, 
whether measured by 
per-capita income…
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Hourly labour productivity (EKS PPP)
Source:  See Figure 5b
Notes:  See Figure 5b.























































Hourly labour productivity (EKS PPP)
Source:  See Figure 5b
Notes:  See Figure 5b.
Figures 7a and 7b examine the link between stock market capitalization and venture capital, on 
the one hand, and investment in intangible assets on the other. Figure 7a shows that the size of 
stock markets as a percentage of GDP is strongly related to the level of intangible investment 
over the period 2001-2004. Figure 7b shows that venture capital (early stage and expansion and 
replacement stage) as a percentage of GDP is also strongly related to the level of intangible 
investment. 
Finally, we have already noted that the non-rival nature of knowledge capital implies a theoretical 
link to MFP growth via the diffusion of knowledge. For example, in the case of R&D, US estimates 
suggest that between a fifth and a quarter of business sector MFP may be due to R&D spillovers. 
…or hourly labour 
productivity.
VOL_1_03_EIB_Papers_Vol_14_Nr_1_VAN_ARK.indd   81 23/12/09   14:49:03If this spillover result can be generalized, there should be a positive association between the 
importance of intangibles as a source of labour-productivity growth and the size of MFP growth. 
This positive association is evident in Figure 8. Even though additional research is needed to 
establish their importance, these results suggest that spillovers from intangibles may exist beyond 
the well-researched effects from R&D.


















































Market capitalization (percent of GDP)
Source:  See Figure 5b
Note:    Market capitalization is the value of the stock market as a percentage of GDP. We use the average percentage from 
2000 to 2006.



















































Venture capital (percent of GDP)
Source:  See Figure 5b
Note:    We include venture capital for the early stage, expansion and replacement, and average the values from 2000 to 
2006.
While the link between intangibles and economic development may be blurred by conditional factors 
and endogeneity issues, there are theoretical reasons to believe that it exists and that it is important. 
Our sample is too small to pin down the size of the effect, but the various pieces of evidence we have 
presented suggest that the importance of intangible capital as a source of growth is large and it 
increases with the level of economic development.
Intangible investment 
is strongly related to 
the size of stock- and 
venture capital markets.
82            Volume14  N°1   2009           EIB  PAPERS























































Source:  See Figure 5b
Note:    The 13 countries are Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Slovakia, 
Spain, the UK and the US.
6.  Conclusion
The current economic downturn has distracted attention away from long-term value-building 
investments in intangibles, which are the ultimate key to recharging our knowledge economy, to 
providing higher rewards to labour and capital and to raising productivity in a sustainable manner. 
Investments in intangibles are also the “foundation” on which short-term stimulation measures are 
anchored. Companies will not commit resources to significant near-term expansion unless it is consistent 
with their overall business model – a model that is supported by intangible capital. 
In this article we have discussed the state of the art in the measurement of intangible capital and its 
contribution to economic growth, with a focus on international comparisons currently available. Our 
core group of eleven countries for which we have been able to build measures of intangible investment 
intensity and of intangible capital deepening shows that intangibles have a large impact on growth. 
To omit intangibles from the analysis of growth is therefore to present a biased picture of the growth 
process. 
Intangible capital explains about a quarter of labour-productivity growth in the US and larger countries 
of the EU. However, the growth patterns of individual countries in the EU vary considerably. Notably 
the continental West-European countries show a distinction between countries with significant 
contributions from intangible capital deepening (although less than in the US and the UK, the lead 
countries) and a group of laggards (Italy and Spain) that show small absolute contributions of intangibles, 
slow growth of labour productivity and even negative contributions from MFP growth. Catching-up 
countries such as the Czech Republic, Greece and Slovakia show much larger contributions from non-
ICT capital deepening than from intangibles, and – in some cases – also larger MFP growth rates related 
to the restructuring of those economies.
Our analysis suggests that higher rates of investment in intangibles (as a share of GDP) are often 
associated with higher growth rates of GDP per capita, which might be attributed to a higher propensity 
to invest in higher-income (and productivity) countries. Returns to scale in innovation and possibly 
Intangible capital 
explains about a quarter 
of labour-productivity 
growth in the US and in 
the larger EU countries.
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Moreover, the non-rivalry in the use of knowledge capital may make across-the-board competition 
for the development of new technology non-optimal, since new technology in the follower countries 
can more often be obtained by technology transfer and diffusion.
This study has identified several areas for further refinement of intangible capital concepts and more 
precise measurement. The best evidence that there is a need to significantly broaden the concept of 
capital as a source of growth is made by many who are associated with the business community 
asserting that brand equity and human capital are at least as important as R&D to most businesses. 
From the narrow standpoint of economic self-interest, policy-makers in high-income countries should 
encourage investment in intangibles to protect their country’s advantage in the globalized world.17 
On the other hand, policy-makers in emerging economies may see the promotion of this form of 
investment as a way of laying the foundations of higher long-term growth and faster convergence to 
the technological frontier.
17  This objective is all the more important in this period of economic downturn, since intangible investments may have 
been hit harder than other components of GDP, and R&D and other non-production workers have experienced steeper 
employment losses. See for example, Michael Mandel in Business Week of November 9, 2009.
Many in the business 
community assert that 
brand equity and human 
capital are at least as 
important as R&D.
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Denmark, Greece and Slovakia
This annex gives an overview of the sources and methods to obtain estimates of intangible capital for 
the five new European countries that have been added in this study.18 They largely follow the 
methodology laid out by Corrado, Hulten and Sichel (CHS 2005 and CHS 2009), which also represents 
the sources for the US figures used in this study. For the UK we rely on Marrano, Haskel and Wallis (MHW 
2007; 2009) while for France, Germany, Italy and Spain, results are based on Hao et al. (2009).
1.  Computerized information 
The major component of computerized information is software. The data source for Austria, Czech 
Republic and Denmark from 1995 to 2005 is EU KLEMS which is an internationally comparative database 
on growth and productivity accounts currently housed at the University of Groningen (www.euklems.
net). The capital account of EU KLEMS provides estimates of the investment and stocks of eight assets 
– (1) software, (2) computing equipment, (3) communications equipment, (4) transport equipment, (5) 
other machinery and equipment, (6) total non-resident investment, (7) residential structures, and (8) 
other assets. Since EU KLEMS does not provide software investment in 2006, we use national accounts 
to extend our estimates from 2005 to 2006. We use the estimates of software investment by industry 
in 2006 for Czech Republic, and use the growth rates from 2005 to 2006 of “intangible investment” 
provided by national accounts for Austria and Denmark. “Intangible assets” in national accounts include 
only a small fraction of intangible assets as defined in our research. For example, 90 percent of “Intangible 
assets” in Danish national accounts are software investment and 10 percent are exploratory drilling 
and copyrights19.
For Slovakia, no data source provides software investment, so we have to roughly estimate software 
investment. Our data source is IT Association Slovakia and EU KLEMS. IT Association Slovakia provides 
the domestic sales of software in Slovakia in 2000 and 2003. We average the ratio of domestic sales to 
the output of the software industry, assuming that domestic sales equal software investment, and use 
that ratio to estimate the software investment for the other years. 
For Greece, the data source for the period from 1980 to 2004 is Timmer et al. (2003, updated to 2005). 
They calculate an average ratio of software to office and computer equipment for France, Italy and the 
UK, and multiply that ratio with investment in office and computer equipment in Greece. We estimate 
year 2005 using the growth rate of the gross output of industry “computer and related activities” 
(NACE 72, version 1), which is taken from EU KLEMS. We estimate year 2006 using the growth rate of 
the turnover of NACE 72 (National Statistical Service of Greece). 
The other component of computerized information is databases. Database activities include the 
following four activities (The Encyclopedia for Classification Codes, 2007): (1) on-line database publishing, 
(2) on-line directory and mailing list publishing, (3) other on-line publishing, and (4) web search portals. 
We argue that companies increase their productivity by accessing data online, so we treat the revenues 
of Database Activities as companies’ investment in databases. 
18  Further details are available from the authors upon request. 
19  National Accounts, sources and methods, 2003. Available at http://www.dst.dk/HomeUK/Guide/documentation/NatAcc/
methods2003.aspx
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activities”, according to NACE codes list). The data source is EU KLEMS for the years 1995 to 2004, and 
we update the data to 2005 and 2006 using national accounts. For Austria, the Structural Business 
Survey of Eurostat provides the output of NACE 724 (“database activities”) in 2006. We average the 
output of 2004 and 2006 to estimate the output in 2005. For the Czech Republic, we use a time trend 
to estimate database investment in 2005 and 2006. For Denmark, we assume that the output of NACE 724 
grew at the same rate as the output of NACE 72 in 2005 and 2006. The national accounts of Denmark 
provide the output of NACE 72 from 2004 to 2006. For Greece, we estimate year 2005 using the growth 
rate of the gross output of NACE 72 (EU KLEMS). We estimate year 2006 using the growth rate of the 
turnover of NACE 72 (National Statistical Service of Greece). For Slovakia, we estimate database 
investment using the growth rate of intangible investment in 2005 and 2006 provided by the national 
accounts.
2.  Innovative property 
Innovative property includes both scientific and non-scientific innovation. The components of innovative 
property are (1) R&D in natural science and social science, (2) mineral explorations, (3) copyright and 
license costs, (4) development costs of new products in the financial industry, and (5) new architectural 
and engineering designs. 
R&D. The data source is Eurostat. Eurostat provides R&D expenditure from 1981 to 2004, including both 
natural science and social sciences. The R&D data are, inter alia broken down by institutional sector: 
business enterprise sector, government sector, higher education sector, and private non-profit sector. 
To measure how much market sectors spend on R&D, we exclude expenditure by government and 
higher education sector. 
Mineral explorations. We have no data for mineral exploration, but that is unlikely to impact our 
estimates. Existing literature shows that mineral exploration is less than 0.04 percent of GDP for countries 
with intangible estimates other than the US.
Copyright and license costs. We approximate copyright and license costs at three times the production 
cost of movies. The data source for year 2000 to 2005 is Screen Digest (2007).20 Screen Digest provides 
production costs of movies for 59 countries from 2000 to 2005. For the year 2006, the turnover of 
motion picture, music and publishing from the Short-term Business Statistics provided by Eurostat is 
used to estimate production costs for Austria, Denmark and Slovakia while a time trend is used for the 
Czech Republic and Greece. A drawback of this estimation method is that some countries have a small 
movie industry, and we would underestimate copyright and license costs for those countries.
Development costs of new products in the financial industry. The data are intermediate costs in the 
financial industry provided by EU KLEMS from 1995 to 2005. We update the data to 2006. For Austria, 
Denmark and Slovakia, the information is taken directly from the national accounts. Since this is not 
possible for the other two countries, we assume the (unreported) growth rate of intermediate costs 
to equal the 2006 growth rate of output (Czech Republic) or that of value added (Greece) of the financial 
sector.
We assume that the financial industry invested 20 percent of the intermediate costs in developing new 
products. 
20  Available at www.screendigest.com
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NACE 742 (‘architectural, engineering and other technical activities’) and is taken from EU KLEMS. We 
update output measures to 2006 using national accounts and Eurostat. For Austria, the data source is 
Structural Business Statistics 2006 provided by the national accounts (www.statistik.at). We use the 
average of 2004 and 2006 as an estimate of year 2005. For the Czech Republic, Denmark and Slovakia, 
we use the turnover index of architectural and engineering of 2005 and 2006 from the Short-term 
Business Survey provided by Eurostat. For Greece, we estimate year 2005 using the growth rate of the 
gross output of NACE 74 provided by EU KLEMS. We estimate year 2006 using the growth rate of the 
turnover of NACE 74 provided by the National Statistical Service of Greece.
We estimate investment as half of the gross output coming from NACE 742.
3.  Economic competencies 
Economic competencies include brand equity, firm-specific human capital and organizational 
capital. 
Brand equity. Firms can increase their brand equity by advertising their brands or by researching the 
market. The data sources for advertisement are EU KLEMS, World Magazine Trends and national accounts. 
EU KLEMS provides the gross output of the advertising industry (NACE 744, “advertising”) from 1970 
to 2004. We update the output to year 2005 and 2006 using national accounts. For Austria, the data 
source is Structural Business Statistics 2006 provided by Eurostat.21 We use the average of 2004 and 
2006 to estimate year 2005. For the Czech Republic, Denmark and Slovakia, we use the advertisement 
index in 2005 and 2006 from the Short-term Business Survey of Eurostat. For Greece, we estimate year 
2005 using the growth rate of the gross output of NACE 74 provided by EU KLEMS. We estimate year 
2006 using the growth rate of the turnover of NACE 74 provided by the National Statistical Service of 
Greece.
We assume that 60 percent of spending on advertisement is investment. Some of the advertising 
expenditure increases current sales but not sales after one year, so part of the advertising costs is 
current expenditure rather than investment. Classified advertisement is unlikely to form brands. We 
exclude half of newspaper advertisement. World Magazine Trends provide the percentages of 
advertisement on newspapers.22 
The data source of market research is the Structural Business Statistics of Eurostat. It provides the 
turnover of Market Research and Public Opinion Polling (NACE 7413). 
Firm-specific human capital. We measure how much firms spend on firm-specific human capital, using 
spending on initial vocational training and continuing vocational training. Initial vocational training 
relates to apprentice training (AT), whereas continuing vocational training (CVT) includes training 
courses, training at work places, training through job rotation, self-learning and learning at conferences, 
lectures and workshops. Initial vocational training includes apprentice training and full-time schooling. 
Since firms do not pay for full-time schooling, we exclude it.
Our major data sources of AT and CVT are the Labour Cost Survey (LCS) 2004 provided by Eurostat, 
Continuing Vocational Training Survey (CVTS) 2005 provided by Eurostat, labour compensations 
provided by EU KLEMS before 2006 and national accounts in 2006.
21  Available at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/
22  Available at http://www.warc.com/LandingPages/Data/MagazineTrends/
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Organizational structure. There are two major ways to improve organizational structure. Managers 
spend time on making firms more efficient (own-account organizational capital), or firms purchase 
management consultancy services to solve problems of organizational structure.
The data sources of own-account organizational capital are EU KLEMS, national accounts, and the 
Structure of Earnings Survey (SES) 2002 from Eurostat. We assume that managers spend 20 percent of 
their time on improving organizational structures. Following CHS (2005), we assume that 4 percentage 
points of those efforts improve current organizational structure and 16 percentage points improve 
future organizational structure, so investment in own-account organizational capital is assumed to 
equal 16 percent of manager compensation. 
The data source of management consultancy is the Annual Survey of the European Management 
Consultancy Market, provided by the European Federation of Management Consultancies Associations 
(FEACO). The survey covers five classes of management consultancy – operations management, 
information technology, corporate strategy services, human resources management and outsourcing 
services – for eleven private sectors and three public sectors. FEACO provides the market size of 
management consultancy from 1998 to 2006 for Austria, Czech Republic and Denmark, and from 1998 
to 2004 for Greece and Slovakia. We update the data to 2005 and 2006. For Greece, we estimate year 
2005 using the growth rate of the gross output of NACE 74 (EU KLEMS) and year 2006 using the growth 
rate of the turnover of NACE 74 (National Statistical Service of Greece). For Slovakia, we estimate year 
2005 and 2006 using the turnover index of management consulting from the Short-term Business 
Survey provided by Eurostat. 
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Annex 2.    Sources and methods to develop growth accounts including intangibles for 
Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Greece and Slovakia
Value-added and labour input. EU KLEMS provides the real value-added (double-deflated, i.e. gross 
output deflate with output deflators and intermediate inputs deflated with input deflators) and labour 
input by industry from 2000 to 2005. National accounts provide value-added and labour input for 
2006. EU KLEMS provide eight variables of labour input: (1) total hours worked, (2) hours worked of 
high-skilled labour, (3) hours worked of medium-skilled labour, (4) hours worked of low-skilled labour, 
(5) total labour compensation, (6) compensation of high-skilled labour, (7) compensation of medium-
skilled labour, and (8) compensation of low-skilled labour.
Investment and stock of tangible assets. For Austria, the Czech Republic and Denmark, the data sources 
are EU KLEMS from 1995 to 2005 and national accounts in 2006. For Greece, the data sources are Timmer 
et al. (2003, updated to 2005) for 1995 to 2004 and national accounts for 2005 and 2006. For Slovakia, 
the source is national accounts from 2000 to 2006.
We measure two groups of tangible assets for Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark and Greece. ICT 
tangible assets include computing equipment and communication equipment. Non-ICT tangible assets 
include non-residential buildings and other tangible assets. We exclude residential structures because 
they are not used in production. For Slovakia, we do not separate ICT assets from non-ICT assets 
because the national accounts of Slovakia provide no data on the division between them. 
Investment and stock of intangible assets. EU KLEMS provides data on the investment and stock of 
software for Austria, the Czech Republic and Denmark. The investment in other intangibles is our own 
estimate. Furthermore, we estimate the stock of each intangible asset using the perpetual inventory 
method (PIM), a method to calculate capital stock from investment flows. The capital stock of the 
current period is the capital stock of the previous period minus depreciation and plus new 
investment. 
Deflators and capital gains. EU KLEMS provides the deflator of tangible assets. We use the deflator of 
aggregate market-sector value-added as the deflator of intangible assets, following CHS (2005). Also 
following the method of CHS (2006), we use a three-year average of deflators to calculate the capital 
gains of each asset. 
Depreciation rates. EU KLEMS provides the depreciation rates of tangible assets, software and databases. 
CHS (2005) provide the depreciation rates for other types of intangible assets. Table A1 below lists the 
values of depreciation rates.
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ABSTRACT
Kieran Mc Morrow (Kieran.Mcmorrow@ec.europa.eu) and Werner Röger 
(Werner.Roeger@ec.europa.eu) are, respectively, Economic Analyst and 
Head  of  the  econometric  modelling  and  medium-term  studies  Unit 
at the European Commission, DG Economic and Financial Affairs. The 
opinions contained in this paper are those of the authors and should 
not be attributed to the European Commission. 
This paper reviews the empirical literature on rates of 
return on R&D and interprets the economic significance 
of these estimates using a semi-endogenous growth 
model with a calibrated knowledge production sector. 
We  analyse  how  R&D  subsidies,  a  reduction  of 
entry barriers for start-ups and increasing high-skilled 
labour would contribute towards raising productivity 
and knowledge investment in the EU. The simulation 
results show that substantial efforts will have to be 
made  if  Europe  wants  to  come  close  to  achieving 
the  Lisbon  productivity  and  knowledge-investment 
targets.  Achieving  US  standards  in  all  three  areas 
would reduce the productivity gap by about 50 percent. 
Improving  the  quality  of  tertiary  education  and 
increasing competition in non-manufacturing sectors 
would  also  help  the  EU  to  get  to  the  productivity 
frontier. 
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R&D capital and economic growth: 
The empirical evidence
1.  Introduction
It is now widely recognized in the economic literature that R&D and innovation are major drivers of 
economic growth. An economy’s ability to develop novel technologies and to adapt to a rapidly 
changing technological environment is seen as essential to its prospects for improving standards of 
living and prosperity. This paper looks at the empirical evidence on the productivity and growth effects 
of R&D at the macro, industry and firm levels and discusses the policy implications of the main findings. 
There are of course numerous approaches for carrying out such an analysis such as calibrated Dynamic 
Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models, growth accounting and growth regressions. These 
latter approaches have generally been complementary, with improved input and output measurement 
narrowing down growth in total factor productivity (TFP), the unexplained part of GDP growth, and 
macro, industry and firm-level regressions explaining what drives TFP. 
The paper is essentially split into three sections, with Section 2 giving a survey of the literature of 
regression-type macro, industry and firm level analyses of the link between R&D1 and productivity 
growth, with a short summary on the evidence from growth-accounting studies2. Section 3 discusses 
R&D-related policy insights based on simulations with the QUEST III DSGE model and the final section 
draws some conclusions and policy implications from the analyses presented. 
2.  R&D and productivity growth: A review of the literature3
The present section focuses on a review of the empirical literature. Most of the evidence presented 
assesses the strength of the relationship between private R&D and productivity growth, with Box 1 
focusing on the efficiency and effectiveness of public sector spending on R&D. Whilst it is clear that 
direct and indirect public sector spending on R&D has a positive effect on private R&D spending and 
on the efficiency of private sector research personnel, there is nevertheless considerable evidence to 
support the view that it is mainly private-sector R&D which drives the positive association between 
R&D intensity and output growth in economies (see for example Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2001) 
and Sveikauskas (20074). This section is divided into four sub-sections. Sub-section 2.1 gives an overview 
of the different methods employed to assess the impact of R&D as well as looking at important 
measurement issues which render definitive statements regarding the strength of the relationship 
between R&D and growth difficult. Sub-section 2.2 reviews econometric estimates of the direct and 
indirect (i.e. spillover) impact of R&D. After a brief summary of growth accounting estimates of the 
contribution of R&D in Sub-section 2.3, the section closes with an overall assessment of the impact of 
R&D on growth.
1    R&D is an admittedly narrow definition of intangible capital but, currently, little internationally comparable data is available 
with respect to other forms of knowledge capital.
2    For a growth-accounting perspective on productivity, with and without intangible capital, see Hao and van Ark (2009) in 
this issue.
3    This section of the paper draws in particular on a number of OECD Science, Technology and Industry Outlooks (OECD 2004, 
2006, 2008); Australian Industry Commission (1995); Congressional Budget Office (2005); Fraumeni and Okubo (2005) and 
Sveikauskas (2007).
4    Sveikauskas (2007) states: “The overall rate of return to R&D is very large […]. However, these returns apply only to privately 
financed R&D in industry. Returns to many forms of publicly financed R&D are near zero.”
Kieran Mc Morrow
Werner Röger
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Box 1.    Efficiency and effectiveness of public spending on R&D
Improving the efficiency and effectiveness of public spending represents an important tool for 
maintaining the fiscal discipline requested by the Stability and Growth Pact and promoting the 
structural reform agenda of Lisbon. Although the measurement of efficiency and effectiveness 
of public spending on R&D raises several methodological difficulties, progress has been made 
in developing the necessary measurement techniques applied to individual spending areas – i.e. 
public activities in R&D, education, health care, infrastructure – on a cross-country basis. 
Empirical research in this area indicates that there is a significant potential for increased efficiency 
in public spending across EU member states (Afonso et al. 2005; Mandl et al. 2008). There is 
evidence of the effect from several economic and social indicators, such as the level of education, 
the strength of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) systems, trade openness, and transparency in 
public policy, on the efficiency of public spending across countries (Afonso and St. Aubyn 2006; 
Jaumotte and Pain 2005a and b). Moreover, several studies underline the existing complementarity 
between public and private R&D funding (David et al. 2000).
A recent study by Cincera et al. (2009) uses Stochastic Frontier Analysis and Data Envelopment 
Analysis to assess the efficiency of public R&D expenditure in stimulating private R&D. Both methods 
compute an efficiency score of the relationship between inputs (such as public R&D subsidies to 
the business sector, expenditure on R&D by higher education institutions and R&D conducted in 
public research organisations) and outputs (as measured by either private R&D spending or R&D 
personnel in the business sector). The empirical analysis is based on macro-economic data for a 
panel of OECD countries. The choice of the estimation method seems to affect to some extent the 
outcome of the analysis. The paper provides some methodological guidance in assessing the choice 
of the best methodology in relation to the sample of available data. 
The main results of the study can be summarised as follows.
1.    Innovative inputs, namely public R&D subsidies and expenditures on R&D by higher education 
institutions, have a positive impact on outputs, i.e. on private R&D spending and on R&D 
personnel in the business sector. 
2.    The relationship between inputs and outputs provides a measure of the efficiency of public 
spending on R&D. On the one hand, efficiency is found to be positively affected by stability-
oriented economic policies; by a legal structure which ensures security of property rights 
(including intellectual property rights); by an industrial structure oriented towards high-tech 
manufacturing sectors; by a more favourable tax regime for international trade; and by more 
deregulation in labour and product markets. On the other hand, efficiency is negatively 
influenced by high inflation rates and by the percentage of government expenditures 
compared with total consumption. 
3.    Japan, Switzerland and the US are ranked as the most efficient amongst 21 OECD countries. 
If the analysis is restricted to a shorter time period, these countries are joined on the efficiency 
frontier by some new member states (Cyprus, Estonia, Lithuania and Malta). This outcome is 
confirmed by the non-linear relationship between GDP per capita and efficiency scores. 
Indeed, countries having intermediate levels of GDP per capita are found to have lower 
efficiency scores. In turn, this outcome highlights the existence of a large amount of private 
R&D spending which is inelastic with respect to changes in the quantity of public R&D 
subsidies, especially in countries with low levels of public R&D. 
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2.1  Methods and measurement issues
There are a large variety of methods for estimating the contribution of R&D to productivity growth, 
with researchers using calibrated models, econometric analyses, growth accounting studies, and case 
studies or cost-benefit analyses.5 Since Section 3 will discuss calibrated DSGE model results and since 
case studies/cost-benefit analyses are generally biased towards an analysis of successful, rather than 
all, R&D projects, the present section focuses on the results from econometric analyses and growth 
accounting studies.
Econometric analyses can be used to estimate the direct and indirect (i.e. spillover) effects of R&D on 
productivity growth. Most of these analyses either estimate the effect of R&D spending on production 
costs (cost function studies) or on output/productivity (production function studies), with the latter 
in turn broken down into cross-sectional and time series studies. Whilst theoretically speaking, cost 
functions are broadly equivalent to production functions, they are much more complicated to estimate 
in practice and consequently production function studies are substantially more prevalent in the 
literature.
Growth-accounting studies (like calibrated models) use theory or empirical estimates from other studies 
to set the parameters of the production function, including an elasticity for R&D. Under the assumptions 
of competitive factor markets, full input utilisation and constant returns to scale, output growth is 
equal to the (income-share) weighted growth of inputs and TFP. In this way one can establish the 
proportion of output or productivity growth that is accounted for by the growth in labour, tangible 
capital, intangible capital (such as R&D) and TFP. However, calculating the share of total capital income 
which is attributable to intangible R&D investments is extremely difficult since R&D is generally not 
capitalised in the national accounts and consequently most researchers include R&D capital in the 
growth accounting framework by simply assuming a rate of return to R&D which has been taken from 
the empirical literature.
Given the intangible nature of knowledge investments such as R&D, all empirical studies of the impact 
of R&D on productivity are plagued by a number of fundamental measurement issues which need to 
be borne in mind when interpreting the empirical estimates. 
Measuring the returns to R&D is the first issue. It is hampered by the fact that a great deal of R&D is 
devoted to quality improvements. National statistical agencies try to capture these improvements in 
quality by using hedonic price indices. Aside from the inherent difficulties in constructing such indices, 
additional problems can emerge when quality adjustments are applied to some but not all industries, 
with a significant risk in these circumstances of R&D gains being wrongly attributed to certain industries. 
Denis et al. (2005) highlight this issue by questioning the results from a series of studies which concluded 
that the TFP growth in a number of “intensive ICT-using” industries in the US, such as wholesale and 
5    Given  the  macro-modelling  focus  of  the  analysis  in  Section  3,  we  limit  our  review  to  those  methods  which  could 
provide results pertinent to a model such as Quest III. Consequently, the list of the methods given in the text is clearly 
not exhaustive, with a number of other approaches providing useful insights into the links between technology and 
productivity. Notable omissions in the text include innovation surveys and research based on firm-level longitudinal 
databases. Innovation surveys have been extremely useful in demonstrating that R&D expenditures are only one element 
of a firm’s overall expenditure on innovation, showing for example that non-R&D expenditure is the dominant form of 
innovation spending in many market-services industries. In addition, microeconomic studies using longitudinal databases 
have highlighted the enormous differences in the productivity performances of firms. These studies have also added to our 
knowledge of the drivers of productivity within firms (e.g. technical change, accumulation of human capital, and “softer” 
non-technical innovations complementary investments linked with the introduction of organisational / managerial best 
practices) and of the drivers of productivity growth amongst firms (e.g. competition and “neo-Schumpeterian” creative-
destruction mechanisms). 
Econometric methods 
use either cost 
functions or production 
functions to assess the 
productivity effect of 
R&D investment.
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retail trade, rather than the TFP gains in the ICT producing sector had been the key factor driving EU-US 
TFP growth differentials in the post-1995 period. The Denis et al. research suggests that due to the 
above-mentioned problems with industry level output deflators, a higher proportion of the post-1995 
acceleration in US TFP should be attributed to the production of ICT rather than to the use of ICT. 
The second issue concerns the measurement of R&D inputs. A measure of the R&D capital stock is 
needed to compute the rate of return on R&D investment. Such investment may have similarities with 
physical-capital investment in that both are undertaken to secure (uncertain) future returns but R&D 
nevertheless differs from other investment in a number of important respects. Firstly, R&D investment 
creates intangible not tangible assets. Secondly, there is a greater degree of uncertainty regarding 
their rates of return. Thirdly, many of the activities which are classified as R&D have no market price. 
Finally, the economic depreciation/obsolescence rates to be applied to knowledge investment are 
inherently more complicated to calculate than for physical investment. All of the above factors underline 
the difficulties of providing an economy-wide measure of R&D capital. Furthermore, R&D capital forms 
only a subset of the overall knowledge capital stock in an economy, with the focus on R&D reflecting 
the fact that expenditure data are available for this part of the intangible capital stock. Despite the 
efforts of Corrado, Hulten and Sichel (2006), Haskel and Giorgio Marrano (2007), van Ark and Hulten 
(2007) and others, there is currently little “hard” data available with respect to other forms of knowledge 
capital.6 This will hopefully change in the near future due to the progress being made by many national 
statistical agencies with respect to innovation satellite accounts7 and also because many of the “spin-
off” research projects linked to the EU KLEMS research programme are expected to produce more 
comprehensive, internationally comparable, knowledge capital datasets for researchers to exploit. 
Measuring the indirect contribution of R&D to growth represents a third issue. Since technical knowledge 
(i.e. R&D capital) is non-rival in consumption and since it is partially non-excludable, R&D investment 
is likely to be subject to spillover effects, i.e. “unintended knowledge transfers” which are of benefit 
to more than the entity carrying out the R&D itself. R&D spillovers may therefore be one possible engine 
of endogenous growth, with R&D-based growth models stressing the existence of increasing returns 
to scale arising from the special property of knowledge to generate externalities.8 Whilst it is therefore 
broadly accepted that national and international R&D/knowledge spillovers could be one of the main 
driving forces of technical change, innovation and growth in an economy, estimating the effects of 
external knowledge on the productivity of firms is extremely difficult since, unlike many other types 
of externalities, knowledge spillovers are not directly observable. According to Mairesse and Mulkay 
(2008), “Economists can only strive to measure the effects of knowledge flow and stock variables on 
outcome variables like numbers of innovations or patents, and labour or total factor productivity. A 
related and difficult issue is to assess the spatial extent of knowledge spillovers. Other major problems 
are encountered in trying to understand and analyze the underlying channels of spillovers, the 
“mechanisms” by which they operate, and the conditions allowing firms to benefit from them.
6    See Hao and van Ark (2009, in this issue) for a more detailed account of the measurement of intangible capital more 
broadly defined.
7    According  to  Sveikauskas  (2007),  “Recent  years  have  seen  substantial  progress  towards  including  research  and 
development (R&D) as a capital investment within the national income accounts (Canberra Group II – 2003). Economists at 
the US BEA have prepared initial versions of an R&D satellite account. Economists in Australia and in the Netherlands have 
also reported initial R&D stocks for their countries. One main motive for adding R&D is to broaden the accounts to include 
a further important source of economic growth”.
8    These R&D-based endogenous growth models assume that the accumulation of R&D (i.e. knowledge capital) does not face 
diminishing returns.
It is difficult to measure 
R&D capital stocks, 
returns to R&D and 
spillovers.
VOL_1_04_EIB_Papers_Vol_14_Nr_1_ROGER.indd   98 23/12/09   14:49:20EIB  PAPERS           Volume14  N°1   2009            99
2.2   Econometric estimates of the direct and indirect (i.e. spillover) impact of private sector R&D
The direct impact of private-sector R&D (I): Elasticities 
Most empirical studies of R&D’s contribution to productivity growth use either time series or cross-
sectional data to assess the impact of R&D at the firm, industry or economy-wide levels. Table 1 gives 
an overview of the type of results obtained for the elasticity of output with respect to R&D at the 
different levels of aggregation.
With respect to firm and industry level analyses, Table 1 shows that very different results are obtained 
depending on whether one uses cross-sectional or time-series data. On the basis of cross-sectional 
data, the elasticity of R&D tends to lie between 0.10 and 0.20, whereas time series data produce much 
smaller coefficients, roughly half those from cross sectional studies. In principle the results using time 
series or cross-sectional data should yield broadly comparable coefficients. However, these differences, 
in a statistical sense, reflect the fact that R&D capital stock data have much less variation in the time 
series dimension than in the cross-sectional dimension (i.e. the variation across units at a single point 
in time), with the relatively smooth year-to-year changes in R&D in the time series studies consequently 
not capable of explaining much of the variation in productivity growth over time. The true value of 
the coefficient probably lies somewhere in the middle, with cross-sectional studies over-estimating 
and time series studies under-estimating the effects.
Table 1.  Selected estimates of the elasticity of output with respect to private R&D
Study R&D elasticity Sample
Cross-sectional data: Selected estimates of the elasticity from studies using firm and industry data
1. Schankerman (1981) 0.10-0.16 110 US firms (chemical and oil industries) – 1963 cross-section
2. Sveikauskas (1981) 0.22-0.25 144 US manufacturing industries (1959-1969)
3. Cunéo and Mairesse (1984) 0.20 182 French manufacturing firms (1972-1977)
(Sub-sample 1) (0.21) (98 firms in scientific sectors)
(Sub-sample 2) (0.11) (84 firms in non-scientific sectors)
4. Hall and Mairesse (1995) 0.05-0.25 197 French firms (1980-1987)
5. Wang and Tsai (2003) 0.19 136 Taiwanese manufacturing firms (1994-2000)
Time-series data: Selected estimates of the elasticity from studies using firm and industry data
1. Griliches (1980a and b) 0.08 883 US firms (1957-1965)
2. Cunéo and Mairesse (1984) 0.05 182 French manufacturing firms (1972-1977)
(Sub-sample 1) (0.14) (98 firms in scientific sectors)
(Sub-sample 2) (0.03) (84 firms in non-scientific sectors)
3. Griliches and Mairesse (1984) 0.09 133 US firms (1966-1977)
4. Hall and Mairesse (1995) 0-0.07 197 French firms (1980-1987)
5. Verspagen (1995)  (-0.02)-0.17 14 industries in 11 OECD countries (1973-1988)
Time-series data: Selected estimates of the elasticity from studies using economy-wide data
1. Nadiri (1980) 0.06-0.10 US (labour productivity) (1949-1978)
2. Patel and Soete (1988) 0.61 US (TFP) (1967-1985)
3. Lichtenberg (1992) 0.07 98 Countries (per capita output) (1960-1985)
4. Coe and Moghadam (1993) 0.17 France (output) (1971-1991)
5. Coe and Helpman (1995) 0.23 G7 countries (TFP) (1971-1990)
6. Coe and Helpman (1995) 0.08 Non-G7 OECD countries (TFP) (1971-1990)
Source:  Australian Industry Commission (1995), Congressional Budget Office (2005) and Sveikauskas (2007)
Note:   The results quoted in Bottazzi and Peri (2007) are qualitatively consistent with those of Coe and Helpman.
Cross-sectional studies 
find a 10-percent 
increase in private R&D 
to boost output by 1 to 
2 percent, time-series 
studies find only half 
that effect.
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The direct impact of private-sector R&D (II): Rates of Return
Rates of return to R&D are shown in Table 2. Although related to R&D output elasticities, they are not 
directly comparable. R&D rates of return provide a measure of the profitability of R&D investment and 
are calculated from standard TFP equations whereas R&D elasticities of output provide an estimate of 
the percentage increase in output resulting from a 1-percent increase in R&D inputs. As with the 
estimates of the R&D elasticity, Table 2 shows that the estimates for the rates of return to R&D investments 
vary widely. The table shows gross rates of return (i.e., including depreciation which generally is higher 
for knowledge capital such as R&D compared with physical capital) of as low as 6 percent and as high 
as 56 percent, with the central tendency being between 20 and 30 percent.
Table 2.    Private R&D’s contribution to productivity growth: Selected econometric estimates of 
the rate of return to R&D 
Study Rate of Return  
to R&D (percent)
Sample
Mansfield (1980) 27 16 US firms (Chemical & Petroleum industries) (1960-1976)
Griliches and Mairesse(1983) 28 528 US & French firms (1973-1978)
Clark and Griliches (1984) 20 924 US manufacturing plants (1970-1980)
Odagiri and Iwata (1986) 20 135 Japanese firms (1966-1973)
Mansfield (1988) 42 17 Japanese industries (1960-1979)
Goto and Suzuki (1989) 22 - 56 40 Japanese manufacturing firms (1976-1984)
Griliches (1994) 12 - 46 142 US manufacturing industries (1958-1989)
Hall and Mairesse (1995) 6 - 34 197 French firms (1980-1987)
Jones and Williams (1998) 35 12 US manufacturing industries (1961-1989)
Source:  Australian Industry Commission (1995), Congressional Budget Office (2005) and Sveikauskas (2007)
Some studies estimate rates of return from a cost function (as opposed to a production function). 
Concerning these studies, the Australian Industry Commission report on “Research and Development” 
(1995) suggests that rates of return to R&D are broadly comparable to the rates estimated using TFP 
equations. Examples of studies using the cost function approach include Bernstein (1989) and 
Bernstein and Nadiri (1988, 1991). Bernstein (1989) estimates that the mean rates of return to R&D at 
the industry level are much higher than those on physical capital, with R&D rates of return ranging 
from 24% to 47% compared with 9% to 12% for physical capital. This conclusion is also supported 
by the very similar results reported in Bernstein and Nadiri (1988, 1991). These cost function results 
suggest that not only are returns to R&D higher compared with those of physical capital but the R&D 
returns are subject to much greater variability. In addition, it is not clear from this segment of the 
literature whether R&D earns higher rates of return compared with physical capital investments after 
adjusting for the additional risks involved and once one allows for the negative relationship between 
the gross rate of return & the length of asset lives. Finally, a notable feature of the results from cost 
function studies is that R&D capital and physical capital tend to be complements rather than 
substitutes.
A striking – but common – result from the cost- and production-function studies alike is the large 
industry variation in rates of return to R&D. This is also a unifying theme in the more recent literature 
on the determinants of TFP across industries. For example, Griffith et al. (2004) study TFP determinants 
across industries in a panel of OECD countries and show that R&D has both a direct impact on TFP 
Estimated private rates 
of return to R&D fall 
in a wide range, with 
a central tendency 
between 20 and  
30 percent.
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growth and a role in facilitating the cross-country convergence of TFP levels. The result is interpreted 
as providing support for the two “faces” of R&D in promoting productivity growth: on the one hand, 
R&D enhances a firm’s innovative potential (thus increasing directly the rate of TFP growth) and on the 
other hand, it improves the absorptive capacity of firms and industries, thus facilitating the adoption 
of existing technologies and spurring TFP convergence. 
One drawback with the Griffith et al. study is that the industry level analysis is limited to manufacturing 
industries and many studies show that TFP growth rates in Europe and the US have been diverging, in recent 
times, especially in private services. Hence, a better understanding of the TFP growth determinants in 
service industries is crucial in assessing the factors which are driving, amongst other things, the EU’s widening 
productivity gap with the US. With a view to addressing such questions, Inklaar et al. (2007) analyse the 
determinants of TFP growth in private services using the EU KLEMS database. Their analysis looks in particular 
at R&D intensive technologies such as ICT and shows that although ICT investments were a main driver of 
labour productivity growth in the service industries of both the EU and the US, the adoption of ICT-intensive 
technologies does not appear to be associated with higher growth rates of TFP. 
Unlike Inklaar et al. (2007), Mc Morrow et al. (2009) do not limit the analysis to private services but look 
at both manufacturing and services. Additionally, they attempt to identify the determinants of TFP 
growth in those specific industry groupings that contributed most to the EU-US TFP growth gap, 
namely ICT- producing manufacturing (i.e. electrical and optical equipment), retail trade and business 
services, and for those industries where EU countries exhibited a stronger performance, i.e. public 
utilities. With respect to the role of R&D, this study finds that industries with higher R&D expenditures 
and higher adoption rates for ICT-intensive technologies appear to exhibit higher TFP growth rates, 
whilst human capital has mostly a significant effect across countries. Regarding industry-specific 
determinants, ICT producing industries appear to benefit from R&D in terms of stronger spillovers 
from TFP gains at the frontier; network utilities are strongly affected by improvements associated with 
reduced product market regulations; whilst the retail trade industry is significantly influenced by 
consumption dynamics which permit a better exploitation of scale economies.
The indirect impact of private-sector R&D: Social versus private returns
Estimating the magnitude of the spillovers associated with R&D spending is a complex task, with most 
researchers confident of their existence but less sure as to their significance at the macroeconomic 
level. In trying to find answers to the key question of the size of R&D spillovers, empirical studies have 
tended to use one of three basic approaches, two of which use the standard production-function 
approach and one which uses cost functions: 
“Rates-of-return” approach. If the estimated R&D capital return is higher than the physical capital  •	
return or if the R&D returns rise when the production function is estimated using higher levels of 
data aggregation (e.g. using industry level versus firm level datasets), then both of these cases provide 
prima-facie evidence of the existence of R&D spillover effects.
Direct approach using specific “spillover variables”. A number of studies measure R&D spillovers by  •	
including variables which attempt to directly measure the spillover effects. This could be done, for 
example, in research using firm level datasets, by including proxy variables for the industry-/economy-
wide stock of knowledge capital, by weighing the R&D stocks according to their technological 
proximity to the “lead” firm or industry, or by using patent citations to see how much knowledge is 
taken up by competitors and where this spillover takes place. 
Cost-function approach. This approach to the estimation of spillovers focuses on estimating the  •	
effects of the R&D stock from the “lead” firms or industries on the costs or production structures of 
the receiving firms or industries.
Industries with higher 
R&D expenditure and 
faster adoption of ICT-
intensive technologies 
exhibit stronger TFP 
growth.
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With respect to the empirical results from the above three approaches, the rates of return evidence 
presented earlier from both the production and cost function approaches appear to strongly support 
the presence of spillovers. This conclusion is supported by studies using the direct approach. 
A useful summary of the overall work in this area is Fraumeni and Okubo (2005) whose broad results 
are given in Table 3. This table indicates, in keeping with Table 2 above, that gross private rates of return 
appear to average between 20 and 30 percent.9 Of more interest in the present discussion on spillovers 
are the social rates of return, which are an estimate of the private returns plus the spillover benefits. 
Table 3 shows that these social returns are substantially higher than the private returns, “ranging from 
an average lower bound of about 30 percent to an average upper bound of 80 percent”. 
Sveikauskas (2007) summarises the evidence shown in Table 3 as follows: “On balance, private returns 
of 25 percent and social returns of about 65 percent, which more than double the private returns, seem 
reasonable. However, these extremely high returns are relevant only for privately financed research.” 
Taking into account other reviews of the literature, including Griliches (2000), Sveikauskas concludes 
that “spillovers contribute approximately three-fifths of the total return to R&D”. 
Table 3.  Estimated rates of return to private R&D
Author (Year) Private return Social return 
(private return + knowledge spillovers)
Sveikauskas (1981) 7-25 50
Bernstein-Nadiri (1988) 10-27 11-111
Bernstein-Nadiri (1991) 15-28 20-110
Nadiri (1993) 20-30 50
Mansfield et al. (1977) 25 56
Goto-Suzuki (1989) 26 80
Terleckyj (1974) 29 48-78
Scherer (1982; 1984) 29-43 64-147
Source:  Fraumeni and Okubo (2005)
Note:  Rates in Mansfield et al. (1977) are median rates. 
In addition to the above literature which focuses primarily on domestic spillover effects, there is a 
considerable body of evidence to support the existence of international R&D spillovers. Empirical 
studies attempting to assess the importance of knowledge spillovers have identified the international 
transfer of technology as an important driver of growth (e.g. Griliches 1992; Geroski 1996; Mohnen   
2001), with foreign innovative activity having a major impact on domestic productivity, especially for 
smaller, open countries (Eaton and Kortum 1997). A key issue in this literature is the identification of 
the channels through which knowledge is transferred internationally. Most extensively studied has 
been the role of international trade, in particular imports. For example, Coe and Helpman (1995) find 
that the level of a country’s TFP depends not only on its own R&D capital stock but also on the R&D of 
9    Fraumeni and Okubo (2005) stress that “the private rates of return to R&D based on these studies are considerably higher 
than the average returns to other types of investments. It can be argued that R&D investments would require a higher 
rate of return than other investments because of the risk and uncertainty attached to R&D. There are more failures than 
successes associated with R&D investments – the rule of thumb often used is that for every successful project, ten projects 
fail. In addition, businesses investing in R&D must take into account the likelihood of imitation by competitors, and also 
the uncertainty in the timing of commercialization of the R&D project, especially for basic and applied research”. 
Social returns to R&D 
are substantially higher 
than private returns due 
to spillover benefits.
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its trading partners (with the effect being greater for smaller countries) and that foreign R&D has a 
stronger effect on domestic productivity, the more open an economy is to international trade. Recently, 
studies have begun to examine the role of foreign direct investment by multinational firms (Lichtenberg 
and van Pottelsberghe 2001; Branstetter 2000).
However, a considerable degree of caution is needed in drawing excessively optimistic conclusions 
about the extent of domestic and international spillover effects, given the wide range of measurement 
and statistical issues. Firstly, as highlighted earlier, there are important unresolved issues with respect 
to the measurement of quality improvements in R&D intensive industries using hedonic deflators. Are 
the well documented increases in TFP in a number of the intensive ICT-using industries in the US (e.g. 
wholesale and retail trade) true spillover effects or do they simply reflect problems in accurately 
assessing the magnitude of the TFP gains which have occurred in the  ICT-producing sector (which is 
exceptionally R&D intensive)? Secondly, R&D spillovers are not entirely without costs for the receiving 
firms or for the economy as a whole. In order to take advantage of the knowledge transfer, firms often 
must make complementary investments in terms of personnel (i.e. additional scientists and engineers), 
laboratory facilities or organisational changes whereas countries must upgrade their education systems. 
Many existing studies exaggerate the cost-reducing benefits of spillovers since they do not take account 
of these additional firm and economy-wide implementation costs. Finally, any assessment of the benefit 
from R&D spillovers must take due account of lags, with the already long and variable delays for firms 
reaping private R&D returns (i.e. gains from their “own” R&D activities), suggesting that the time taken 
for social returns to manifest themselves in the form of transfers of new knowledge to other firms, 
industries or countries is likely to be even longer. 
Overall, there is considerable empirical evidence to support the view that domestic and international 
R&D spillovers exist and that they are of significance at the macro level. However, due to the measurement 
and statistical caveats highlighted earlier, it is not surprising to find that the size and significance of 
the estimates in the literature vary considerably. This high degree of variation justifies Griliches’ (1995) 
cautious conclusion: “R&D spillovers are present, their magnitude may be quite large, and social rates 
of return remain significantly above private rates. [Nevertheless,] “in spite of a number of serious and 
promising attempts to do so, it has proven very difficult to estimate the indirect contribution of R&D 
via spillovers to other firms, industries and countries.”
2.3  Growth accounting estimates
As discussed earlier, growth accounting studies estimate the contribution of R&D to productivity 
growth by assuming a rate of return to R&D which is representative of the estimates provided in the 
empirical literature. Consequently, the results from such studies depend heavily on the assumption of 
the lead researcher as to whether the R&D spillover effects are large or not. Results depend not only 
on assumed rates of return to R&D but also on whether a narrow (i.e. private R&D) or broad (i.e. private 
and public R&D) measure of the R&D capital stock is employed. Generally the results from growth 
accounting studies suggest that the impact of R&D on productivity remains modest. However, using 
more optimistic assumptions for R&D rates of return, the contribution of R&D becomes, not surprisingly, 
larger. For example, the work of Griliches (1992) implies that R&D spending may have accounted for 
nearly three-quarter of all of the TFP growth in the US during the post-war period but Griliches admits 
that “most of the explanatory effect is coming from the spillover component, which is large, in part, 
because it is the source of increasing returns”.
2.4  Assessing the impact of R&D on economic growth
The effects of R&D on productivity have been analysed in many empirical studies. Comparing these 
studies is difficult because of the different levels of aggregation (country, industry or firm level), 
However, excessively 
optimistic conclusions 
from high social-return 
estimates would be 
misplaced.
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variations in the definitions of productivity or R&D used (i.e., TFP versus labour productivity; R&D 
expenditures versus patents etc.) and the various methodological approaches (econometric analysis 
of production functions versus cost functions; growth accounting studies). Furthermore these studies 
are plagued by many problems, such as the construction of the R&D capital stock, the use of price 
deflators for measuring output and quality improvements, and finally the difficulties in measuring 
R&D spillover effects. 
Despite the various approaches and problems, the evidence clearly points to R&D being a major driver 
of productivity/TFP growth. Following the pioneering work of Griliches (1988), a large number of 
empirical studies at the country, firm and industry level have confirmed this positive impact of R&D 
activity on productivity growth. A good synopsis of the main strands of the literature is contained in 
the 2005 US Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report on “R&D and Productivity Growth” which 
stated that “a consensus has formed around the view that R&D spending has a significantly positive 
effect on productivity growth, with a rate of return that is about the same size (or perhaps slightly 
larger than) the rate of return on conventional investments”. The CBO report goes on to conclude 
that “if it was necessary to pick a single number to use in macroeconomic models, a reasonable 
strategy would be to choose a value that lay within the central tendency of the estimates from the 
empirical literature. Choosing a value in the middle of the range is consistent with the presumption 
that the rate of return to R&D is slightly higher than that on other types of corporate spending. […] 
It also rules out estimates at the upper end of the range, which are unrealistic because they would 
be unlikely to persist for long periods of time. Thus an estimate of the rate of return between 0.20 
and 0.30 would be reasonable, which would imply an output elasticity of R&D that would lie between 
roughly 0.02 and 0.05”. 
3.  R&D expenditure and GDP growth: Insights from macro-simulations
The previous section has shown that R&D spending is widely regarded as a main driver of technical 
progress and yields returns which are above average when compared to tangible investments. Since the 
returns associated with knowledge investments tend to be higher and because such investments are 
often associated with both regional and intertemporal externalities, there exists the danger that market 
economies under-invest in R&D. This section addresses some policy issues related to fostering R&D.
The R&D policy debate focuses very often on direct measures to support R&D such as subsidies or tax 
credits for R&D spending. However, one can also think about wider measures to support the R&D 
activities of firms, such as increasing the pool of qualified R&D personnel, via increased human-capital 
formation or high-skilled immigration. One can also think of other measures such as lowering entry 
barriers for start-ups. These policies could aim at lowering administrative entry costs or alternatively 
removing the imperfections with respect to the venture capital financing of start-ups. In this section 
we provide a quantitative evaluation of alternative policy measures. For this analysis we make use of 
an endogenous growth extension of the Commission’s QUEST III model (see Ratto et al. 2009), which 
is a standard Dynamic DSGE model. The framework that we adopt is the Jones (1995, 2002) extension 
of the Romer (1990) endogenous growth model, which uses a variety approach for modelling knowledge 
investment. 
The model has been calibrated for the EU (plus individual Member States) and the US, using information 
from various empirical studies in order to characterise both the production of goods and services as 
well as the production of knowledge. Concerning the parameters governing the macroeconomic 
aggregates and the labour market we use information provided by the QUEST III model. Table 4 provides 
As markets may 
under-invest in R&D, 
public policy aims at 
stimulating R&D directly 
or indirectly.
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a summary of the crucial parameters for both the EU and the US. As shown in the Annex, and in keeping 
with the conclusions of the literature survey in Section 2, the knowledge production parameters imply 
a rate of return for R&D investment in the range of 30 percent.
Table 4.  EU - US parameter comparison
EU US Source
1. R&D sector
R&D employment share  
(percent of total employment)
0.6 1.1 EUROSTAT / OECD
R&D intensity (percent of GDP) 1.840 2.670 EUROSTAT / OECD
Output elasticity of R&D workers (λ) 0.393 0.441 Calibration (constrained by equations)
International R&D spillovers  (φ) 0.704 0.668 Bottazzi-Peri (2007) / Coe-Helpman (1995)
Domestic R&D spillovers  (ω) 0.279 0.312 Bottazzi-Peri (2007) / Coe-Helpman (1995)
R&D efficiency (δ) 0.078 0.090 Calibration (constrained by equations)
2. Intermediate sector
Mark-up (mupx) 0.11 0.12 Own estimates
Fixed entry costs (f)  
(percent of GDP per capita)
38 2 Djankov et. al. (2002)
3. Final goods sector
Mark-up (mupx) 0.242 0.205 Own estimates
4. Skill distribution
Low-skilled share (sL) 0.310 0.121 EUROSTAT / OECD
Medium-skilled share (sM) 0.628 0.803 EUROSTAT / OECD
High-skilled share (sH) 0.063 0.076 EUROSTAT / OECD
Elasticity of Substitution between skill groups σ 1.4 1.4 Katz and Murphy (1992)
5. Financial market
Risk premium (venture capital market)  
(percentage points)
2.6 1.6 Calibration (constrained by equations)
6. Taxes and subsidies R&D
B-Index  0.98 0.93 OECD / Warda (2006) 
Taking the US as a benchmark, Table 4 highlights some of the deficiencies in the EU’s innovation 
environment. As can be seen from the OECD’s B-index (defined as one minus the average subsidy rate 
on R&D), the EU is providing lower tax incentives for private R&D than the US (see last line of Table 4). 
However, tax credits for R&D investment have become more popular as several EU member states, 
notably Belgium, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands have switched from direct R&D funding 
towards tax incentives (see European Commission 2007). There are also larger structural impediments 
for higher innovation spending in the EU, such as larger administrative entry barriers for new firms and 
higher financing costs for start-ups (see items 2 and 5 in the table). Given the information provided in 
Table 4, the US outperforms the EU in terms of the costs for starting a new business as measured by 
Djankov et al. (2002) but also in terms of financing costs for start-ups as measured by risk premia in the 
venture capital market. Finally, when looking at the skill distribution, one can observe that the US has 
a higher share of high-skilled workers (scientists and engineers). Recently some efforts have been made 
in the EU to increase the share of high-skilled workers via the European Commission’s ‘blue card’ 
proposal which aims at boosting high-skilled immigration into the EU. 
Tax incentives to private 
R&D are lower in the EU 
than in the US but have 
recently been stepped 
up in some countries.
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After a short presentation of the model, Sub-section 3.2 will evaluate the potential for increasing GDP by 
pursuing policies aimed firstly at increasing tax incentives for R&D, secondly lowering the entry barriers 
for start-ups, and finally by improving human capital. Since there could be short-run reform costs, we do 
not only show long run effects but provide the full dynamic solution for the relevant variables.
3.1  A growth model with knowledge production
The model we use in this paper is an extension of the QUEST III model with endogenous growth. The 
QUEST III model is a global DSGE model employed in the European Commission for quantitative policy 
analysis. This model belongs to the class of micro-founded DSGE models that are now widely used in 
economic policy institutions.10 The equations in these models are explicitly derived using intertemporal 
optimisation under technological, institutional and budgetary constraints and the model incorporates 
nominal, real and financial frictions in order to fit the data (Ratto et al., 2009). The model employs the 
product variety framework proposed by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and applies the Jones (1995) semi-
endogenous growth framework to explicitly model the underlying development of R&D. A more detailed 
description of this model can be found in Roeger et al. (2008). The semi-endogenous growth model differs 
from the endogenous growth model in the specification of the research technology. Endogenous growth 
models assume non decreasing returns of R&D inputs, while semi-endogenous growth models allow for 
decreasing returns of R&D inputs. Jones (1995) shows empirically that the semi-endogenous research 
technology hypothesis is more plausible. A formal exposition of the main features of the model is given 
in Box 2. 
To model knowledge investment as a decision of the private sector, the characteristics of the innovation 
process must be captured. What distinguishes an innovation – which can be traded in the form of a patent 
– from a standard good is essentially its sunk-cost nature, i.e., a firm which buys a patent and starts 
production of a new good must recoup the initial expenditure via innovation rents over the product life-
cycle. This defines an arbitrage condition between the present discounted value of profits of the patent 
holder and the initial R&D expenditure, which effectively determines the flow of new firms entering the 
market. In addition, the resource cost associated with the creation of new knowledge undertaken by the 
research sector is modelled via a knowledge production function where research output (in the form of 
new patents) in a competitive research sector is generated by current research inputs in the form of high-
skilled labour, plus the knowledge capital accumulated in the past. As highlighted in the endogenous 
growth literature, there are two distortions in the innovation process, namely monopoly rents required 
to cover the cost of patents and the knowledge spillovers embedded in the knowledge capital stock, 
which will generally lead to a market outcome with too little R&D spending. Thus policy measures can be 
devised to improve upon the non-interventionist market solution.
The economy is populated by households, final-goods and intermediate-goods producing firms, a research 
industry as well as a monetary and a fiscal authority. In the final-goods sector, firms produce differentiated 
goods which are imperfect substitutes for goods produced abroad. Final-goods producers use a composite 
of intermediate goods and three types of labour (low-, medium- and high-skilled). Intermediate goods 
must be thought of as investment goods. Households buy the patents of the designs produced by the 
R&D sector and license them to the intermediate-goods producing firms. The intermediate sector is 
composed of monopolistically competitive firms which produce intermediate products from rented capital 
inputs using the designs licensed from the household sector. The production of new designs takes place 
in research labs, employing high-skilled labour and making use of the existing stock of ideas. Technological 
change is modelled as increasing product variety in the tradition of Dixit-Stiglitz (1977)
10    See, for example, the International Monetary Fund’s Global Economy Model (Bayoumi et al. 2004) and the European Central 
Bank’s New Area-Wide Model (Coenen et al. 2008).




that producers buy to 
launch a new good.
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Box 2.  Overview of the model
Investors / households 
There are three types of assets traded in this economy, namely riskless bonds (Bt), physical capital (Kt) and 
intangible assets (At) in the form of patents. Financial assets yield a real rate of return (rt). The rental rate of 
return for physical and intangible capital is given by, (rt
K) and  (rt
A), respectively. Optimal household portfolio 
diversification implies the following two arbitrage conditions:
(B.1)  rt
K = rt +δ
K −(π t+1
I −π t+1




A) rt −(π t+1
A −π t+1
Y ) ( ) +rpt
A
 
The return on physical capital exceeds the rate of return on financial assets because of depreciation (δK) 
and a risk premium associated with the possible default of the borrowing firm (rpK). The return on physical 
capital can be lower to the extent that investors expect a capital gain, i.e. an expected rate of inflation for 
investment goods exceeding the rate of inflation of final goods   (π t+1
I −π t+1
Y >0). Similarly, the return on 
intangible capital is equal to the rate of return on financial assets, adjusted for the rate of R&D tax credits 
(τA) and a risk premium rpt
A  associated with technological or economic obsolescence. Holding a patent 
until the next period could yield a capital gain for the investor if the expected price increase of the patent 




There are n (j=1,…,n) monopolistically competitive final goods producers. They produce products (Yt
j) 
which are imperfect substitutes and charge a mark-up which is inversely related to the elasticity of 
substitution (mupY=1/σY). In symmetric equilibrium, final output is produced using A varieties of intermediate 
inputs (x) and labour LY:




 , where  Kt = Atxt 
where K, the physical capital stock, is made up of A varieties of intermediate inputs. This production 
function is a generalisation of the conventional production function where Kt is implicitly defined   
 
as the sum of all different types of capital (Kt = xit =
i=1
A
∑ Atxt ), or in other words, where all capital   
 
goods are perfect substitutes. The expanding product variety model as adopted here assumes that the 
introduction of new goods (ΔAt > 0) increases the efficiency of production. The degree to which efficiency 
rises is inversely related to the elasticity of substitution between capital goods. The inverse of the elasticity 
of substitution is denoted by γ. Thus the less substitutable the variants of intermediate inputs (the larger 
γ), the greater difference an additional input variant makes for output. For example, consider computer 
and communication networks: combining the two imperfectly substitutable or even complementary inputs 
in production has the potential of yielding extra benefits. An example of close substitutes in production 
would be trucks and trains. Combining the two in production is likely to yield lower efficiency gains. Notice, 
A is external to final-goods producers, who only demand labour and intermediate inputs according to the 












, i = 1, …, A
Because of symmetry in factor demand across varieties and identical technology across intermediate 
producers all intermediate goods prices are identical and are proportional to the aggregate output-to-
capital ratio.
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Intermediate-goods producers
The intermediate sector consists of monopolistically competitive firms which have entered the market by 
licensing a design from households and by making an initial payment F to overcome administrative entry 
barriers. Physical capital inputs are rented at rate rt
K. Firms which have acquired a design can transform 
each unit of capital into a single unit of an intermediate input. The demand for intermediate inputs of final 









Intermediate-goods producers set prices as a mark-up over marginal cost. The mark-up is inversely related 
to the elasticity of substitution of intermediate goods in the production of final goods (mupX=1/σX). Therefore 






Free entry requires that entry into the intermediate-goods producing sector takes place until the interest 
payments from taking up a loan to finance the patent and the administrative entry fee is equal to profits 
from current production and the expected capital gain from holding the patent:
(B.8a)  ((1−τ t
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Profits in the intermediate-goods sector are a positive function of the mark-up prevailing in that sector 
(mupX). Because of a declining marginal product of intermediates in final goods production, the marginal 
value product declines with new intermediate goods producers (A). Also, market imperfections in the 
production of final goods lower demand for intermediates and therefore reduce profits.
R&D sector
Innovation corresponds to the discovery of a new variety of intermediate input (ΔAt) which enhances the 
efficiency of producing final goods. The R&D sector hires high-skilled labour (LA,t) and generates new 
designs according to the following knowledge production function: 
(B.10)  ∆At =νAt−1
φ L A,t
λ
The Parameter γ measures the spillover effects from the existing stock of knowledge (At-1). Parameter ν can 
be interpreted as the total factor efficiency of R&D production, while λ measures the elasticity of R&D 
production with respect to the number of researchers (LA). We assume that the R&D sector is perfectly 











H refers to the wages of high-skilled workers. It is assumed that only high-skilled workers can 
be employed in both the production and the research sector.
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3.2  R&D policy scenarios 
In this section we apply the model for an analysis of various policy measures which have the potential 
to increase R&D spending and which play a prominent role in the policy debate. The measures we 
analyse are tax credits for R&D investment, a reduction of entry barriers for high tech start-ups and an 
increase in the supply of high-skilled workers. 
Measure I: Raising R&D through tax credits
The fiscal measure which we analyse first is a permanent increase in the EU’s rate of tax credit (τA) by 
5 percentage points, which would approximately increase the rate of R&D tax subsidies to US levels 
(see Table 4). Subsidies are financed through lump-sum taxes. Table 5 presents the effects on production, 
R&D intensity, TFP, R&D, employment, total employment and other variables.11 
Table 5.  Effects on the EU economy of a 5 percentage point R&D tax-credit 
Percentage difference from baseline
Years
1 2 3 4 5 10 20 50 100
GDP -0.01 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 0.00 0.08 0.23 0.31
TFP 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.05 0.13 0.24 0.27
“Ideas/Patents” 0.06 0.22 0.44 0.67 0.90 1.97 3.50 5.46 6.04
Capital 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 0.09 0.21
Capital intensity 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.10 0.22 0.38 0.59 0.66
Employment 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00
  -(Low-skilled workers) (0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.05) (0.04)
  -(Medium-skilled workers) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.02)
  -(High-skilled workers) (-0.37) (-0.89) (-1.21) (-1.37) (-1.43) (-1.38) (-1.20) (-0.98) (-0.92)
  -(R&D workers) (2.59) (4.85) (5.78) (6.14) (6.26) (5.95) (5.17) (4.20) (3.91)
Investment -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.01 0.12 0.21
Wages 0.04 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.14 0.21 0.33 0.40
  -(Low-skilled workers) (-0.02) (-0.03) (-0.04) (-0.05) (-0.05) (-0.01) (0.07) (0.22) (0.29)
  -(Medium-skilled workers) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (0.00) (0.04) (0.12) (0.26) (0.33)
  -(High-skilled workers) (0.37) (0.81) (1.00) (1.07) (1.08) (1.04) (0.98) (0.96) (0.98)
R&D intensity (% of GDP) 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.08
The simulations show a characteristic feature of semi-endogenous growth models: subsidies for R&D 
yield a permanent increase in GDP levels but not in the growth rate of GDP. Higher tax credits lower 
the rental rate for intangibles, thus reducing the fixed costs of firms producing intermediates. This 
raises entry and increases the demand for blueprints. The output of the research sector increases, and 
reallocates high-skilled workers from production into research. The size of the effect is however rather 
limited. The results show a 0.08-percent increase in GDP relative to the baseline 20 years after the initial 
shock and a 0.3-percent increase in the long run. The number of employees in the R&D sector increases 
by around 4 percent and R&D intensity rises by 0.08 percentage points in the long-run. 
11  Note that in the tables TFP refers to a constructed measure of technological progress defined as Y/ LYK
1−α α ( ).
Raising R&D tax 
incentives to US levels 
would increase R&D 
spending by about  
0.1 percent of GDP.
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It takes time for the output effects to emerge because in the short run there are output losses due to 
the reallocation of high-skilled workers from production to research. Because of supply constraints for 
high-skilled workers, part of the fiscal stimulus is crowded out by wage increases for high-skilled 
workers (see Goolsbee 1998 for empirical evidence). These results suggest that differences in fiscal 
incentives explain less than 5 percent of the productivity differential and less than 10 percent of the 
knowledge investment gap (as measured by the R&D share) between the EU and the US.
How can these results be reconciled with estimated return measures for R&D? As shown in the Annex, 
our knowledge production coefficients suggest a rate of return of 0.3. The R&D subsidy suggests a 
permanent increase in the R&D share of around 0.1 percent of GDP. According to the rate-of-return 
estimate, this should lead to an increase in the annual growth rate of TFP of 0.03 percent on average. 
After 100 years this should lead to an increase in TFP of about 3 percent. However, the long run (100 
year) TFP gain is only about 0.3 percent. Two factors explain this discrepancy. First, there is a crowding-
out effect in the form of higher wages in the R&D sector which absorbs about 25 percent of the 
additional R&D spending; and second, there is the declining marginal efficiency of R&D workers in the 
knowledge production function. 
Measure II: Reducing entry barriers for start-ups 
Transforming new ideas into marketable products and services is probably one of the most central 
mechanisms generating growth in modern industrial economies. Consequently, administrative entry 
barriers and financial frictions can be important obstacles to growth and innovation. When it comes 
to innovation, there are numerous examples which indicate that a larger share of innovations is 
undertaken by young firms in the US compared to the EU. Venture capital has become a popular form 
of financing young firms in high-tech sectors. With underdeveloped venture capital markets, investors 
lack opportunities to diversify risk and therefore they require a larger risk premium12. Philippon and 
Véron (2008) suggest a number of measures to increase the supply of venture capital financing. Amongst 
others, they argue for more competition in the banking sector, changes in insolvency legislation and 
the removal of prudential regulations, which hamper equity investment by institutional investors such 
as pension funds and insurance companies.
Also, administrative costs for starting a new company are much larger in the EU compared to the US 
(see Table 4). However, one has to be careful when making direct comparisons. One important argument 
for a downward bias in the US level of entry regulation is the high standard of consumer protection 
legislation in the US. In the case of non-compliance, firms operating in the US face costly litigation 
procedures and high fines. Entry regulation in Europe can be seen as forcing firms to comply with 
certain health and safety standards. But given the wide variation in start-up costs in the EU, it seems 
feasible to lower administrative entry costs towards levels prevailing in best-practice countries.
As both financial and administrative entry barriers are sunk costs for start-up companies in our model 
and have similar transmission mechanisms, we look at both barriers together. We conduct the following 
experiment: we simultaneously reduce financial and administrative entry barriers, closing about half 
the gap relative to the US by a reduction of risk premia for start-ups of 50 basis points and a reduction 
in administrative costs for new entrants of 18 percent of GDP per capita. Table 6 summarises the short- 
and long-run effects of the experiment. 
12    Alternatively, the risk premium can be interpreted as the shadow price of the collateral constraint for the firm investing in 
intangible capital.
Lower barriers to market 
entry and higher supply 
of risk capital would 
foster R&D, innovation 
and long-term growth.
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Table 6.  Effects on the EU economy of halving the EU-US gap in entry barriers  
Percentage difference from baseline
Years
1 2 3 4 5 10 20 50 100
GDP -0.01 -0.10 -0.16 -0.16 -0.11 -0.01 0.18 0.54 0.71
TFP 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.10 0.33 0.59 0.62
“Ideas/Patents” 0.11 0.53 1.04 1.57 2.10 4.63 8.25 12.94 14.44
Capital 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.08 -0.08 0.20 0.46
Capital intensity 0.01 0.08 0.10 0.18 0.25 0.52 0.89 1.41 1.58
Employment 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.01
  -(Low -killed workers) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (-0.04) (-0.06) (-0.06)
  -(Medium-skilled workers) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.07) (0.07) (0.01) (0.00) (-0.01) (-0.01)
  -(High-skilled workers) (-0.88) (-2.09) (-2.82) (-3.23) (-3.34) (-3.24) (-2.82) (-2.36) (-2.20)
  -(R&D workers) (6.05) (11.37) (13.55) (14.38) (14.70) (14.01) (12.28) (10.08) (9.40)
Investment -0.01 -0.02 -0.09 -0.09 -0.10 -0.10 -0.01 0.26 0.52
Wages 0.09 0.19 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.35 0.52 0.80 0.96
  -(Low-skilled workers) -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.08 0.30 0.60 0.78
  -(Medium-skilled workers) -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.09 0.26 0.61 0.79
  -(High-skilled workers) 0.87 1.86 2.31 2.47 2.48 2.40 2.30 2.29 2.36
R&D intensity (% of GDP)) 0.24 0.27 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.28 0.26 0.20 0.19
Reducing entry barriers stimulates the entry of new firms and increases the demand for patents. This 
raises the price of patents and reallocates high-skilled workers from production to research. Initially 
this reallocation reduces final-goods production and physical-capital formation. However, over time 
the positive output effects dominate by increasing the level of TFP. This also increases the marginal 
product of physical capital and stimulates investment in the long run. Reducing start-up costs relative 
to the US by about 50 percent could reduce the productivity gap by roughly 10 percent in the long 
run. It would also stimulate the economy’s R&D intensity by more than the direct R&D subsidy discussed 
under Measure I. 
Measure III: Improving human capital 
The share of high-skilled labour in the EU is 1.4 percentage points lower compared to the US (6.2 percent 
versus 7.6 percent). Table 7 shows the effects of gradually increasing the EU’s high-skilled labour share 
by 1 percentage point over 40 years. The simulation assumes that this increase comes about via high-
skilled immigration. The large fraction of the additional high-skilled labour will be employed in the 
production of final goods (replacing the less efficient medium-skilled workers). However, after five 
years there is an increase in employment in the R&D sector because of a decline in the wages of high-
skilled workers. This reduces the price of patents and stimulates entry in the intermediate goods sector. 
In the first five years, the anticipated decline in the price of patents exceeds the reduction in high-
skilled wages and hence, R&D production and R&D employment slightly decline. Output is gradually 
built up, with a positive impact of 0.26 percent after 20 years and around 1.40 percent in the long run. 
Notice that the employment share of R&D workers increases over time but the nominal R&D share does 
not because the increasing supply of R&D personnel and other high-skilled workers results in a slight 
reduction in their wages. 
Investment in human 
capital and high-skilled 
immigration would also 
raise innovation and 
growth in the long run.
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Table 7.  Effects on the EU economy of a 1 percentage point increase in the share of high-skilled 
workers
   Percentage difference from baseline
Years after the shock
1 2 3 4 5 10 20 50 100
GDP 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.11 0.26 0.93 1.40
TFP 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.11 0.27 0.85 1.08
“Ideas/Patents” -0.01 -0.04 -0.07 -0.08 -0.09 0.14 1.57 10.10 14.76
Capital 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.31 0.89
Capital intensity 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.17 1.08 1.55
Employment 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.12 0.10
  -(Low-skilled workers) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.02) (-0.07) (-0.08)
  -(Medium-skilled workers) (-0.02) (-0.06) (-0.10) (-0.14) (-0.18) (-0.37) (-0.75) (-1.54) (-1.55)
  -(High-skilled workers) (0.34) (0.86) (1.34) (1.76) (2.16) (4.07) (7.95) (16.10) (16.61)
  -(R&D workers) (-0.51) (-0.78) (-0.64) (-0.34) (0.03) (2.05) (5.74) (12.08) (9.81)
Investment -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 0.41 0.93
Real wages -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.04 0.15 0.72 1.12
  -(Low-skilled workers) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.06) (0.17) (0.77) (1.21)
  -(Medium-skilled workers) (0.02) (0.06) (0.09) (0.12) (0.15) (0.32) (0.70) (1.84) (2.29)
  -(High-skilled workers) (-0.26) (-0.66) (-0.98) (-1.26) (-1.52) (-2.77) (-5.18) (-9.46) (-9.37)
R&D intensity (% of GDP) -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.03
4.  Conclusions and policy implications
In this paper we have reviewed the empirical literature on the effects of R&D on technical progress. 
We have then used a semi-endogenous growth model, with a calibrated knowledge production sector, 
to analyse the macroeconomic impact of various measures to increase private R&D activity. The model 
allows one to look at concrete policy measures and trace their impact on the main macroeconomic 
aggregates over time. 
The starting point of our analysis has been the stylized fact of a significant under-investment in 
knowledge capital in the EU. The current policy debate focuses on various measures to increase 
knowledge investment and innovation in the EU. They range from direct measures such as tax incentives 
for R&D spending, to indirect measures such as lower administrative entry barriers and better access 
to credit for start-up companies, as well as policies to increase the supply of R&D personnel. As shown 
in Section 3, these recommendations are consistent with the predictions made by standard semi-
endogenous growth models. Our simulations also show the dynamic response of the economy to 
research policy measures, i.e., possible short-run crowding out effects and long-run effects from a 
declining marginal efficiency of knowledge investment. 
The simulation results show that substantial efforts will have to be made if Europe wants to come close 
to achieving the Lisbon productivity and knowledge investment targets. Catching up with the US 
would require an increase in productivity by about 10 percent and an increase in the R&D share in GDP 
from 2 to 3 percent. 
The simulations show 
that the policy measures 
under debate would 
reduce the EU-US gap 
in innovation and 
productivity.
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An important insight from our analysis is that focusing exclusively on the – reportedly high – rate of 
return on R&D would overstate the productivity and growth effects of direct policy measures such as 
an R&D subsidy. According to our simulations, which take into account crowding-out effects and 
decreasing returns to knowledge production, the contribution of R&D subsidies both towards reaching 
the 3-percent Lisbon target and closing the productivity gap are modest. Hence, the long run gains 
from direct policy measures, such as R&D subsidies, are likely to be overstated if one only focuses on 
standard rate-of-return measures, abstracting from crowding out and decreasing returns. 
Reducing entry barriers and financial constraints for start-ups is another avenue one could take. As 
indicated by our simulations, the measures would have to be substantial. Even a reduction of entry 
barriers to US levels would only close the overall gap by about 20 percent. Finally, increasing the stock 
of human capital, for example via high-skilled immigration, is another option. Raising the share of 
natural scientists and engineers to US levels could increase the productivity level by another 2 percent 
in the long run. 
Why would all these policies not be enough to reach the Lisbon targets and enable a catching up with 
the US? The answer is that whilst all these policies would undoubtedly help, there are at least two 
additional obstacles which prevent the EU from reaching parity with the US. Firstly, the average skill 
level of high-skilled workers in the US exceeds the level in the EU. Consequently, additional efforts to 
increase the quality of tertiary education in the EU are required. Secondly, apart from differences in 
barriers to entry, there is less competition in the EU’s non-manufacturing sectors such as services and 
agriculture, which prevents full convergence to the productivity frontier in these sectors.
Europe also needs to 
tackle deficiencies in 
higher-education quality 
and service-sector 
competition to enable 
full catching-up with  
the US.
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Annex:  The rate of return of R&D in semi-endogenous growth models
The social rate of return (r) is generally determined by regressing TFP growth on the R&D spending 
share in GDP (s):
gTFP ,t =c +r • st
What is the (social) rate of return in the QUEST  III model? The rate of return can be determined by 
looking at the production of (final) goods and the production of knowledge. The two production 
functions are given by Equations (A.1) and (A.2): 
Goods production: 




In this formulation aggregate TFP is a function of patents: TFP = A
γ.
Knowledge production (we neglect international spillovers in this formulation): 
(A.2)   ˙  A =νA
φL A
λ  with φ < 1 and λ > 0 
New knowledge is produced with labour diverted to R&D () and accumulated past knowledge. 
We can rewrite (A.2): 
(A.2’)  


















Approximating (A.2’) around a trend growth path, denoting the trend variables by s ,Y  t, A  t and using 
the link between A and TFP, we arrive at the following expression for the rate of return on knowledge 
investment (see Jones et al. 1997): 









































We use information on the output elasticity of labour in knowledge production from Bottazzi et al. 
(2007) which suggests a value for λ of 0.73. Given a (neutral) TFP trend in the range between 0.7 and 
1 percent per annum over the last 10 years and an R&D share of about 2 percent, the implied rate of 
return on R&D is in the neighbourhood of 0.3. However, one has to be very careful in interpreting this 
rate-of-return measure. In the empirical R&D literature there is a tendency to concentrate on the 
estimated elasticity only. This would imply that a 1-percentage-point increase in the R&D share in GDP 
would lead to a permanent increase in the growth rate of TFP by r percent. In a semi-endogenous 
growth environment this is not the case as shown by the last term in Equation (2’’), which shows the 
falling marginal productivity schedule of the knowledge production function. That is, every marginal 
increase in the stock of knowledge reduces the efficiency of R&D workers. Another important feature 
is that increases in the R&D share in GDP need to be corrected for the part which simply results from 
increases in the wages of R&D workers. 
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This article analyzes the potential benefits of industry-
science  collaborations  for  samples  of  Flemish  and 
German firms. A firm collaborating with science may 
benefit from knowledge spillovers and public subsidies 
as industry-science collaborations are often granted 
preferred  treatment.  I  shed  light  on  the  potential 
spillover and subsidy effects by estimating treatment 
effect  models  using  nearest  neighbour  matching 
techniques. For both countries, I find positive effects 
on  business  R&D.  Firms  that  engage  in  industry-
science collaborations invest more in R&D compared 
to the counterfactual situation where they would not 
collaborate  with  science.  Furthermore,  within  the 
sample of firms collaborating with science, a subsidy 
for  that  collaboration  leads,  on  average,  to  higher 
R&D  in  the  involved  firms.  Thus  there  is  no  full 
crowding-out of subsidies targeted to science-industry 
collaborations. 
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The virtue of industry-science   
collaborations
1.  Introduction
The successful creation of new knowledge often depends on the ability of firms to establish collaborative 
R&D agreements in order to combine their resources, exploit complementary know-how, and internalize 
R&D externalities (Katz 1986; d’Aspremont and Jacquemin 1988; Kamien et al. 1992). 
Governments have long understood the virtues of R&D collaboration and have exempted R&D 
partnerships from anti-trust legislation. In the European Union, for instance, the Treaty of Rome already 
contained a notice in article 85(3) that collaborating in R&D is permitted as long as post-innovation 
rivalry is not blocked. In 1984, the European Commission approved a block exemption for R&D 
collaborations that also allows joint exploitation of results (see Martin 1997 for an overview on policy 
practices in the US, Japan and Europe).
In addition, governments often subsidize R&D collaborations. Governments of EU member states often 
maintain subsidy schemes whereby grant applications from consortia are preferred over single-firm 
applications. In the recent past, technology transfer from science to industry has attracted the attention 
of policy makers and, as a result, industry-science collaborations are often granted a preferential 
treatment in public grant systems. It is believed that an enhanced knowledge and technology transfer 
from science to industry also contributes to the long-run innovativeness and thus competitiveness of 
the business sector. Figure 1 shows the development of grants from the German federal government 
to research consortia. It becomes apparent that, over time, industry-science partnerships were 
increasingly preferred in grant schemes when compared to pure company consortia or pure public 
science consortia. 
Figure 1:  Division of collaborative research grants by type of research consortia in Germany


















































Source:  PROFI database from Germany’s Federal Ministry of Education and Research; own calculations
Dirk Czarnitzki
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The potential benefits of R&D collaborations can be summarized as follows. First, technological 
spillovers are internalized, thus eliminating the free-rider problem within the group of collaborating 
firms. Second, since R&D often exhibits economies of scale it might well be that only a consortium 
of firms has the necessary resources both financially and physically to undertake the ever larger, 
more complex, and more expensive research projects that are common today. Third, economies of 
scope also often characterize the R&D process. Hence, synergetic effects and risk pooling can 
broaden the research horizon of collaborating firms. It can thus be expected that sustaining R&D 
collaborations leads to an increase in private R&D activity. From the growing literature on R&D 
collaboration, it can be concluded that collaborative R&D levels exceed non-collaborative levels 
when technological spillovers are large, while the opposite holds for small technological spillovers 
(see Veugelers 1998 for a survey of the theoretical and empirical literature).
This study discusses the potential impacts of R&D subsidies to consortia of firms and public research 
institutions. It can be assumed that such collaborations are undertaken for projects where the research 
conducted concerns more basic and generic knowledge that may be difficult to be discovered by a 
single firm and may also lead to results that are more difficult to appropriate than those of more 
regular R&D conducted in the firm. First, I discuss the potential market failures in R&D and the 
economics of R&D collaborations, reviewing both the theoretical and the empirical literature. Second, 
I give a brief overview of the recent literature on effects of R&D policies at the firm level. The third 
goal of the study is the combination of both strands of literature which leads to an empirical study 
on how R&D subsidies to industry-science partnerships influence private R&D at the firm level.
2.  Theory
2.1  The market failure for R&D investment
The standard argument for governmental intervention in the market for R&D is based on two market 
failure arguments. First, R&D creates positive external effects, that is, R&D creates knowledge and 
as Arrow (1962) hypothesized, something intangible such as knowledge cannot be kept fully secret 
by the original R&D investor. This implies that a private company investing in R&D will not be able 
to appropriate all returns on its initial investment as knowledge will spill over to rivals and other 
third parties that subsequently free-ride, i.e. build on the knowledge, without having participated 
in the investment. This may happen through the mobility of personnel, but also through many other 
channels such as joint customers or suppliers (see e.g. Mansfield 1985). Thus the social benefit of 
R&D investment is typically larger than the private return. As, however, firms only embark on 
investment with a positive expected private return, many R&D projects that are socially desirable 
may not be undertaken. This leads to a gap between social and private equilibrium and, consequently, 
a justification for government intervention. 
The second market failure argument is typically established with respect to financing constraints 
for R&D. If a firm seeks external financial resources for an investment, R&D features several 
characteristics that make it more difficult or expensive to finance externally than, for instance, 
investment in tangible assets. For instance, the lion’s share of an R&D investment project is sunk 
cost, as R&D mainly consists of wages for researchers. In contrast to physical capital investment, 
R&D itself cannot be used as collateral in credit negotiations with banks. Furthermore, the outcome 
of an R&D project is typically much more uncertain than the return on investment in physical capital, 
which also makes financiers less likely to invest (see e.g. Hall 2002 or Hall and Lerner 2009 for surveys 
of this strand of the literature).
R&D collaborations 
can help to internalize 
spillovers and to exploit 
synergies and scale 
economies. 
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Although these are good economic reasons for governments to support R&D by financing R&D in 
universities and also in the form of grants or tax credits to private companies, it is not straightforward 
to establish a clear-cut theoretical market failure argument for a preferential treatment of industry-
science collaborations within certain schemes. Exempting R&D collaboration from anti-trust 
legislation can already be seen as a policy itself, as the possibility of collaborating in R&D (i) allows 
firms to internalize the potential external effects at least within the consortium of project partners, 
(ii) spreads the risk of outcome uncertainty and (iii) divides the cost of R&D among involved 
agents. 
However, in combination with some empirical evidence from the literature on knowledge and 
technology transfer between science and industry, arguments for such extra incentives may be 
made. 
It seems to be a generally accepted opinion that the involvement of universities or other public 
research institutions concerns more basic research projects and the transfer of more generic 
knowledge than the “usual” business R&D projects. The idea is that companies seek university 
collaboration for more fundamental, long-term and possibly strategic R&D projects. Empirical 
evidence supports this view (e.g. Hall et al. 2003; Belderbos et al. 2006). Thus, is could be argued that 
R&D conducted within industry-science collaborations involves projects that are socially more 
desirable than others, as more basic knowledge is created which expectedly would lead to higher 
knowledge spillovers, i.e. the social return on these investments is high. From the company 
perspective, however, basic research suffers from worse appropriability conditions than other 
projects. For instance, without any specific industrial application in mind, the original investor may 
not be able to take out a patent to protect the results of the initial investment. 
In addition, the uncertainty about expected pay-offs of such investments is typically even higher 
than for other R&D investment, as projects of more basic research are further away from the market 
and its potential applicability to new products and processes may be largely unknown at the time 
of investment. Thus, financial constraints may be more binding for basic research than for experimental 
development, for instance (see Czarnitzki and Hottenrott 2009; Czarnitzki et al. 2009). 
This reasoning leads to the conclusion that the market failures due to external effects and financial 
constraints apply even more for research conducted within industry-science consortia than for 
other projects, justifying a higher degree of government intervention than for other R&D. 
2.2  Theory of R&D collaboration
In the literature on policy evaluation, the standard question to be answered is “How much would 
a subsidized firm have invested in R&D if it had not been subsidized?” Econometric models are 
typically designed to estimate the potential “additionality effect” of a subsidy with respect to its 
pure monetary value. As I will outline in the following, however, the evaluation of industry-science 
collaborations should include and separate two effects: first, the effect of the subsidy in terms of 
its additional capital that becomes available for investment of the recipient firm, and a possible 
effect on investment because of knowledge spillover effects between the collaborating parties. As 
the core of the industrial organization literature focuses on horizontal collaboration, that is, 
collaboration between competitors, I briefly outline the main aspects of this literature, and then 
turn to the differences in vertical and diagonal collaborations, i.e. collaborations with customers, 
suppliers and finally universities. 
Companies seek 
university collaboration 
for longer-term, more 
fundamental research 
whose results are more 
difficult to appropriate. 
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Horizontal collaboration
The question of how and why firms engage in R&D collaborations and how that affects welfare 
emerged during the 1980s in the economic literature (see Veugelers 1998 for a survey). The industrial 
organization literature emphasizes the importance of knowledge spillovers in the context of 
collaborative research (e.g. Katz 1986; d’Aspremont and Jacquemin 1988; Beath et al. 1988; De Bondt 
and Veugelers 1991; Kamien et al. 1992; Motta 1992; Suzumura 1992; Vonortas 1994; Leahy and Neary 
1997). Such studies relate decisions to collaborate in R&D to the presence of spillovers and the effects 
on market performance with respect to profits. Models rely on the fact that returns from R&D are 
not fully appropriable by the firm, but knowledge leaks out to competitors such that social returns 
are higher than private returns. This leads to underinvestment in innovative activities from a social 
point of view. R&D collaborations are one possibility to internalize such knowledge spillovers and 
thus increase the appropriability of returns within research consortia. Three main issues with respect 
to collaborative R&D are considered in the following: coordination, free-riding and information 
sharing.
Coordination in such models is typically described through joint profit maximization. One finding 
is that investment in R&D among collaborators increases with the level of spillovers. A second result 
states that if spillovers are high enough, that is, above some critical level, collaborating in R&D will 
result in higher investment compared to the status of no collaboration (see De Bondt and Veugelers 
1991). As this will also lead to higher profits, firms have an increased incentive to engage in R&D 
collaborations in the presence of spillover effects. It should be noted, however, that the cost of 
coordinating R&D is often ignored in these models.
Collaborations bear the inherent risk of free-riding that may jeopardize the stability of the collaboration. 
Partners may free-ride as they could try to absorb knowledge from their partners but conceal their 
own (see e.g. Shapiro and Willig 1990; Baumol 1993; Kesteloot and Veugelers 1995). Models find that 
collaborative agreements for being profitable and stable require that involuntarily outgoing spillovers 
be not too high. This is in contrast with the results on coordination, where profits are higher with 
larger spillovers, regardless of their direction. Here the profitability of collaboration increases with 
the firms’ ability to manage the outgoing spillovers in order to protect against the possible free-riding 
of partners.
Some models explicitly account for information sharing among partners, that is, for managing 
spillovers (e.g. Kamien et al. 1992, Katsoulacos and Ulph 1998). Katsoulacos and Ulph find that research 
joint ventures will always share at least as much information as non-collaborating firms because 
research joint ventures maximize joint profits. Another issue for managing spillovers is absorptive 
capacity. Cohen and Levinthal (1989) point out that incoming spillovers can be used more efficiently 
(in reducing own cost) when the firm is engaged in own R&D. Engaging in own R&D builds absorptive 
capacity, that is, the ability of a firm to benefit from the knowledge others have created through R&D 
activity. Kamien and Zang (2000) take that into account, and find ambiguous results of collaboration 
with respect to the level of firms’ R&D investment. Yet, collaboration is still the more profitable 
option. 
To conclude, theory states that non-collaborative R&D levels decrease with the magnitude of spillovers, 
while collaborative investment tends to increase with spillovers. Thus, imperfect appropriability of 
knowledge generating processes increases the benefits from collaborative agreements. The presence 




increases with the level 
of knowledge spillovers.
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Theoretical results have initiated a debate on the implications of R&D collaborations for antitrust 
and the treatment of research joint ventures, leaving a favourable policy stance towards this type of 
collaboration (Ordover and Willig 1985; Jacquemin 1988; Shapiro and Willig 1990). Although it seems 
to be an important policy conclusion leading to more lenient policies towards R&D collaborations, 
it should be stressed that this only holds for co-operation restricted to R&D. If R&D collaboration 
facilitated product market collusion, the welfare enhancing results would not necessarily hold any 
longer. 
Furthermore, it should be stressed that the vast majority of theoretical models deals only with 
horizontal R&D collaboration, that is, collaboration with competitors. While this set-up is predominant 
in theory, it stands in stark contrast to survey evidence: in practice, the most important partners are 
customers, suppliers and universities or other research institutions. By contrast, collaboration with 
competitors is not found to be frequent in R&D collaborations. This is a gap between theory and 
empirical “stylized facts”. Thus all interpretations with respect to linkages between economic theory 
and empirical results should be interpreted with care.
Vertical and diagonal R&D collaboration
As outlined above, the theoretical literature on vertical collaboration including industry-science 
collaboration is scarce. The economics of vertical R&D collaboration is different because vertical 
collaboration partners do not impose a negative externality on each other, as they do not compete 
in the same product market. Thus, the theoretical concerns about trade-offs in cost and benefits of 
R&D collaborations apply to a lesser extent to vertical collaboration. Firms may engage in vertical 
R&D collaboration to reduce the cost of R&D, e.g. a firm decides to collaborate with a university as 
the public research institution may possess superior knowledge for certain projects than the firm 
has internally available. Rather than generating this knowledge in-house, it may be preferable to 
seek it externally. Furthermore, seeking complementary knowledge may lead to economies of scale 
and scope which in turn result in increased in-house R&D (see Cassiman and Veugelers 2006). 
Similarly to horizontal collaboration, risk sharing arguments concerning the outcome uncertainty 
of R&D investment are a further motive for engaging in vertical collaboration. Firms would choose 
to engage in vertical collaboration if the expected benefits outweigh the transaction cost involved. 
Steurs (1995) is the first paper that extends models of R&D collaboration to inter-industry spillovers 
in a two-industry, two-firm-per-industry setting. It is assumed that intra-industry and inter-industry 
spillovers exist. As firms engaging in inter-industry collaboration do not impose a negative externality 
on each other, it is found that inter-industry collaboration is socially more beneficial than collaborations 
whose members come from a single industry. In the Steurs (1995) model, the industries are not related 
except for the presence of spillovers. This framework is extended by Inkmann (2000) who explicitly 
models strategic R&D investment in the presence of R&D spillovers between vertically related 
industries. The R&D investment of the upstream firm affects the production process or quality in the 
downstream firm which in turn leads to higher demand in the final product market and thus also for 
the intermediate good. In equilibrium, vertical collaboration maximizes the profits of the participating 
firms, and leads to increased R&D in the economy. A similar model is presented in Atallah (2002) 
where vertical R&D collaboration unambiguously leads to higher R&D and welfare in the economy. 
These papers are able to explain the empirical finding that vertical collaborations are more frequent 
than horizontal collaborations in reality. In addition, the paper by Steurs (1995) shows that “diagonal” 
collaboration is more beneficial than intra-industry collaboration. Industry-science collaborations 
could be seen as inter-industry collaborations as universities are not active in any market and thus 
neither horizontally nor vertically related to the firm in question. 
Vertical R&D 
collaboration does 
not impose a negative 
externality on partners 
because they do not 
compete in the same 
product markets.
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3.  Empirical evidence
This section first reviews a selection of empirical studies on the determinants of collaboration with 
special attention to industry-science partnerships and also reports some empirical evidence on the 
effects of these collaborations at the firm-level. Thereafter, results of empirical studies on the evaluation 
of R&D policies are briefly introduced. These two components then lead to studies that analyze both 
the effects of R&D policies and collaboration on firms’ innovation activity.
3.1  Empirical studies on collaboration
Recent empirical studies have established that contractual forms of R&D, such as joint R&D, have 
become a very important mode of inter-firm and science-firm collaboration as the number of 
partnerships has largely increased (Sakakibara 1997; Hagedoorn and Narula 1996). Several empirical 
papers on R&D collaborations are reviewed in Veugelers (1998). As one recent example, Cassiman and 
Veugelers (2002) explore the effects of knowledge flows on R&D co-operation. Their results suggest 
that firms with higher incoming spillovers and better appropriability conditions have a higher probability 
of co-operating in R&D which confirms the arguments on spillovers made by theoretical 
contributions. 
Not many studies analyze industry-science collaborations explicitly. Hall et al. (2003) conduct a survey-
based study of research projects having universities as research partners within the US ATP program. 
They argue that universities are involved in such projects that apply “new science”, i.e., firms seek for 
expertise to absorb results of basic research. The role of the university may be a translation of basic 
science towards an applicable technology for selected problems. This interpretation is supported by 
the fact that universities are engaged in industry collaboration in fields where business R&D is closer 
to science, particularly in areas where technology tends to be more complex. University involvement 
also occurs more frequently in projects that are broader in scope. Projects where results are expected 
in a timely manner for a specific technological problem are typically not conducted in collaboration 
with universities.
Veugelers and Cassiman (2005) explore the determinants of industry-science collaboration using 
Belgian Community Innovation Survey (CIS) data. They emphasize that there are large cross-industry 
differences in the probability of a firm collaborating with science. Firms in the chemical and 
pharmaceutical industry are most likely to collaborate with universities. Furthermore, firms that are 
impeded by high cost of innovation are often attracted by government subsidized cost-sharing in 
public-private partnerships. In addition, larger firms are more likely to collaborate with universities 
than smaller firms indicating that some minimum absorptive capacity is needed for fruitful collaboration. 
Moreover, it is often hypothesized that research projects involving a high uncertainty of outcome are 
preferably conducted within research consortia, as this allows to spread the risk. However, Veugelers 
and Cassiman find no evidence for the risk-sharing argument in industry-science collaborations with 
their data. The authors argue that the risk-sharing effect is possibly confounded with higher transaction 
cost when communicating with science. As long as these effects cannot be separately measured, 
results may remain ambiguous. 
Belderbos et al. (2004a) also analyze the determinants of university collaboration. They account for 
collaborations with different types of partners by including a measure of incoming spillovers from 
these potential collaboration partners. Among others, one interesting finding is that spillovers received 
from universities not only stimulate industry-science partnerships but also R&D collaboration with 
other partners. 
The role of universities 
may be a translation 
of basic science into an 
applicable technology.
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Belderbos et al. (2004b) investigate the impact of R&D collaboration on firm performance using panel 
data of Dutch manufacturing firms. The noteworthy feature of this study is the distinction of two 
dependent variables, growth of labour productivity and growth of firms’ innovative sales, where the 
latter is measured as the growth rate in sales of products that were market novelties. Although these 
variables are treated as separate dependent variables not connected in a simultaneous-equation 
system, the results are interesting. It turns out that R&D collaborations with competitors and suppliers 
positively affect productivity growth. Belderbos et al. refer to this as a result of incremental innovation 
leading to higher sales of established products. In boosting innovative sales, however, university 
collaborations play an important role along with the collaboration with rivals. They also find that 
customers and universities are important sources of sales growth in market novelties even in the 
absence of formal collaborative agreements. 
3.2  Empirical studies on R&D subsidies1
The impact of R&D policies on firms’ innovation behaviour has been of interest in the economic literature 
for decades. The predominant question investigated is whether public subsidies crowd-out private 
investment. David et al. (2000) survey microeconomic and macroeconomic studies on that topic. One 
result of their survey is that most of the estimations reviewed are subject to a potential selection bias 
as recipients of subsidies might be chosen by the government because they are the most promising 
candidates for successful research projects. In this case, public funding becomes endogenous to 
innovative activity, leading to bias in simple regressions of, for example R&D investment on government 
subsidies (selection bias). 
More recent studies addressing the selection bias include Busom (2000), Wallsten (2000), Lach (2002), 
Czarnitzki and Fier (2002), Almus and Czarnitzki (2003), Duguet (2004), González et al. (2005) and 
Hussinger (2008). Results are ambiguous. Busom finds positive effects of public funding on R&D in 
Spanish manufacturing, but cannot rule out partial crowding-out for a sub-sample of firms. Wallsten 
finds full crowding-out effects in the US SBIR program, an initiative to foster innovation in small and 
medium-sized US companies. Lach reports large positive effects for small firms in Israeli manufacturing, 
but no effects for large firms. The analysis of Czarnitzki and Fier rejects full crowding-out effects in 
German service industries. Almus and Czarnitzki analyze East German manufacturing where the 
government has offered high amounts of subsidies in order to enhance the transformation process 
from central planning to a market economy since the German re-unification in 1990. They conclude 
that about 50 percent of R&D performed in East Germany would not have been carried out in the 
absence of public innovation programs. Duguet (2004) rejects crowding-out in R&D using a sample 
of French firms, as does Hussinger (2008) based on a sample of German firms using semi-parametric 
selection models. González et al. (2005) employ a large panel of Spanish manufacturing firms and find 
no evidence for crowding-out either.2
3.3  Studies combining collaboration and R&D subsidies
Just a few empirical analyses, however, deal with R&D co-operations as a part of firms’ innovative 
behaviour and as a policy instrument. Among those, Sakakibara (2001) analyzes Japanese government-
sponsored R&D consortia over 13 years and finds evidence that the diversity of a consortium is associated 
with greater R&D expenditure by participating firms. The results support the hypothesis of large 
spillover effects. The effect of participating in an R&D consortium on a firm’s R&D expenditures is found 
1  For an evaluation of another policy tool, the R&D tax credit, see Ientile and Mairesse (2009) in this issue.
2    Fewer studies deal with public policies and innovation outcomes such as growth of employment or sales. See the survey 
by Klette et al. (2000) for examples of such studies.
R&D subsidies tend 
to increase total R&D 
expenditure but often by 
less than the amount of 
the subsidy. 
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to be 9 percent on average. Branstetter and Sakakibara (2002) examine the impact of government-
sponsored research consortia in Japan. They find evidence that participants of research consortia tend 
to increase their patenting after entering a consortium, which is interpreted as evidence for spillovers 
effects. The marginal increase of participants’ patenting in targeted technologies, relative to the control 
firms, is large and statistically significant.
Czarnitzki and Fier (2003) employ econometric matching analysis to investigate the relationship between 
R&D collaboration and patent outcome as a measure of intermediate innovative output. Controlling 
for R&D input, firm size, industry heterogeneity and other common covariates, they find that firms that 
collaborate achieve higher patent outcomes than under no collaborative agreements. Using German 
data they also demonstrate that German R&D policy in the 1990s increasingly subsidized research 
consortia comprising firm-firm partnerships or industry-science partnerships. Czarnitzki and Fier find 
that firms in publicly-sponsored research consortia file more patents than other collaborators. However, 
they cannot disentangle whether this stems from more intensive science-industry interactions or 
simply from the R&D increase in response to the subsidy receipt.
Czarnitzki et al. (2007) employ a heterogeneous treatment effects estimator where R&D collaboration, 
R&D subsidies and the combination of both are considered as a treatment. Their analysis is conducted 
for Community Innovation Survey data from Germany and Finland. Although the two countries have 
similar frameworks for technology policy, it can be observed that the frequency of R&D collaborations 
is much higher in Finland than in Germany in the early 2000s. Czarnitzki et al. (2007) find that both R&D 
collaboration and public R&D grants result in higher R&D in the treated firms. Firms that receive subsidies 
and are engaged in R&D collaboration exhibit complementarities in the sense that they invest more 
in R&D when benchmarked against each of the three following counterfactual situations: “only subsidy 
receipt”, “only collaboration” and “neither subsidy receipt nor collaboration”. This also points to the 
presence of sufficiently large spillovers in collaborative agreements, so that firms increase R&D inputs. 
Another interesting result of Czarnitzki et al. (2007) is the analysis of “treatment effects on the untreated”. 
As said above, the level of R&D collaboration is high in Finland. The econometric estimations show 
that firms not engaged in collaboration would not invest more in the counterfactual situation of 
engaging in R&D collaboration. In Germany, however, where R&D collaboration is less frequent, the 
authors find that firms would, on average, invest more in R&D if they did engage in collaboration. Thus, 
the authors conclude that there would be additional room for fostering collaboration in German 
technology policy while in Finland this seems to be limited. The Finish population of non-collaborating 
firms is to a larger extent characterized by very small firms, other than in Germany. Such firms may not 
have the necessary absorptive capacity or capabilities to benefit from R&D collaborations.
4.  Econometrics: The evaluation question
To investigate the effect of public subsidies one has to construct the counterfactual situation: What 
would have been the behaviour of the subsidized firms had they not been subsidized? As the 
counterfactual cannot be observed it has to be estimated. Our fundamental evaluation question can 
be illustrated by an equation describing the average treatment effect on the treated firms. That is:
(1)  E(αTT) = E (YT|S=1) – E(YC|S=1) 
where YT is the outcome variable. The status S refers to the group: S=1 is the treatment group and S=0 
the non-treated firms. YC is the potential outcome which would have been realized if the treatment 
group (S=1) had not been treated. The problem is obvious. While the outcome of the treated individuals 
Firms that both engage 
in R&D collaboration 
and receive R&D 
subsidies spend more on 
R&D than comparable 
firms with only one 
or none of these 
characteristics. 
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in case of treatment, E(YT|S=1), is directly observable, it is not the case for the counterfactual situation: 
What would these firms have realized if they had not received the treatment? E(YC|S=1) is a counterfactual 
situation which is not observable and, therefore, has to be estimated.
The literature on the econometrics of evaluation offers different estimation strategies to correct for 
selection bias (see Heckman et al. 1999 or Imbens and Wooldridge 2009 for surveys). For cross-sectional 
data, popular choices for treatment-effect estimations are instrumental variable regressions, control 
function approaches (selection models) and matching estimators. 
In this study, I employ a nearest-neighbour propensity score matching. The advantage of matching is 
that no parametric model for the R&D equation has to be specified. The counterfactual outcome of 
treated firms is constructed from a control group of non-treated firms. The matching relies on the 
intuitively attractive idea to balance the sample of program participants and comparable non-
participants. Remaining differences in the outcome variable, e.g. R&D intensity, between both groups 
are then attributed to the treatment. Initially, the counterfactual situation cannot simply be estimated 
as the observed average outcome of the non-participants, because due to the possible selection bias, 
the subsidized firms and non-subsidized firms are expected to differ. Hence, E(YC|S=1) ≠ E(YC|S=0).
Rubin (1977) introduced the conditional independence assumption (CIA) to overcome the selection 
problem. The CIA states that participation and potential outcome are independent for firms with the 
same set of exogenous characteristics X. Phrased differently, the selection only occurs on 
observables: 
(2)  Y C    S | X 
If this assumption is valid, it follows that
(3)  E (YC | S = 1,X) = E (YC | S = 0,X).
Equation (3) states that the outcome of the non-participants can be used to estimate the counterfactual 
outcome of the participants in case of non-participation, provided that there are no systematic 
differences between both groups. The treatment effect can be written as 
(4)  E(αTT) = E (YT|S=1,X=x) – E(YC|S=0,X=x)
Conditioning on X takes account of the selection bias due to observable differences between participants 
and non-participants. In nearest-Neighbour matching, one picks the most similar firm from the potential 
control group of non-subsidized firms. In addition to the CIA, another important precondition for 
consistency of the matching estimator is common support: it is necessary that the control group 
contains at least one sufficiently similar observation for each treated firm. In practice, the sample to 
be evaluated is restricted to common support. However, if the overlap between the samples is too 
small the matching estimator is not applicable.
As one often wants to consider more than one matching argument, one has to deal with the “curse of 
dimensionality”. If we employ a lot of variables in the matching function, it will become difficult to find 
appropriate controls. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) suggested to use a propensity score as a single 
index and thus to reduce the number of variables included in the matching function to just one. 
Therefore a probit model is estimated on the dummy indicating the receipt of subsidies S. The estimated 
propensity scores are subsequently used as a matching argument. Lechner (1998) introduces a 
modification of the propensity score matching (“hybrid matching”) as it is often desirable to include 
additional variables in the matching function. In this case, instead of a single X (the propensity score), 
other important characteristics may be employed in the matching function.
What would have 
been the outcome of 
untreated firms if they 
had been treated?
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5.  Empirical study
For the first analysis, I employ data obtained from the Flemish Community Innovation Survey (CIS) 
2005 and 2007, i.e., the data refer to the years 2004 and 2006. In these surveys, respondents were 
requested to indicate whether they received public subsidies from the local, federal or European 
authorities. In addition, they were asked to specify if the subsidy was granted within a research 
consortium and whether that consortium included at least one public research institution. The latter 
will be defined as subsidized industry-science collaboration.
For a second analysis, I use data from the German CIS. Here, data from the surveys of the years 2001 
and 2005 can be used, i.e., the data refer to the years 2000 and 2004.3 Firms were also asked whether 
they received subsidies from the government. However, the information on whether the subsidized 
projects involved industry-science collaboration, too, needs to be collected separately from the PROFI 
database of the German Federal Ministry for Education and Research (BMBF) which covers all federally 
subsidized civilian R&D projects in Germany (BMBF 2009). 
5.1  Data description
In total, the usable sample of the Flemish CIS comprises 3,331 firm-year observations of which 1,791 
can be classified as innovators. An innovator is a firm that introduced at least one product or one 
process innovation in the past three years, or had ongoing or abandoned innovation projects. Thus, 
this constitutes the sub-population of firms that at least attempted to innovate. 
Out of those innovating companies, 890 firms engaged in some type of collaborative agreement, of 
which 532 firms were involved with partners from public science (60 percent). Of the 532 firms with 
industry-science partnerships, 230 received public subsidies for the industry-science partnership 
(43 percent). 
For Germany, the data are quite similar. 1,074 collaborating companies can be identified within the 
survey data. Out of those, 804 collaborate with public science (75 percent). Among those 804 
observations, 284 received subsidies from the federal government (35 percent).
5.2  Set-up of econometric study and variables
For this study, we use the sub-sample of firms engaging in any type of collaborative agreement as a 
starting point, and investigate two research questions:
Do firms that collaborate with public science spend more on R&D than in the counterfactual situation 
where they would not?
Among firms collaborating with public science, do firms that receive subsidies spend more on R&D 
than in the counterfactual situation of not receiving subsidies?
For both research questions, I employ the nearest-neighbour matching technique described above. 
First, industry-science collaboration is interpreted as a “treatment” within the sample of collaborating 
firms. Subsequently, the subsidy receipt within the sample of industry-science partnerships is considered 
as a treatment. 
3    Although the CIS is harmonized across countries, the questionnaires are not identical in each year and for all countries. In 
Flanders, the question on collaboration behavior is available for 2005 and 2007 while it was asked only in 2001 and 2005 
in Germany. For a detailed description of the CIS see e.g. Eurostat (2008).
Do firms engaged 
in industry-science 
collaboration spend 
more on R&D than firms 
collaborating with  
other firms?
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The dependent variable is R&D intensity (RDINT), measured as R&D spending divided by sales, times 100.
For the matching procedure, a relatively large set of control variables can be included. Firm size is 
measured in terms of employment (EMP). As the firm size distribution is skewed, the variable enters 
in logarithms. I also allow for a potential non-linear relationship by including [ln(EMP)]2. Furthermore, 
the log of firms’ age is considered, as younger firms might be relatively more innovative (lnAGE). 
Another important control is previous successful R&D activities. On the one hand, this may account 
for the absorptive capacity in the firm. On the other hand, it may approximate the attractiveness of a 
firm as a potential collaboration partner. I measure previous successful innovation by a dummy variable 
indicating whether the firm has filed at least one patent in the past. For the Flemish sample this takes 
into account patents filed with the European Patent Office (EPO) before the corresponding survey year. 
For Germany, this variable also accounts for patents filed with the German national patent office. In 
order to control for the degree of competition a company faces, I include an export dummy (EXPORT) 
that equals one if the firm is an exporter and zero otherwise, as firms in international markets may be 
forced to innovate more than others if they want to remain competitive in the global economy. 
In addition, I use a dummy indicating whether the company is part of an enterprise group, such as a 
multinational company or a holding company (GROUP). It may imply more professional innovation 
management of the firm (especially when compared to small stand-alone companies). A further control 
variable indicates whether or not the parent company is located abroad (FOREIGN). Such firms may 
be less likely to receive local public funding. Last but not least, a set of industry dummies controls for 
unobserved heterogeneity across sectors and a time dummy captures common macroeconomic 
shocks.
Table 1 shows the means of all variables used for the different Flemish sub-samples. In the upper panel, 
it can be seen that firms engaged in industry-science partnerships show higher R&D intensity than 
other collaborators (6.3 percent versus 2 percent). However, the two groups also differ significantly 
with respect to export and patenting activities. Thus, the difference in R&D intensity cannot simply be 
assigned to the fact that firms engage in industry-science partnerships and receive spillovers that lead 
to higher investment.
In the lower panel of Table 1, the 532 firms with industry-science partnerships are split into those that 
received public subsidies for their projects and others. Similarly as above, firms that received subsidies 
show higher R&D intensity but they also differ in export and patenting activities. It remains to be 
investigated if the higher R&D input can be assigned to the subsidy. 
The matching of treated 
with untreated firms is 
based on firms’ size, age, 
R&D track record and 
competitive pressure. 
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Table 1.  Flemish data – Means of all variables by sub-sample
Sample 1: Firms that collaborate but not with public science  






t-test on mean 
differences
Ln(EMP) 4.20 4.34
GROUP 0.62 0.67 *
FOREIGN 0.33 0.32
DEX 0.79 0.86 ***
Y2006 0.54 0.58
Ln(AGE) 3.10 3.18
PATENT 0.09 0.26 ***
RDINT 2.00 6.30 ***





Subsidized industry science 
partnerships 
(230 obs.)
t-test on mean 
differences
Ln(EMP) 4.31 4.39
GROUP 0.70 0.63 *
FOREIGN 0.33 0.30
DEX 0.90 0.84 *
Y2006 0.56 0.62
Ln(AGE) 3.22 3.12
PATENT 0.19 0.35 ***
RDINT 3.65 9.76 ***
Notes:  *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1 percent (5 percent, 10 percent). Industry dummies omitted.
For the German sample, we also find differences between firms collaborating with public science and 
other collaborators. The former are on average larger, more active on export markets, and are more 
likely to have at least one patent. On average, their R&D intensity amounts to 8.8 percent, compared 
with 4.2 percent for the group of other collaborators (Table 2).
Within the group of German firms that collaborate with science, there are also significant differences 
between firms that receive a subsidy for the science collaboration and those that do not. Interestingly, 
on average, the subsidized firms are smaller and younger than the non-subsidized firms. They are 
nevertheless more likely to have a patent. With respect to R&D intensity, subsidized firms reach almost 
13 percent and the non-subsidized firms roughly 7 percent. 
Firms engaged in 
industry-science 
partnerships have 
higher R&D intensity 
than firm-firm 
collaborations but they 
differ with respect to 
other variables as well. 
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Table 2.  German data – Means of all variables by sub-sample
Sample 1: Firms that collaborate but not with public science  






t-test on mean 
differences
Ln(EMP) 4.45 4.78 ***
GROUP 0.57 0.59
FOREIGN 0.15 0.13
DEX 0.65 0.76 ***
Y2004 0.53 0.54
Ln(AGE) 2.93 2.86
PATENT 0.72 0.85 ***
RDINT 4.21 8.78 ***





Subsidized industry science 
partnerships 
(284 obs.)
t-test on mean 
differences
Ln(EMP) 4.93 4.52 ***
GROUP 0.62 0.55 *
FOREIGN 0.13 0.14
DEX 0.74 0.79 *
Y2004 0.53 0.55
Ln(AGE) 2.93 2.73 ***
PATENT 0.83 0.89 **
RDINT 6.65 12.69 ***
Notes: *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1 percent (5 percent, 10 percent). Industry dummies omitted.
5.3  Matching
In this sub-section I report the results of the nearest-neighbour matching. First, it is investigated whether 
the differences in R&D intensity between firms that collaborate with science and other collaborators 
can be assigned to the fact of engaging in industry-science collaboration. Thus, for each firm in the 
sample of firms that collaborate with science, I pick the most similar firm from the control group, i.e. 
collaborating firms that chose not to involve public science in their research consortia. The R&D intensity 
of the drawn controls is used as an estimate for the counterfactual situation, that is, what the firms that 
collaborate with science would have invested if they had not collaborated with science.
To implement the nearest-neighbour matching, I require that the picked control operates in the same 
industry as the firm in question. Among those, the firm with the most similar propensity to collaborate 
is drawn as control (see Table A1 in the Annex for a detailed matching protocol). The propensity to 
collaborate with public science is determined by the estimation of probit models on the treatment 
indicator. Results of the probit models are presented in Tables A2 and A3 in the Annex.
Table 3 below presents the matching results for Flanders. Out of the 532 firms that collaborate with 
science, the matching algorithm succeeds in finding a twin firm for 500 observations. As one can see 
in the upper panel, the samples are now balanced in the covariates after the matching routine.   
Firms engaged in 
subsidized industry-
science collaborations 
spend more on R&D  
than non-subsidized 
R&D collaborators but 
other variables are 
different, too. 
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The treated group of firms does no longer differ significantly in its characteristics from the selected 
control group which can now be used as an estimate for the counterfactual situation.
For the first estimation, the treatment effect amounts to 3.1 percentage points of R&D intensity (5.87 
– 2.77), and is significant at the 1-percent level. Thus, we conclude that firms engaging in industry-
science collaborations increase their R&D spending as a response to this “treatment”, all else constant. 
The treatment effects estimation for subsidized industry-science collaborations in Flanders is presented 
in the lower panel of Table 3. Now the group of firms collaborating with public science is split into 
those that receive subsidies for the public-private partnership and non-subsidized industry-science 
consortia. The controls for the subsidized firms are drawn as nearest neighbours from the sample of 
non-subsidized firms. For 222 out of the 230 initial observations, the matching algorithm could find 
an appropriate control. For this second estimation, the treatment effect is about 5.1 percentage points 
(9.4 – 4.3), and is also significant at the 1-percent level. Thus, we find that even within the sub-sample 
of firms engaging in industry-science partnerships, the public subsidy receipt triggers still higher R&D 
investment. Consequently, full crowding-out effects of the policy of funding research consortia with 
involvement of public science can be rejected in this setting, as the estimated treatment effect due to 
the subsidy (about 5 percentage points in terms of R&D intensity) is significantly larger than zero.
Table 3.  Flemish data – matching results: Means of all variables by sub-sample for treated firms 
and selected controls
Sample 1: Firms that collaborate but not with public science  
















RDINT 2.77 5.87 ***

















RDINT 4.33 9.44 ***
Notes:    *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1 percent (5 percent, 10 percent). Industry dummies omitted. Selected controls 
are active in the same industries as the treated firms.
When controlling for 
differences in other 
variables, treatment 




science collaborations  
in Flanders. 
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For the German data, the results of the matching estimator are quite similar. The procedure is equivalent 
to that run on the Flemish data with the exception that the survey year needs to be added as a matching 
argument. Thus, the samples are here exactly balanced with respect to industry and year. Based on 
these restrictions, the most similar firm in terms of the propensity score is drawn as control group for 
the respective firm in the treatment group. In the sample of firms collaborating with science, the 
matching algorithm finds appropriate controls for 775 out of the initial 804 firms in the treatment 
sample. The estimated treatment effect of industry-science collaboration amounts to about 4 percentage 
points of R&D intensity (8.91 – 4.87), and is significant at the 1-percent level.
Among the industry-science collaborators, we can match 261 of the 284 firms that received a subsidy 
with appropriate controls, i.e. firms collaborating with science without being subsidized. Here, too, the 
treatment effect is of similar magnitude as in the Flemish sample. It amounts to about 3.7 percentage 
points (13.01 – 9.33) and is also significant at the 1-percent level.
Table 4.    German data - matching results: Means of all variables by sub-sample for treated firms 
and selected controls
Sample 1: Firms that collaborate but not with public science  
















RDINT 4.87 8.91 ***





Subsidized industry science 
partnerships 
(261 obs.)









RDINT 9.33 13.01 ***
Notes:    *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1 percent (5 percent, 10 percent). Industry dummies omitted. Selected controls 
are active in the same industries as the treated firms and refer to the same year.
Therefore, we can conclude that subsidizing industry-science partnerships does not appear to be 
subject to full crowding-out effects in either Germany or Flanders.
German firms have 
positive treatment 
effects, too. 
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It should be noted, however, that it is not possible to conclude that an expansion of such policy schemes 
would lead to higher R&D in the economy. The treatment effects estimation only allows evaluating 
the program effect for the firms that were actually treated. An expansion of such a policy may lead to 
entry of firms that show significantly different characteristics from the currently treated firms. Thus, it 
may happen that treatment effects would get smaller if firms that newly enter the schemes lack the 
necessary absorptive capacity to benefit from scientific knowledge or are in a different financial 
situation so that they are not able to raise additional capital for further R&D (even in the presence of 
a subsidy) and thus cause higher crowding-out effects of the scheme. Consequently, the analysis above 
is only able to report positive treatment effects for the status quo but these findings cannot be used 
as ex-ante evaluations of changes in the schemes. 
As a robustness check, I finally control for heterogeneous collaboration patterns of the firms in the 
sample. Firms may either collaborate horizontally, vertically or in both directions over and above their 
collaboration with public science. Consequently, I perform analyses equivalent to those above but 
include dummies for the other collaboration patterns as a matching argument. Thus, the drawn controls 
are active in the same industry, are most similar in the control variables as used above and also show 
the same collaboration pattern with respect to vertical and horizontal collaboration as the treated 
firms. As the results are virtually the same as above I do not present them here. 
6.  Conclusions 
This study has shown an example for the evaluation of industry-science R&D collaborations. Industry-
science partnerships may influence the R&D activities of the involved business partners. As outlined, 
theories of industrial organization suggest that R&D collaborations may lead to higher R&D because 
firms can internalize potential external effects of R&D, that is, free-riding of other firms due to knowledge 
spillovers. Furthermore, it has been described that collaborations with universities or other public 
research institutions may lead to higher R&D than collaborations with horizontally related firms as the 
former do not exert a negative externality on profitability since universities are not involved in any 
market rivalry with the firm. 
In addition to the potential knowledge spillover effect, business R&D may be influenced by subsidies. 
Granting subsidies to research consortia rather than individual firms is currently a popular policy, and 
among the former, industry-science partnerships receive preferential treatment in many EU member 
states. Thus, firms may benefit in two ways from the collaboration with science. First, they may benefit 
from knowledge spillovers and second, public subsidies lower the price of R&D conducted in the 
firm. 
As an example for possible evaluations of the benefits of industry-science collaborations I employ 
nearest-neighbour matching techniques to firm level data from Germany and Flanders. First, treatment 
effects of R&D collaboration with public science are estimated using comparable firms that collaborate 
in R&D, but not with public science, as a control group. Second, the firms that collaborate with public 
science are split into those that engage in subsidized industry-science consortia and those that 
collaborate with public science without being subsidized. For both scenarios, I find positive treatment 
effects, and can thus reject full crowding-out effects of policy schemes supporting industry-science 
collaborations. 
It should be noted, however, that the analysis cannot tell whether an expansion of such policies would 
lead to similar treatment effects. In the extreme case, all companies that could potentially benefit from 
collaborating with science may actually do so already. New entrants into a policy scheme for (subsidized) 
Treatment effects would 
not necessarily remain 
as strong if the schemes 
were extended to 
additional firms. 
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science-industry collaboration may not show an increase in R&D as they, for instance, may lack the 
necessary absorptive capacity. Thus, the results of the treatment effects analysis can only shed light 
on actual program participants. The findings cannot be extrapolated to a hypothetical situation with 
more participating firms.
In addition, industry-science collaborations may not be unambiguously welfare-enhancing. If it is 
believed that the primary task of university research is basic science and that results of basic science 
lead to higher welfare in the long run, one may ask whether basic research suffers from industry-science 
collaboration in the long term. Increased commercialization of university research may distract 
researchers from their basic research tasks. This assumption is not implausible as a firm typically seeks 
specific solutions for technological problems emerging in its business. Thus, engaging in industry-
science collaborations may force university researchers to shift their attention to more applied research 
questions that possibly have to be addressed within tight deadlines. Basic research output might suffer 
under these circumstances. Czarnitzki et al. (2009) analyze this question using individual data of German 
professors. They correlate their publication counts and quality with patenting activity where patents 
are differentiated into purely academic patents and corporate patents. The latter are patents where 
the university researcher appears as the inventor and a firm as the patent applicant. This can be 
interpreted as an indicator for an engagement in industry-science collaboration. Regression analysis 
shows that such collaboration harms the publication output of the scientist with respect to both 
quantity and quality whereas commercialization activity measured as academic patenting does not. 
Lower(-quality) publication output may be an indication of the opportunity cost of science-to-industry 
technology-transfer policies, especially if additional subsidies to industry-science collaborations are 
financed by reductions in basic public university budgets – a trend that can be observed for Germany.4 
The potential benefits in business R&D should therefore be carefully assessed against potentially 
negative effects occurring in knowledge output of public science.
4    Between 1981 and 2005, German higher education R&D expenses remained more or less constant at 0.4 percent of GDP. 
During the same time, however, the share of higher education R&D financed by the business sector grew from 2 percent 
to 14 percent (OECD 2009).
The benefit of industry-
science collaboration 
for business R&D should 
be carefully balanced 
against the opportunity 
cost in terms of lower 
academic publication 
output. 
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Annex:  Matching protocol and probit estimations
The following matching protocol summarizes the empirical implementation of the nearest neighbour 
matching procedure used in this study.
Table A1.  The matching protocol
Step 1 Specify and estimate a probit model of engaging in industry-science collaboration and 
receiving a subsidy, respectively, to obtain the propensity scores ˆ P(X). 
Step 2 Restrict the sample to common support: delete all observations on treated firms with 
probabilities larger than the maximum and smaller than the minimum in the potential 
control group. In this study, I apply the common support restriction for each industry 
separately, as it is required that the treated firms and selected controls belong to the same 
industry (see Step 5).
Step 3 Choose one observation from the sub-sample of treated firms and delete it from that 
pool.
Step 4 Calculate the distance between this firm and each non-subsidized firm in order to find 
the most similar control observation. As we match on the propensity score, we use a 
Euclidian distance. (In case multiple matching arguments are used a standard choice is 
the computation of a Mahalanobis distance. This has been done for the robustness check 
where hybrid matching has been used.)
Step 5 Select the observation with the minimum distance from the remaining sample. In this 
study, I restrict the potential control group to firms that are active in the same industry 
as the treated firm in question. (Do not remove the selected controls from the pool of 
potential controls, so that it can be used again.) 
Step 6 Repeat Steps 3 to 5 for all observations on subsidized firms.
Step 7 Using the matched comparison group, the average effect on the treated can thus be 
calculated as the mean difference of the matched samples:
n
T









   
 
 
    
with Yi
C being the counterfactual for firm i and nT the sample size (of treated firms). Note 
that the same observation for Yi
C may appear more than once in that group.
Step 8 As we perform sampling with replacement to estimate the counterfactual situation, an 
ordinary t-statistic on mean differences is biased, because it does not take the appearance 
of repeated observations into account. Therefore, we have to correct the standard errors 
for valid statistical inference. We follow Lechner (2001) and calculate his estimator for an 
asymptotic approximation of the standard errors.
Tables A2 and A3 present the propensity score estimation for the Flemish and German samples. The 
propensity scores are used to pick the most similar control observation within the matching 
procedure. 
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Table A2.  Flemish data: Probit regressions on treatment dummies



















Industry dummies YES YES
McFadden R2 0.09 0.11
Note:  Standard errors in parentheses. *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1 percent (5 percent, 10 percent).
Table A3.  German data: Probit regressions on treatment dummies



















Industry dummies YES YES
McFadden R2 0.07 0.07
Note:  Standard errors in parentheses. *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1 percent (5 percent, 10 percent).
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In  this  article  we  address  various  issues  raised  by 
the  evaluation  of  the  R&D  tax  credit  policy.  We 
first  consider  the  studies  that  estimate  the  direct 
effects of the tax credit on R&D inputs. We discuss 
results  obtained  through  different  approaches  and 
methods and show that they give a contrasted picture 
of  the  policy’s  effectiveness.  Next  we  argue  that  a 
comprehensive  evaluation  of  the  R&D  tax  credit 
should  include  other  outcomes  and  present  studies 
focussing on them. We also initiate a very tentative 
meta-analysis  to  obtain  a  more  synthetic  view  on 
the  various  evaluation  results.  We  finally  conclude 
that  harmonization  and  increased  comparability  in 
evaluation  studies  would  be  useful  to  bridge  the 
gap  between  evaluation  and  policy  design  and 
implementation. 
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A policy to boost R&D: Does the 
R&D tax credit work?
1.  Introduction
Any government has scarce resources to fulfil their various responsibilities and should therefore make 
use of them as wisely and efficiently as possible. In the last thirty years there has been an increasing 
demand from citizens and firms for improved accountability of government management and 
policies. The need for systematic quantitative evaluations of the efficiency of economic instruments 
and the use of public resources has now become well-established in the public debate in modern 
democracies.
In parallel, the emergence of the knowledge-driven economy has led to research and innovation being 
considered as crucial factors of competitive advantage and main sources of future economic growth. 
Accordingly, public policies to stimulate investment in Research and Development (R&D) by private 
firms are actively implemented in most industrialized countries. They are rooted in the concern that 
due to knowledge spillovers private firms invest less in R&D than would be desirable from society’s 
viewpoint.
The R&D tax credit, which was launched in the early 1980s in the US, France and Canada and which 
has gained importance and spread to other countries since then, is a major such policy instrument. 
The large amounts of public money it involves, under the form of forgone tax revenue, make it an 
obvious object of public-policy evaluations. Asking “Does the R&D tax credit work?” is an important 
and legitimate question, and indeed a significant international literature has developed to address it.
Concurrently to these evolutions, from a technical perspective, the remarkable progress in data 
collection, processing and possibilities of diffusion and the development of statistical methods made 
it possible to conduct much more rigorous and convincing econometric analyses and policy evaluations. 
In particular, the micro-level data available today allow for more relevant, precise and reliable analyses 
by providing highly variable and richer information. When also accessible in the form of panels (i.e., 
not only as a cross-section but also in the time dimension), such micro-data allow for more realistic 
dynamic model specifications and for useful controls of potential estimation bias resulting from 
unobserved heterogeneity across firms. International comparisons of econometric studies and policy 
evaluations, in spite of their many additional difficulties, can also offer important insights and help in 
improving policy design.
There are two very different kinds of policy evaluations. Implementation evaluations focus on delivery 
times and deadlines, cost optimization and transparency of public policies; they consist mainly in 
building indicators and scoreboards, doing specific surveys and applying audit methods. Outcome 
evaluations which measure the effects of policies on their targets usually take the form of statistical 
analyses and econometric studies. They are most difficult since outcomes can be uncertain and variable, 
being affected by many uncontrolled variables and differing in the short and long terms. Policies can 
also have side effects or unintended consequences, good or bad, besides their targeted outcomes.
This article intends to shed light on the effectiveness of R&D tax credit by explaining how it can greatly 
differ in its design, by discussing the main methods of evaluations which are used, and by briefly 
surveying the results of several of the more recent studies, already published or not, in the international 
literature. Hall and Van Reenen (2000) in their excellent survey article consider a wide array of older 
articles and review the methods of evaluations from a broadly similar perspective as ours.
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In the next section of the article, we present the R&D tax credit in its different forms within the broader 
scope of public policies towards research and discuss the various outcomes to be considered for its 
evaluation. In the third section, we explain the evaluation methods focusing on the direct impacts of 
the tax credit on firms’ R&D expenditures and illustrate them by some of the results of recent analyses. 
In the fourth section, we consider the much less frequent evaluations that have been conducted for 
other types of outcomes. In the fifth section we evoke the difficulties of comparing appropriately the 
results of the various evaluation studies, and illustrate some of these difficulties by presenting a tentative 
and yet incomplete exercise in meta-analysis. The sixth section concludes.
2.  What is the R&D tax credit? Designs, objectives and outcomes
Firms cannot fully appropriate the benefits of their R&D investments: Patents are circumvented in 
different ways, and valuable process and product innovations are emulated more or less quickly. Even 
when intellectual property rights are enforced effectively, R&D generates positive externalities that 
spill over to other firms and benefit the economy at large. Firms thus tend to invest less in R&D projects 
than they should since they know that other firms will capture part of the returns, or they tend to wait 
for other firms to engage in R&D projects rather than doing so themselves. As a result firms will normally 
tend to increase their R&D expenditures to the size where their expected private returns and marginal 
costs will match, but they will not increase them further to the level that would equalize marginal social 
costs and marginal social returns and maximize economic efficiency and social welfare. This market 
failure can be corrected by direct public funding of research activities performed by public research 
organisations and universities and by economic policies supporting private R&D.
2.1  R&D tax credit and direct subsidies
The basic idea of the tax credit is to provide a built-in incentive for firms to increase their research 
activities by allowing them to deduct a share of their corresponding expenditures from their corporate 
taxes, and thus lowering their cost and increasing their expected returns. It is a relatively recent answer 
to the need for public intervention in private research and is part of a broader public research policy 
that, besides the funding and monitoring of public research, mainly includes subsidies directly granted 
to firms.1 The R&D tax credit is generally opposed to R&D subsidies, since they have different advantages 
and downsides. The main advantage of the tax credit is that firms are completely free in choosing, 
financing and conducting their R&D projects. This argument is consistent with the basic view that 
profit-maximizing agents make more efficient decisions than centralized authorities. However, it 
remains possible that firms might use the tax credit to support poor-quality or excessively risky 
projects.
R&D subsidies consist in funds directly provided to firms applying for financial support of a given 
research project to specialized public agencies. The main advantage of subsidies is that before being 
granted, the research projects submitted by the firms are examined and selected by these agencies, 
which can control their quality and orientation and are ideally able to decide on projects with high 
social returns. Research subsidies can thus be targeted to specific goals and their implementation can 
be quite flexible. To a lesser extent, the tax credit can also be modulated with respect to firms’ 
characteristics, in particular their size and overall R&D expenditure. In a number of countries, such as 
1    It also includes the immediate direct deductibility of the major part of R&D investment (wages of R&D personnel and 
intermediate consumption expenditures of R&D activities) from the base of corporate taxes. This is in contrast to the other 
types of investments, such as buildings and equipments, which in general have to be amortized over given fiscal service 
lives.
An R&D tax credit allows 
firms to deduct part of 
their R&D expenditure 
from the corporate  
tax bill.
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the Netherlands and Norway, the rate of the tax credit is higher for smaller firms; in France it can 
decrease for the fraction of eligible R&D expenditure exceeding certain ceilings. Finally, a drawback 
of subsidies relative to the tax credit is that they involve higher costs both for the firms applying and 
competing for them and for the public agencies monitoring them.
Hægeland and Møen (2007a) have studied the relationship and relative efficiency of R&D subsidies 
and the tax credit on the same representative panel of Norwegian firms. They conclude that both 
instruments are complements at the level of the firm, while they seem to be substitutes at the level of 
the economy as a whole. They also provide evidence that the tax credit generates more additional 
private R&D than direct subsidies.
2.2  Main designs
Two main designs of the R&D tax credit can be distinguished, the “volume tax credit” and the 
“incremental tax credit”. The two have different implications in terms of allocation of the credit and in 
terms of incentives and efficiency. Deciding which of these two designs is better is still an open question 
raising many issues, in theory as well as in practice. Before going further, it is useful to shortly recall 
their main features.
The volume tax credit is based on current R&D expenditures in the fiscal year, either all of them or a 
part of them depending on their exact definition. For example if the eligible base is the total current 
R&D expenditures and the rate is equal to 20 percent, then firms can deduct an amount equal to 
20 percent of these expenditures from their corporate taxes, implying that at the margin (as well as on 
average in this simple case) the R&D cost for the firm is 20 percent lower than its market price. Firms 
that invest in R&D can always benefit from the volume tax credit, irrespective of whether they are 
increasing or decreasing their R&D expenditures.
By contrast, under the incremental tax credit only firms that tend to increase their R&D expenditures 
may benefit, since the tax credit is based on the difference between a reference level and the current 
level of expenditures. This reference level is usually defined as an average of past expenditures. In 
France at the beginning of the R&D tax credit, from 1983 to 1990, the reference level was simply 
expenditures in the previous year, and later until 2004 it was the average of expenditures in the two 
previous years. Thus, the tax credit is positive when R&D expenditures are increasing and negative if 
they are decreasing. In the latter case, the (negative) tax credit will be deductible from future positive 
tax credits, if a mechanism of negative tax credit is implemented like it was in France; it will be zero if 
such mechanism is not implemented. The incremental tax credit is difficult to analyze because its 
effects are reduced by the fact that current expenditures increase the reference level of the following 
years. Mixed tax credit policies that are a combination of the two types of tax credit can also be 
implemented. That was the case of France from 2004 to 2008, when a particularly generous pure 
volume tax credit was adopted.
Simple microeconomic theory will tend to give preference to the incremental tax credit, since it seems 
rational for the government to support private R&D only when private marginal productivity is lower 
than marginal cost while (expected) social marginal productivity is higher. The first-best policy would 
thus be to subsidize only the R&D activities that firms would not have done in the absence of the tax 
credit (and only up to the point where their social marginal productivity and cost are equalized). 
However, the government do not know how much firms would have invested in R&D in the absence 
of the tax credit, which is difficult to assess. In this setting of asymmetric information, the conservative 
assumption usually made is that the firm’s R&D expenditures would have been stable (in constant 
prices) in the absence of the tax credit. The incremental tax credit thus appears as a second-best policy 
The ‘volume tax 
credit’ applies to total 
R&D expenditure, 
the ‘incremental tax 
credit’ only to spending 
increases.
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which avoids supporting R&D expenditures that firms would do anyway. In contrast, the volume tax 
credit subsidizes R&D expenditures in their entirety.
However, the comparison between the volume tax credit and the incremental tax credit involves other 
considerations, too. In particular, the incremental tax credit can incite firms to adopt opportunistic 
R&D strategies of stop-and-go and of outsourcing. It is also deemed to be complex and costly for them. 
The negative tax credit mechanism, when it is implemented, is much criticized for its deterring effect. 
It cancels out or weakens the tax credit incentives to catch up on R&D activities for firms which have 
been cutting them down because of economic difficulties and are currently recovering.
Besides the major differences between the volume and incremental tax credit, there exist numerous 
smaller variations, which may nonetheless matter in practice. Only eligible R&D expenditures can be 
declared by firms, and eligibility can be defined by law in specific ways, favouring for example 
cooperative research with academic and public laboratories or the hiring of young PhD researchers, 
as is currently the case in France. The definition of the tax credit also generally includes one or several 
ceilings as well as carry-forward and carry-back rules (which allow to transfer to following years the 
part of tax credit which is higher than the current corporate tax). Such smaller design differences tend 
to vary across countries and possibly sectors, as well as over time in a given country. They contribute 
to the complexity of evaluations and to making evaluations more difficult to compare among each 
other. For example, a volume tax credit with a rate of 30 percent and a ceiling on the total of eligible 
R&D expenditures is not equivalent to a volume tax credit with a rate of 20 percent and no ceiling, and 
assessing which one is more efficient is not straightforward.
2.3  Direct objectives and main evaluation outcomes
Although the question of the objective(s) of the R&D tax credit is essential, it is scarcely addressed 
explicitly. The answer has important implications for the evaluation of the policy. Depending on the 
objective of the policy, its performance should not be measured in the same way. Thus whether “the 
R&D tax credit works” depends on the objective(s) and, hence, on what “working” means precisely. 
Does it mean “increasing R&D investment” – full stop? Or does it mean increasing R&D investment with 
positive follow-on effects on innovation, productivity, competitiveness, and social welfare?
The objective of the tax credit can also change over time. This point may be illustrated by the French 
example. When introduced in 1983, the French tax credit was mainly aimed at fostering private R&D 
(expenditure and R&D personnel). This is still its official objective as part of the Lisbon Strategy of the 
European Union.2 However, it is also considered today as a major fiscal incentive to attract foreign R&D 
investment and deter French firms from relocating to other countries. The transition from an incremental 
to a volume tax credit, which multiplies the amount of public funding by a factor of about three, is 
thus a way to protect the domestic industry and to make it more attractive. It may be viewed as a 
compensation for lower corporate tax rates elsewhere.
A comprehensive analysis of the objectives of the tax credit should distinguish between those which 
are directly related to R&D and innovation and those which are less directly related and ultimately 
target other economic variables. As most of the literature, the scope of this article is limited to the 
former and to the main outcomes naturally following from them that should be taken into account in 
2    The Lisbon strategy was defined by the European Council in March 2000 to make the European Union “the most dynamic 
and competitive knowledge-based economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better 
jobs and greater social cohesion, and respect for the environment by 2010”. As far as R&D is concerned, the objective was 
to reach a ratio of R&D expenditures to GDP of 3 percent by 2010 with the following decomposition: two-thirds for the 
private sector and one-third for the public sector.
The incremental tax 
credit tends to avoid 
subsidizing R&D that is 
done anyway but it is 
more complex and might 
lead to opportunistic 
behaviour.
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the evaluations of the performance of the R&D tax credit. All in all, the various outcomes that can be 
considered are the following:
Impact on existing R&D activities (level or rate of growth of R&D expenditures, R&D-to-output ratios,  •	
R&D capital, number of researchers, shares of researchers and engineers in R&D personnel etc.);
Impact on starting R&D activities (as above,  •	 plus the number of firms performing R&D);
Impact on innovation output (product and process innovations, patents), productivity (labour and  •	
total factor productivity) and other performance indicators (share of “innovative sales”, 
profitability etc.);
Other (possibly unintended) impacts such as impact on researcher wages; and •	
Impact on social welfare (comprehensive cost-benefit analysis). •	
The results of the evaluation analyses can be presented and summarized in very different ways, which 
make them often difficult to compare precisely. The results concerning the impact on R&D level and 
intensity are usually cast in terms of elasticities and multipliers. Elasticities of R&D with respect to the 
tax credit measure the impacts on R&D expenditures of changes in the tax credit rate. Such elasticities 
have to be assessed in the short and long run and cannot be directly interpreted in terms of policy 
efficiency; but they can serve to do simulations of policy changes. Multipliers, also labelled “bang for 
the buck” (BFTB), estimate the amount of additional R&D (say in euros) that is generated by one euro 
of tax credit. A number of authors tend to consider that a multiplier above one is an indication that 
the tax policy is efficient. Conversely, a multiplier below one would point to an inefficient policy on 
the argument that since one euro of forgone tax receipt generates less that one euro of additional 
R&D, direct public funding of R&D, through public research or subsidies, would be a better instrument. 
However, this is not obvious – at least as long as the multiplier is not negative – since in principle what 
matters is the comparison of the corresponding net social returns.
3.  Evaluation of the effects of the R&D tax credit on R&D investment
Even when focusing on a precisely defined outcome, evaluations vary widely in terms of methods of 
analysis. We distinguish four broad methods here: survey analyses; quasi-natural experiments relying 
on time and policy-design changes; dummy-variable regressions and matching techniques; and 
structural econometric modelling. We mainly concentrate on the last one, which we tend to prefer. Of 
course these methods are complementary. They are also related in many respects and the distinction 
between them is not always clear-cut in practice. As shown below, the dummy-variable regressions 
and matching techniques can be very close either to quasi-natural experiments or to structural 
econometric models, depending on how these methods are understood and implemented.
Ideally, one might consider that evaluations should be based on randomized experiments. To adopt 
the language used in such experiments, we would say that the objective of the tax credit evaluation 
is to assess whether, and to what extent, a “treatment”, i.e., the tax credit has an effect on the R&D 
behaviour of firms. Treatment evaluations usually rely on the comparison between the average outcome 
of a treatment group and that of a control group which is not treated. Of course the allocation of firms 
to one group or the other must be exogenous and random. Otherwise the treated firms may be 
intrinsically different from the ones that are not treated. If the allocation is randomized, the control 
group is considered a valid counterfactual and can be used to determine the outcome the treatment 
group would have had in the absence of the treatment. The evaluation of new drugs is usually conducted 
on the basis of such randomized experiments. In the field of economics, experiments have been applied 
to the evaluation of schooling policies (see Krueger and Whitmore 2001 for a famous example).
The ‘bang-for-the-buck’ 
multiplier is the increase 
in firms’ R&D per euro of 
R&D tax credit.
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A crucial issue when trying to evaluate the R&D tax credit along similar lines is the absence of a directly 
observable counterfactual, since the implementation of an experiment would imply that only some 
randomly selected firms receive the tax credit (which is forbidden by competition law). In order to 
circumvent this limitation, researchers rely on the various methods described in the following sub-
sections. Surveys may be viewed as an undemanding way of constructing a counterfactual by asking 
beneficiary firms directly “What if you did not benefit from a tax-credit?”, and vice versa. In turn, quasi-
natural experiments and matching methods use exogenous variations in the design of the tax credit 
and in the firm’s self-selection to benefit from it, together with appropriate statistical techniques, to 
overcome the lack of randomization. Finally, structural econometric modelling applies similar statistical 
techniques but relies more strongly on an economic model of the firm’s behaviour, with the ambition 
of being more informative in the assessment of policy efficiency.
3.1  Survey analyses
The survey-based approach relies on the straightforward idea that firms themselves know best what 
their R&D expenditures would have been in the absence of the tax credit. The multiplier (or BFTB) is 
simply the ratio between the total expenditures that would have been forgone in the absence of the 
tax credit and the total amount of the tax credit (possibly adding monitoring costs). Such an estimate, 
however, does not allow to foretell the effect of future policy changes or to distinguish between short- 
and long-run impacts. Mansfield and Switzer (1985) in a pioneer survey of the Canadian tax credit find 
a BFTB equal to 0.3-0.4, which is weak. Hægeland and Møen (2007b) in a recent survey of the Norwegian 
R&D tax credit obtain a BFTB between 2.12 and 2.65, which is quite high. Yet, contrary to Mansfield and 
Switzer, they rely on qualitative data to which they assign numerical values in a debatable fashion.
The first limitation of the survey approach is the usually small sample size due to high cost of 
implementation. The second weakness is limited reliability of the answers. Indeed, surveyed executives 
may ignore the answers or give incorrect ones because of the intrinsic difficulty to assess the relative 
weight of all other factors that motivate their R&D decisions. They may also bias the answers for 
marketing and strategic reasons. On the former, executives in firms where innovation is a marketing 
argument may not readily admit that the tax credit has a strong incentive effect on their R&D. On the 
latter, they may exaggerate the effect strategically, anticipating that their opinion would be of some 
influence in future public-policy decisions.
Although they might not be very reliable to evaluate the overall impact of the tax credit on R&D 
expenditures, surveys may often appear the best way to bring complementary insights on specific 
features of the policy (such as special rules aimed at encouraging firms to collaborate with public 
research laboratories and hiring young researchers). They can also inform policy makers by providing 
a better understanding and detailed feed-back on industry-specific concerns.
3.2  Quasi-natural experiments relying on time and policy-design discontinuities
These methods rely on discontinuities in the implementation and design of the R&D tax credit policy. 
A natural idea is to compare R&D expenditures or growth rates of similar firms (preferably the same 
firms) before and after the introduction of the tax credit. If R&D increases substantially, then it can be 
argued that such a change can only be explained by the implementation of this policy. Yet, this before-
after analysis cannot by itself separate the effect of the tax credit from that of macroeconomic shocks 
and changes in industry and market trends. Indeed, it could be that the government and firms 
understand the importance of R&D in a knowledge-based economy at about the same time, inducing 
the former to launch the tax credit and the latter to increase R&D. In the opposite direction, for example, 
the current economic crisis might deter firms from increasing their R&D and make governments less 
As firms themselves 
know best what their 
R&D expenditure would 
have been absent the 
tax credit, some studies 
use surveys.
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generous. In these cases, the before-after analysis would indicate that the tax credit has a significant 
effect on R&D even if in fact it does not.
One way to address such an identification problem is the so called difference-in-difference analysis, 
which takes advantage of a second source of discontinuity. In most R&D tax-credit schemes the total 
R&D amount eligible for the tax credit is subject to a ceiling above which there is either no tax credit 
or the rate of the tax credit declines. A ceiling generates such a discontinuity that may be considered 
as producing a quasi-natural experiment in which firms above the ceiling (i.e., those that are not, or 
are less, affected by the public policy) can be used as a control group for the firms below the ceiling 
(treatment group). The difference-in-difference analysis combines the comparison between these two 
groups with the difference over time, that is, before and after the introduction of the tax credit.
Hægeland and Møen (2007b) have followed this approach for Norway where a 20-percent volume tax 
credit was introduced in 2002 with a ceiling of NOK 4 million (about EUR 0.45 million at the time). They 
argue that the firms which would have had R&D expenditures above the ceiling in the absence of the 
tax credit do not benefit from tax credit for their marginal units of R&D, whereas the firms which would 
have had R&D expenditures below the ceiling in the absence of the tax credit do. The latter have 
stronger incentives than the former to increase their R&D investment and, hence the effect of the tax 
credit should be higher for them. To determine which two groups of firms would have been respectively 
above and below the ceiling in the absence of the tax credit, the authors simply select them according 
to whether their R&D expenditures were already above or below the ceiling in 2001, one year before 
the introduction of the tax credit. The results show that the firms of the ‘below-ceiling group’ had 
indeed a higher rate of growth of R&D from 2001 to 2003 than the ‘above-ceiling group’. Their study 
provides evidence that the Norwegian policy is effective in stimulating R&D, as already suggested by the 
results of the survey analysis, but it does not allow to quantify the impact of the R&D tax credit accurately.
3.3  Dummy-variable regressions and matching techniques
These methods basically rely on the comparison between the firms that receive the tax credit and the 
firms that do not. The dummy-variable approach is the simpler one, consisting of econometric regressions 
of a dependent variable such as R&D expenditures, R&D growth rates or intensity ratios on 0/1- variables 
indicating whether or not firms have benefited from the R&D tax credit and on a set of other relevant 
explanatory and control variables.
Hægeland and Møen (2007a and 2007b) follow such a regression approach, too, estimating and testing 
a number of different specifications on their panel of Norwegian firms. In particular they try to separate 
short-term from long-term effects and they also try to address the endogenous-selection issue.3 Their 
estimations yield sizeable and statistically significant stimulating effects. They find that the tax credit 
increases R&D expenditure by 1.35 percent on average. From their favourite specification they derive 
a multiplier (BFTB) higher than one (but weakly significant) for the firms above the ceiling and higher 
than 2 for the firms below the ceiling (highly significant). Duguet (2007) estimates a similar dummy-
variable regression on a panel of French firms, taking the rate of growth of private R&D net of the tax 
credit and subsidies received as the dependent variable. He finds that on average the tax credit increases 
the rate of growth of private R&D by 0.05 to 0.10 percent but he does not compute the corresponding 
multiplier.
3    They also include dummies indicating firms’ position with respect to the ceiling of the tax credit in addition to the 
dummy indicating whether or not they benefit from the tax credit. They use sales as an explanatory variable and they take 
advantage of the panel nature of their sample by controlling for firm fixed effects and year dummies interacted with an 
indicator of whether the firm R&D was below or above the ceiling before the introduction of the tax credit.
Other studies exploit 
discontinuities in policy 
design such as the 
introduction of a tax 
credit and a ceiling for 
the eligible amount.
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The matching method is a more general and sophisticated approach than the dummy-variable 
regression. Basically, it compares the respective outcomes (e.g. the R&D expenditures) of pairs of firms 
that are alike or as comparable as possible, except for the fact that only one of them has received the 
treatment (i.e. the R&D tax credit). Since this is the only difference between the pairs of firms, the 
differences in outcomes can only be explained by the treatment. Of course, in practice it is impossible 
to find firms that are perfectly comparable, so the comparison is made on the basis of a set of control 
variables under the assumption that only these control variables have a potential effect on the selected 
outcomes. In a first step, two groups of firms are created, the treatment and the control group. Each 
firm in the treatment group is associated with the firm in the control group that is most comparable 
to it. This association or matching process can be achieved using various techniques. In a second step, 
the difference in outcomes (for instance, R&D expenditures or R&D intensity) is computed pair by pair, 
and the average difference between pairs is interpreted as an estimation of the effect of the tax 
credit.
Duguet (2007) applies the matching method to the evaluation of the effect of the R&D tax credit in 
France over the period 1993-2003 during which the tax credit was fully incremental and its major 
features did not change much. The precise purpose of the analysis is to evaluate the effect of the tax 
credit, considered in a binary way (treatment – no treatment), on the annual rate of growth of private 
R&D expenditures. When two firms have the same estimated probability to obtain the tax credit but 
only one asks for it and effectively receives it, then one may assume that the tax credit was randomly 
attributed. This is an artificial way to create an experiment in which the tax credit is proposed only to 
randomly-selected firms, using the others as the control group.
In fact Duguet considers two sets of estimates for each year: one computed on the full sample of firms 
(including firms that do not perform R&D or reduce their R&D expenditure, and hence cannot benefit 
from the incremental tax credit) and one based on the sub-sample of firms that have increased their 
R&D expenditures. Working with the sub-sample requires that there are enough firms that qualify for 
the tax credit but do not ask for it. This may be because (i) firms ignore the existence of the policy; (ii) 
most of their R&D expenditures are not eligible for the tax credit; (iii) they consider that asking for the 
credit it too complex and costly; or (iv) they fear that asking for the tax credit increases the likelihood 
of a tax audit.
The two sets of estimates produce quite different results. Results also vary a lot from year to year and 
many of them are not statistically significant, with effects on yearly growth rates of R&D ranging from 
0.01 percent to 0.1 percent. The estimates obtained from the sub-sample of firms with growing R&D 
are lower than those obtained on the full sample, which is not surprising. Presenting the results as 
multipliers (BFTB), Duguet finds a BFTB of zero (one euro of tax credit generates zero additional R&D) 
for the sub-sample and a BFTB of 2.3 for the full sample. It is difficult to say which control group to 
prefer.4
3.4  Structural econometric modelling
This approach of evaluating the R&D tax credit has been developed by the US Government Accounting 
Office (1989) and by Hall (1993) and has since been followed by a number of studies for different 
countries. It follows the traditional framework of ‘structural’ econometric analysis, relying on an 
4    The sub-sample might be preferred because the control group (only firms with growing R&D) arguably contains better 
matches for the treated firms. On the other hand, one might prefer the full sample and consider all non-treated firms as 
the control group because the tax credit is in principle available to all firms (i.e., firms in the control group can receive it as 
soon as they start increasing their R&D expenditure again).
Yet another technique 
matches beneficiary 
firms with otherwise 
comparable non-
beneficiary firms.
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economic model of the firm’s R&D investment behaviour and using those econometric techniques 
that seem most appropriate given the model and the available data. The model states that the level 
of R&D investment of the firm is determined by the user cost of R&D capital, that is, the real cost faced 
by the firm when it makes an R&D investment decision, which is a function of the rate of the tax credit 
scheme, among other variables. “Other things being equal”, the higher the R&D user cost, the lower 
the R&D investment. One advantage of the approach is that it allows a more informative evaluation of 
the policy and of policy changes.
The structural econometric approach thus does not directly estimate the effects of the R&D tax credit 
on R&D but involves two main steps, namely:
Computing the response of the user cost of R&D to changes in the rate of the tax credit also  •	
taking into account other characteristics of tax credit design (incremental versus volume tax 
credit, existence of ceilings etc.); and
Specifying and estimating an econometric model of the response of the firm’s R&D investment or  •	
-capital to changes in the user cost of R&D capital. 
The user cost of R&D capital, like any rental cost is defined as the cost of using one unit of capital for 
one year (Hall and Jorgenson 1971). The user cost involves the price to buy this one unit of capital, the 
interest rate that could have been generated by the money used to buy it, the unit’s economic rate of 
depreciation and an inflation gain or loss5. It also depends on the corporate tax rate of the firm, the 
specific fiscal rules of amortization of R&D and the characteristics of the R&D tax credit.
Usually the econometric model is a regression of R&D capital or investment on the user cost of R&D 
capital and a set of explanatory firm-specific variables (in particular sales), involving different lags of 
these variables to take into account the firm dynamic behaviour. It thus allows estimating short-run 
and long-run own-price elasticities of R&D capital (i.e. the time profile of variations of R&D when the 
user cost changes). When panel data are available, individual firm effects may be included to correct 
for unobserved heterogeneity (i.e. unobserved, albeit relevant, variables that vary across firms but not 
over time are practically constant over time). Under an incremental or mixed tax credit scheme, the 
user cost of R&D is endogenous since it depends on the level of R&D expenditures.
To evaluate the R&D tax credit in France, Mairesse and Mulkay (2004) rely on such an econometric 
model for an unbalanced panel of 2,431 firms (mainly in the manufacturing sector) over the 18-year 
period 1980-1997. They find a long run elasticity of R&D capital to its user cost of −2.7, providing evidence 
of a positive and significant effect of the tax credit on R&D expenditures. The authors also make a 
policy simulation for 2003. They assume an increase of the statutory rate of the incremental tax credit 
by 20 percent (from 50 percent to 60 percent) together with an increase of the tax-credit ceiling by 
20 percent too. Such a policy change would have generated between EUR 168 million and EUR 320 
million of additional private R&D expenditures, substantially more than the additional government 
expenditures on the tax credit (EUR 88 million or 20 percent). The BFTB multiplier is thus between 2 
and 3.6. That is, one euro of tax credit generates between EUR 1 and EUR 2.6 of additional private 
R&D.6
5    That is, if the price of one unit increases during the year, the user cost is reduced because at the end of the year the firm 
can sell the unit of capital at a price higher than the buying price.
6    In an update Mairesse and Mulkay (2008) use the analysis on a similar sample but over the 24 years 1980-2003 and find an 
even stronger effect on R&D capital of a decrease in its user cost. Their provisional estimation of the long-term elasticity 
of R&D capital with respect to its user cost appears to be about twice as high as that before. However the BFTB multiplier 
corresponding to a similar simulation as the one in their 2004 study remains of about the same order of magnitude.
The structural-modelling 
approach explicitly 
accounts for the tax 
credit’s effect on the user 
cost of R&D.
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Several articles have recently been published on the evaluation of the R&D tax credit in Spain. They 
are all based on panel data samples covering the 1990s, constructed from the same firm survey (Encuesta 
Sobre Estrategias Empresariales). The Spanish tax credit has changed several times since its introduction 
and has a mixed design, combining a volume base and an incremental base (Romero and Sanz 2007). 
All these analyses distinguish small firms from large firms, showing that the results are different for 
the two groups and suggesting that the tax credit can be more cost efficient when taking into account 
the size of the firms. 
Marra (2004) finds a user-cost elasticity of R&D expenditures of −0.6 and −0.8 for small and large firms, 
respectively, and an elasticity of the user cost to the tax credit rate of about −0.5 for both types of 
firms, and hence a combined elasticity of R&D to the tax credit rate of about 0.3 for small firms and 0.4 
for large firms. Corchuelo (2006) obtains a higher user-cost elasticity of R&D expenditures (−1.2). Romero 
and Sanz (2007) find a user-cost elasticity of R&D expenditures of about −1.0 and an elasticity of the 
user cost to the rate of tax credit of about −1.5, and hence a combined elasticity of R&D to the tax credit 
rate of 1.5.7 They also compute a BFTB multiplier equal to 0.25, suggesting that the R&D tax policy is 
not very efficient.
One of the most recent studies following the user-cost structural econometric method is the evaluation 
of the Dutch R&D tax credit (WBSO) by Lokshin and Mohnen (2009). The WBSO is a volume tax credit 
which is based on R&D labour costs and has two ceilings defining a first bracket with a higher tax credit 
and a second one with a lower tax credit.8 As in Mairesse and Mulkay (2004) but for a smaller and shorter 
unbalanced panel (of 400 firms for the period 1996 to 2004), the authors compute a firm-specific user 
cost of R&D capital which depends on the characteristics of the R&D tax credit and they estimate the 
user-cost elasticity of R&D capital considering various dynamic regression specifications and taking 
care of the endogeneity of the user cost in different ways. They find significant short-run user cost 
elasticities ranging from −0.2 to −0.5 depending on the dynamic specification and long-run elasticities 
ranging from −0.5 to −0.8. To compute a BFTB multiplier, Lokshin and Mohnen also simulate a 
counterfactual scenario in which the tax credit does not exist and estimate how much firms would 
have invested in R&D in such a scenario. They obtain that on average for all firms the multiplier is about 
0.5, but that it is significantly higher at 1.2 for small and medium-sized firms (SMEs) with less than 250 
employees and smaller at 0.4 for large firms.
4.  Evaluation of the effects of R&D tax credit on other outcomes
This section aims at providing a more comprehensive view of the tax-credit evaluation by completing 
the input-oriented approach presented and developed in the previous section. It evaluates the effect 
of the tax credit on other outcomes, namely the decision to start R&D, R&D output, researcher wages   
and social welfare.
4.1  Effects on the decision to start R&D
Increasing R&D can be achieved through stimulating the firms that already perform R&D but also 
through encouraging firms (in particular SMEs) to start R&D. The evaluation of the tax credit’s impact 
on the decision to start R&D raises specific and difficult issues. Engaging in R&D activities even at a 
7    Romero and Sanz use a somewhat different approach based on a system of demand equations (not only an R&D equation), 
derived from a cost function as in Fuss (1977), but on a much smaller sample than Marra and Corchuelo.
8    In 2004 firms could deduct 42 percent below a first ceiling of EUR 110,000 of their R&D labour cost and 14 percent above 
this ceiling and up to the second ceiling set at EUR 7.9 million.
The R&D tax credit 
seems to be more 
efficient in France and 
in Norway than in Spain 
and in the Netherlands.
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small scale involves various fixed and learning costs for the firm, on which there is little or no information. 
The decision to start investing in R&D may justify special policy provisions.9
The lack of appropriate information is a major reason why only very few evaluation studies have 
considered the issue in spite of its importance. More research on the process of engaging in R&D would 
help to shed light on the following questions:
What are the determinants of the decision of firms to perform R&D? For example, exports are  •	
highly positively correlated with R&D but it is hard to disentangle which is the cause and which 
the effect.
Do fiscal incentives really encourage firms to start R&D activities? One could fear that fiscal  •	
incentives might not be sufficient to trigger the decision to invest in R&D. One could also think 
that fiscal incentives incite firms to reveal R&D activities they already have or to redefine informal 
innovation activities as R&D. The true impact of the tax credit would thus be difficult to 
distinguish from a revelation or re-labelling effect.
Is the true tax credit impact on real beginners a long-lasting one or is the pool of potential R&D- •	
performing firms rapidly exhausted?
Is it really efficient to push small firms to start R&D activities? If fixed costs and economies of scale  •	
are important, it should not be surprising that the majority of small firms cannot afford to invest 
in R&D and be strong innovators.
From a technical-evaluation point of view, making progress in explaining the decision to start  •	
R&D would also help in controlling for the potential selection bias in assessing the impact of the 
tax credit on R&D-performing firms.
Corchuelo (2006) in her evaluation of the Spanish tax credit estimates a generalized Tobit model with 
the user cost of R&D capital in both the selection probit equation and intensity regression. She obtains 
a significant user-cost elasticity of the probability to do R&D of about −2.7. Hægeland and Møen (2007b) 
in their analysis of the Norwegian R&D tax credit find that in 2003 and 2004, just after the introduction 
of the tax credit, the firms that did not perform R&D two years earlier had a higher probability by about 
7 percent to engage in R&D than in 1995-2001, but that this is not true anymore in 2005, suggesting 
that the pool of firms likely to engage in R&D was largely exhausted by then.
4.2  Innovation outputs and productivity
Under the assumption that the marginal productivity of R&D is decreasing within firms, additional R&D 
generated by the tax credit would be less productive and could lead to only limited achievements. It 
is thus important to be able to evaluate the R&D tax credit not only in terms of R&D inputs but also 
outputs. Two variables are usually considered to measure R&D outputs: the number of patents granted 
to or applied for by the firm and the process and product innovation indicators reported in innovation 
surveys. These are of course imperfect measures because not all patented or reported innovations are 
productive for the firm or the economy as a whole. A realistic vision of the innovation-production 
process would also require taking time into account. A patent or a reported innovation may be the 
result of several years of research on a project, and the average duration of a project depends on the 
industry and the type of research (fundamental, applied or development).
9    Stimulating firms to engage in R&D for the first time has been a constant objective of the French tax credit policy since its 
beginning in 1983. Also the current system of a pure volume tax credit applies a specific tax credit rate for firms starting 
R&D activities. For these firms the rate is equal to 50 percent in the first year and 40 percent in the second, with the ordinary 
rate of 30 percent applied as from the third year. 
The R&D tax credit also 
raises the probability 
that firms start  
doing R&D.
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The effect of the R&D tax credit on patents and product and process innovations should also be 
translated into firm productivity and sales. The firm model developed by Crépon, Duguet and Mairesse 
(1998) – known as the CDM model – offers an econometric framework to analyze these issues. It relates 
R&D, innovation and productivity in a three-step model. The first step accounts for the firm decision 
to do R&D and for its R&D intensity. The second step explains innovation (either in terms of patents, 
process and product innovation indicators, or the share of new or improved products in sales) as a 
function of R&D and other variables. The third step is a regression of productivity on innovation and 
the traditional factors of production (labour and physical capital intensity).
It would be possible to combine the CDM model with the structural modelling approach described in 
Sub-section 3.4 by including a user cost of R&D capital in the first-step intensity equation and in the 
selection equation. The direct effect of the R&D tax credit on firm R&D expenditure and its indirect 
effects on innovation and productivity could thus be estimated consistently in the CDM framework. 
As far as we know, this has not been attempted, probably because of data limitations and intrinsic 
econometric difficulties.
Czarnitzki et al. (2005) focus on the effect of the tax credit on innovation, using matching techniques 
for a large representative cross-sectional sample of Canadian manufacturing firms. They take advantage 
of the information which is provided by the 1999 Survey of Innovation conducted by Statistics Canada. 
They rely particularly on four product innovation variables. The first two are binary indicators of whether 
the firm introduced an innovation that was new to Canada or new to the world, while the third is the 
number of new or significantly improved products produced by the firm and the fourth is the share 
of these innovative products in sales.
Czarnitzki and his coauthors are thus able to compare the innovation outputs of the firms that receive 
the R&D tax credit with those of firms that do not. As Duguet (2007), they consider two control groups: 
the first based on all firms that do not benefit from the tax credit, the second based only on the firms 
that perform R&D but do not apply for the tax credit.10 They show that Canadian firms that receive the 
tax credit declare a higher number of product innovations, are more likely to generate innovations 
new to the market and have a higher share of total sales accounted for by innovative products. They 
thus conclude that the Canadian tax credit encourages firms to do more R&D, which leads to innovations 
valued by the market.11
4.3  Researchers’ wages
Public policies in general may have unintended or side effects, positive and negative, which should 
be taken into account by policy makers when designing or modifying policies. The possibility of an 
increase of R&D prices and particularly of researchers’ wages is the side-effect of the R&D tax credit 
that is most often acknowledged, though it is still little studied. An R&D tax credit that strongly stimulates 
firm R&D expenditure may foster the demand for R&D personnel, resulting in an increase in their wages, 
at least in the short run, if the supply of such personnel is relatively inelastic. In this situation, the 
additional R&D expenditures fuel higher R&D prices and do not correspond to effective additional 
R&D. Still, this does not directly imply that the policy is a failure as the price increase is likely to trigger 
10    Here again, the construction of the second control group implies that a number of firms could apply for the tax credit but 
do not do so. In matching tax credit recipients with non-recipients, the authors also use various other control variables: 
the size of the firm, its R&D organization (whether R&D is performed internally or contracted out), its R&D intensity, its 
price-cost margin, its operations in new markets, and industry dummies as well as geographical dummies accounting for 
differences in the tax credit scheme across provinces.
11    However, in complementary analyses, the authors find no evidence that the tax credit encourages firms to start R&D or 
contribute to increasing productivity, profitability or their market shares.
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an increase in supply and to lead to an increase in the economy’s R&D capital and personnel in the 
long run. Thus the tax credit may have effects on the price of R&D (i.e. the interest rate on R&D capital 
and researcher wages) and on the stock of R&D and the number of R&D personnel. Assessing the 
efficiency of the tax credit includes focusing on those matters, but only a few researchers have done so.
Goolsbee (1998) has initiated such a research with a study on the income of 17,700 researchers and 
engineers, using information from the US Current Population Survey (for the period 1968-1994) and 
macroeconomic data. He runs regressions of individual incomes on the shares of R&D spending to 
GDP and government-funded R&D to GDP, which also includes a set of covariates aimed at capturing 
the effect of economic trends and individual characteristics. He finds that there is a positive and 
significant relation between R&D spending and the income of R&D personnel, and argues that this is 
a causal relation showing that R&D spending has a strong and significant effect on the R&D personnel’s 
wages. The conventional estimates of the effect of R&D policies would be largely overestimated because 
of this effect. Goolsbee’s analysis, however, is not fully convincing since it does not take into account, 
for example, gains in the productivity of researchers and it does not explicitly address the question of 
reverse causality (the government supports private R&D because it is more and more costly).12
Notwithstanding its weaknesses, Goolsbee’s analysis raises a question that should be part of a 
comprehensive evaluation of R&D policies. Answering the question of R&D-price effects requires a 
precise identification strategy. Indeed, it is likely that a common underlying movement may account 
for both the implementation of R&D policies and the increase in R&D personnel productivity. For 
instance, globalization puts pressure of the innovative capacities of firms and countries in industrialized 
countries, which may increase wages to attract more productive personnel and urge governments to 
strengthen R&D policy. Two recent studies on firm data concur in finding that the effect of the R&D 
tax credit on the wages of R&D personnel is rather weak. Haegeland and Møen (2007b) estimate that 
the wage effect could amount to a reduction of 0.3 of the high BFTB multipliers they obtain for Norway 
(one third of a dollar of tax credit goes into higher wages). Lokshin and Mohnen (2008), in a companion 
paper to their main analysis for the Netherlands, find an estimate in the order of 0.10 for the elasticity of 
R&D wages with respect to the fraction of the wage bills supported by the Dutch tax credit scheme.
4.4  Social welfare
Social welfare is more complex an outcome to measure than R&D expenditure. The evaluation of a 
policy in terms of social welfare should be done in the framework of a cost-benefit analysis taking 
ideally into account all the significant direct and indirect effects of the policy on the economy and 
society. The R&D tax credit is considered efficient in terms of social welfare if it stimulates innovation 
and productivity over and above boosting R&D and if it does so without mobilizing resources that 
could be used more efficiently elsewhere. To our knowledge, the only attempt of an evaluation of the 
R&D tax credit policy on social welfare is Parsons and Phillips (2007). In their cost-benefit analysis for 
Canada, the effects of the tax credit on social welfare work through five main channels which are 
quantified in cent per dollar and which sum up to the global net effect of the policy:
The tax credit stimulates R&D investment to reach a socially more efficient level, helping to bridge  •	
the gap between the level that is optimal to individual firms and the optimal level for society. Its 
primary effect is thus the social return in the form of R&D externalities (‘spillovers’);
The tax credit increases the producer surplus of firms by lowering the cost of each unit of R&D as  •	
well as stimulating them to do more R&D at this lower cost;
12    Reverse causality also partly invalidates Goolsbee’s other central result, namely that government-funded R&D crowds out 
private R&D activity (as evidenced in a negative correlation between the ratios of government-funded R&D and private 
R&D to GDP). 
Rising researcher wages 
weaken the volume effect 
of the R&D tax credit 
today but help ensure 
higher supply of 
researchers in  
the long run.
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The tax credit has  •	 a direct social cost equal to the amount of tax revenue forgone;
The tax credit also has compliance and administration costs affecting both firms and the  •	
authorities; and
The tax credit has an opportunity cost since the forgone tax revenue could have been used to  •	
fund other public expenditures or other tax cuts.13
Parsons and Phillips carefully survey many previous studies to calibrate the benefits and costs for all 
five channels. All in all, the median increase in social welfare would be around 10 cents per dollar of 
tax credit, suggesting that the Canadian tax credit policy is indeed socially efficient. However, the 
authors also analyze the sensitivity of this result to the uncertainty and imprecision of the different 
estimations underlying their calibration, and they show that even within a range of small variations, 
the global net effect of the policy on social welfare can be either positive or negative. This illustrates 
the limitations of such a cost- benefit analysis, which is as difficult as it is ambitious.
5.  Comparability of evaluations and a tentative exercise in meta-analysis
As evidenced by the recent studies presented above, evaluations of the tax credit may yield contrasting 
results, even when focussing on a definite outcome such as the BFTB multiplier. An isolated evaluation 
study can give very useful indications on the effectiveness of a given policy in a specific context. But 
comparisons of studies in different countries and for different periods may provide insights on what 
policy design characteristics may be more appropriate and efficient than others. Such comparisons 
would thus be more helpful to policy makers faced with the decision whether or not to introduce an 
R&D tax credit or how to radically reform an existing tax credit policy. However, taking stock of the 
results of the various studies raises great difficulties, and the best way would be to compare them in 
the framework of a meta-analysis, trying to take into account the main sources of differences. This 
section first stresses these sources of differences and then presents an incomplete and tentative 
attempt of meta-analysis mainly to illustrate.
5.1  Limits to the comparability of evaluation studies
The comparison between different evaluation analyses should in principle help policy makers in 
assessing the efficiency and improving the design and implementation of public policies. Yet, the 
various evaluations of the R&D tax credit yield very different and potentially contradictory results. How 
to interpret such differences in evaluation results? To what extent is it possible and indeed legitimate 
to compare these evaluation results? The comparison in terms of BFTB multipliers seems attractive for 
at least three reasons. First, they are easy to understand for non-specialists and give a synthetic idea 
of the policy’s efficiency. Second, they seem to provide a standardized way of presenting the results 
and making them directly comparable across countries, periods, and tax credit characteristics. Third, 
all the estimates stemming from the various evaluation methods can, in principle, be converted into 
corresponding multipliers. All in all, and although limited to the one outcome of additional R&D 
expenditures, BFTB multipliers seem to be a good yardstick for the comparison of tax credit evaluations. 
Parsons and Philips (2007) also strongly argue for using them as a first basis of comparison.
13    The alternative use considered by Parsons and Phillips is the allocation of lump-sum tax refunds to citizens and firms that 
are equivalent to the expected tax expenditure for the R&D tax credit. However, allocating the funds to public research and 
higher education would have been politically more realistic alternatives. 
Evaluations should 
consider the tax credit’s 
impact on social 
welfare in a cost-benefit 
analysis accounting 
for R&D spillovers and 
administrative and 
opportunity costs.
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Ideally, differences in estimated multipliers should mainly reflect differences in policy efficiency. 
However, they are more or less precisely estimated and can be biased to a varying degree. Studies 
conducted for the same country and same time period may find very different results, as evidenced, 
for example, by the contrast between Mairesse and Mulkay (2004; 2008) who find that the French tax 
credit is efficient by following an econometric structural approach, and Duguet (2007) who reach a 
similar conclusion or a far less optimistic one (depending on the control group chosen) by applying 
matching techniques.
The differences in the BFTB multiplier between studies in practice may reflect:
Genuine differences in policy efficiency. These differences are the ones of interest for policy  •	
makers.
Methodological differences. Some methods may be more demanding than others; they may also  •	
be more relevant and generate more informative results.
Country heterogeneity. For various reasons such as industry composition, market structure,  •	
features of economic policy in general and corporate tax policy in particular, firms in different 
countries might react differently to identical tax credit policies.
Time differences. Studies conducted over different periods may yield diverse results because of  •	
changes in the national economic situation and international environment. Depending on the 
length of the study period, long-term effects may be more or less reliably identified and more or 
less precisely estimated.
Publication biases (Ashenfelter  •	 et al. 1999). Such biases can arise from the fact that authors may 
have a natural tendency to look for positive results and that it is easier to publish articles showing 
a significant impact of a policy than those showing no effect.
Estimated BFTB multipliers from different evaluation studies should thus be compared with great 
caution and not be taken for granted “naively”. Gathering them and examining them in the framework 
of a ‘meta-analysis’ is probably the best way to control for potential sources of differences unrelated 
to true efficiency and make the results more comparable. Yet, the relatively limited number of evaluations 
of the R&D tax credit coupled a relatively large variety of methodological approaches, policy designs 
and economic contexts, makes it a challenge to attempt such a meta-analysis.14 Also, many studies 
also do not present results in the form of a BFTB; some of them do not document standard deviations 
or confidence intervals; some also provide so many different estimates, depending on various 
assumptions, that it is hard to make a choice of the one(s) to be selected in a meta-analysis. In spite of 
all these difficulties, there is value in gathering most of the studies that assess the impact of the R&D 
tax credit in terms of BFTB multipliers (and/or elasticities) and in carefully comparing them, even if not 
in the framework of a formal meta-analysis.
In the future, policy makers should also support efforts to enhance comparability and harmonization 
in evaluation practices of R&D tax incentives (European Commission 2006 and 2008). Without preventing 
researchers from using different methods of investigation and trying to improve them, a harmonized 
framework of evaluation and a set of recommendations should be defined and agreed upon at the 
level of the European Union or the OECD countries. This would contribute to widening the scope of 
evidence-based policy decisions. Instead of simply answering the question “Is this policy design 
efficient?” it would help answer the question “Which is the most efficient design?”.
14    A “simple” meta-analysis would consists in running a regression of the BFTB multipliers estimated in a “sufficiently” large 
sample of studies on a set of dummies indicating at least the country, type of tax credit and main evaluation method.
Estimated multipliers 
do not only reflect 
differences in policy 
efficiency but also 
differences in evaluation 
methods and country 
heterogeneity.
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5.2  An incomplete and tentative meta-analysis
A careful meta-analysis of the R&D tax-credit evaluations including a number of potentially relevant 
control variables in a regression setting would imply a tremendous effort. Still, it is possible to give a 
feeling of what kind of insights one could gather from a first step towards such a meta-analysis.
Parsons and Phillips (2007) have already adopted a meta-analytical approach, focused on the country 
dimension, when they compare the country averages of the estimated R&D tax credit impacts in studies 
available for Canada and the United States. They find that on average the BFTB multiplier is equal to 
0.91 in Canada compared with 1.42 in the United States. This suggests that the American R&D tax credit 
is more efficient than the Canadian one, with one dollar of tax credit generating 50 cents more of R&D 
in one country than in the other. From the policy maker’s standpoint, this could be interpreted in terms 
of relative efficiency of policy designs. Since the American tax credit is incremental whereas the 
Canadian one is a volume tax credit, one could be tempted to conclude that the incremental design 
is preferable to the volume design. The gap in tax credit efficiency could also be imputed to country 
heterogeneity but this is not too convincing in the present case since the United States and Canada 
are commercially integrated and their economies are comparable in terms of general organization and 
performance.
Relying on 33 BFTB multiplier estimates, mostly gathered from the studies quoted by Parsons and 
Phillips (2007), we first look whether results differ in the time dimension. An increasing trend might 
indicate some overall progress in tax policy design and implementation and in learning by firms. Yet 
a significant trend (positive or negative) could also reflect improvement in evaluation methods. In 
order to assign a year to each estimate, we take the average year of the study period. For example, we 
assign the multiplier estimated by Mairesse and Mulkay (2004) to 1989, the mid-point of their sample 
period (1982-1996). The BFTB estimates and their average years of estimation are reported in the Annex 
(Table A1). Figure 1 plots the estimated BFTB multipliers on the Y-axis and the corresponding sample 
mid-point years on the X-axis. 















Source:  See Annex Table A1
The effectiveness of the 
R&D tax credit appears 
to have increased over 
the past 30 years.
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The linear regression adjusted through the data points shows that the BFTB estimates tend to increase 
over time at a (weakly significant) average annual rate of 2.5 percent15. This is rather huge, implying an 
overall average increase of 60 percent in the 30 years from the earliest to the latest estimates. Of course 
such a result should be taken with a pinch of salt, but at least it does not contradict the idea that the 
R&D tax credit policies might have been increasingly efficient over the years, possibly because of the 
sharing of good practices in launching or reforming policy designs and in their implementation.
We also look for some evidence of publication bias, relying on the method developed and used by 
Ashenfelter et al. (1999) who analyze the numerous estimates of returns to education. A basic reason 
for the existence of a publication bias is that at equal levels of scientific quality, a study showing that 
an effect is positive as expected and significantly different from zero is more likely to be submitted for 
publication and published than another study showing that this effect is insignificant or even negative. 
As a result, the average of the estimates from published studies would tend to be an overestimation 
of the true average effect.
Since it is much more difficult, if not impossible, to access unpublished publications, finding evidence 
of a publication bias is of course a challenge. Ashenfelter et al. make the point that in the absence of 
a bias there is no reason why the precision of published estimates (as measured by the standard error) 
should depend on their magnitude and, hence that we should not observe a significant correlation 
between these estimates and their standard errors. By contrast, if there is a publication bias, one might 
expect to find a positive correlation between the published estimates and their standard errors. Indeed, 
when the level of precision decreases (increasing standard errors), higher estimates are more likely to 
be reported than lower ones. A significantly positive correlation between reported estimates and 
standard errors thus gives some presumption of a publication bias, even if it could also be due to other 
factors16.
In Annex Table A2 we report those 15 estimated BFTB multipliers (out of the 33 presented above) for 
which we are able to retrieve standard errors. In fact many studies do not provide standard errors for 
the BFTB multipliers, so we compute them whenever it seems possible. When a 95-percent confidence 
interval is provided, we derive the standard error of the estimate using the fact that it is approximately 
normally distributed and thus that the length of the 95-percent confidence interval is four times the 
standard error. Otherwise, when a study was reporting various estimates under different hypotheses 
and methods, we assume boldly that the 95-percent confidence interval is equal to the range between 
the maximum and minimum reported estimates. 
The following Figure 2, which plots the BFTB multipliers on the Y-axis and their corresponding standard 
errors on the X-axis, shows a strong positive and highly significant correlation between the two 
(correlation coefficient of 0.79). The correlation remains very high and significant (at about 0.73) when 
we delete the two highest estimates with also the highest standard errors. This suggests that there 
might be a publication bias leading to overestimating the efficiency of the R&D tax credit. Although 
our evidence at this point must be taken with caution, it clearly calls for a thorough meta-analysis that 
should be based on a larger sample of estimates with standard errors and include a variety of 
controls.
15    The standard error is of 1.7, corresponding to a Student t-value of 1.5 with 31 degrees of freedom and a unilateral p-value 
of 7.5 percent.
16    For example, instrumental-variable estimates of R&D user cost elasticities, which correct for measurement errors in the user 
cost tend to be higher and to have higher standard errors than estimates which do not correct for such errors.
If higher ‘bang-for-the-
buck’ estimates are less 
precisely estimated, 
this might point to a 
publication bias.
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Source:  See Annex Table A2
6.  Conclusions
We have seen that a comprehensive evaluation of the R&D tax credit involves a number of different 
questions. In particular, the efficiency of the policy should be assessed through its effect on several 
outcomes. So far the literature has concentrated on the effect on R&D inputs, in general R&D expenditure, 
which is a natural first step for all evaluation. The results obtained through various methods and for 
various countries are very different, which makes it hard to answer the question “Does the R&D tax 
credit work?” in a clear-cut way.
The results reported here give indeed a contrasted picture. Hægeland and Møen (2007b) gather strong 
evidence that the Norwegian tax credit is efficient. It is noteworthy that their estimates appear to be 
particularly robust because they are constant across various methods. For France, Mairesse and Mulkay 
(2004; 2008) conclude that the French tax credit efficiently stimulates R&D expenditures on the basis 
of a structural econometric model. However, studies following the same approach for other countries 
like the one for the Netherlands by Lokshin and Mohnen (2009) and those for Spain come to less 
optimistic conclusions.
Overall the evidence obtained in terms of BFTB multipliers appears to be more scattered than the 
evidence from estimated elasticities with respect to the user cost of R&D capital. While these elasticities 
cannot be directly translated into measures of efficiency, they are useful to simulate small policy 
changes. However, they are probably not reliable in predicting the effects of radical policy changes. 
For example, it is likely that the marginal effect on R&D expenditures, and hence the BFTB multiplier, 
will decrease when the rate of the tax credit or its ceiling is strongly increased or when an incremental 
tax credit is replaced by a volume tax credit.
The effect of the tax 
credit on R&D inputs 
varies widely across 
countries and studies.
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While the body of research on the tax credit’s impact on firm R&D investment is rich, evidence is much 
scarcer for other outcomes of interest for economic policy, such as the probability to engage in R&D, 
innovation and productivity as well as social welfare. The few articles considering these outcomes are 
examples that should be followed in future policy evaluations. The BFTB multiplier is not a fully 
satisfactory measure of efficiency because it concentrates on how much additional R&D expenditures 
were generated per euro of tax credit but does not inform on higher-order goals of the tax credit 
policy.
The fact that the BFTB is below or above the benchmark of one tells us whether the additional private 
R&D is entirely funded by the government or whether it is also funded by the firm and in what proportion. 
It does not tell to what extent firms’ additional R&D contributes to increasing their own innovations 
and productivity and to fostering positive research externalities to the benefit of other firms and the 
economy at large. The more fundamental question is about the overall social return on the additional 
private R&D net of social costs. As the careful attempt of a full cost-benefit analysis for Canada by 
Parsons and Phillips (2007) shows, this is also the most difficult question to answer.
In any case, the need for harmonization and for increased comparability is obvious throughout this 
article, and maybe is its major conclusion. This objective could be reached through a consensus on 
the outcome variables to be studied, on the choice and implementation of evaluation methods and 
on the ways to present results. The development of a meta-analysis framework adapted to the R&D 
tax credit – and to fiscal incentives more generally – is a relevant and important direction for future 
research.
There is a need for 
harmonizing evaluation 
methods, and more 
research should be 
devoted to effects on 
innovation and social 
welfare.
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BFTB Studied year Country
1 McFetridge and Warda 1983 0.60 1972 Canada
2 Mansfield and Switzer 1985 0.39 1982 Canada
3 Mansfield 1985 0.34 1982 Sweden
4 Bernstein 1986 1.28 1985 Canada
5 Mansfield 1986 0.45 1982 US
6 Gen. Accounting Office 1989 0.26 1983 US
7 Cordes 1989 0.64 1983 US
8 Baily and Lawrence 1992 1.30 1985 US
9 Tillinger 1991 0.25 1983 US
10 Hall 1993 2.00 1986 US
11 Hines 1993 1.55 1987 US
12 Bureau of Ind. Eco. 1993 0.80 1988 Australia
13 Berger 1993 1.74 1984 US
14 McCutchen 1993 0.32 1984 US
15 Shah 1994 1.80 1973 Canada
16 Mamuneas and Nadiri 1996 0.95 1978 US
17 Lebeau 1996 0.98 1985 Canada
18 Abt Associates 1996 1.38 1994 Canada
19 Dagenais et al. 1997 0.98 1984 Canada
20 Bloom et al. 1997 0.54 1991 Australia
21 Bloom et al. 1997 0.28 1991 Canada
22 Bloom et al. 1997 0.18 1991 France
23 Bloom et al. 1997 0.82 1991 US
24 Van den Hove et al. 1998 1.20 1995 Netherlands
25 Brouwer et al. 2002 1.02 1997 Netherlands
26 Poot et al. 2003 1.02 1997 Netherlands
27 Klassen et al. 2004 1.30 1994 Canada
28 Klassen et al. 2004 2.96 1994 US
29 Mairesse and Mulkay 2004 2.80 1989 France
30 Cornet and Vroomen 2005 0.65 2001 Netherlands
31 Duguet 2007 2.17 1999 France
32 Hægeland and Møen 2007 2.10 2002 Norway
33 Lokshin and Mohnen 2009 0.90 2000 Netherlands
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Ref. Authors Year Country BFTB Std Error
2 Mansfield and Switzer 1985 Canada 0.39 0.14
4 Bernstein 1986 Canada 1.28 0.23
6 Gen. Accounting Office 1989 US 0.26 0.05
9 Tillinger 1991 US 0.25 0.09
11 Hines 1993 US 1.55 0.18
12 Bureau of Industry Eco. 1993 Australia 0.80 0.10
14 McCutchen 1993 US 0.32 0.02
17 Lebeau 1996 Canada 0.98 0.04
24 Van den Hove et al. 1998 Netherlands 1.20 0.25
34 Bureau Bartels 1998 Netherlands 1.50 0.25
26 Poot et al. 2003 Netherlands 1.02 0.16
29 Mairesse and Mulkay 2004 France 2.80 0.40
30 Cornet and Vroomen 2005 Netherlands 0.65 0.08
31 Duguet 2007 France 3.33 0.28
31 Duguet 2007 France 1.01 0.26
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This paper re-visits the empirical failure to establish 
a  clear  link  between  R&D  efforts  and  patent 
counts  at  the  industry  level.  It  is  claimed  that  the 
“propensity-to-patent”  concept  should  be  split  into 
an  “appropriability  propensity”  and  a  “strategic 
propensity”. The empirical contribution is based on 
a unique panel dataset composed of 18 industries in 
19 countries over 19 years. The results confirm that 
the R&D-patent relationship is affected by research 
productivity, appropriability propensity and strategic-
propensity  factors.  The  observed  increase  in  the 
propensity to file patents is much stronger for supra-
national (that is, triadic or regional) patents than for 
national  priority  filings,  suggesting  that  the  current 
patent hype is essentially the result of a globalization 
phenomenon. 
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The R&D-patent relationship:  
An industry perspective
1.  Introduction
Patent data are the most widely used indicators of technology output. They are used for instance to 
assess the rate of technological change, to gauge firms’ competitive positions, to measure industrial 
structure, or to evaluate scientific progress and knowledge spillovers. The success of patent statistics 
is rooted in their wide availability, their intrinsic relatedness to inventions, and their relatively 
homogeneous standards across countries. International treaties such as the Paris Convention for the 
protection of industrial property of 1883 or the Patent Cooperation Treaty of 1978 have indeed set 
some degree of minimum legal and quality standards.
The quality of patents as indicators of technological change has however been criticized or challenged 
for several decades (see Griliches 1990). There are noticeable differences in the reliance on patents 
across firms, industries and countries, which make patent data rather difficult to interpret. It is well 
known that not all inventions are patentable and not all patentable inventions are actually patented. 
In addition, patented inventions differ in their quality or “inventive step”. This latter shortcoming means 
that patents vary greatly in their technical and economic significance, with a majority apparently 
mirroring minor technological improvements. A growing stream of research has therefore analyzed 
the extent to which patents are a reliable indicator of technological change. Schmookler (1957) is 
probably the first formal attempt to investigate what patent statistics actually indicate. The literature 
has mainly focused on correlations between patent counts and one or several other variables that 
measure either innovative input, such as R&D expenditures, or ultimate output measures, such as 
productivity growth or the stock market value of firms. 
Studies on the R&D-patent relationship performed on cross-sectional data lead to the conclusion that 
there is a strong and highly significant correlation between R&D inputs and patent counts across firms. 
However, this correlation almost vanishes when within-firm time-series are considered. Patents do 
react to firm changes in R&D expenditures, but much less than expected. Investigations at the industry 
level lead to even more incongruous results, with a weak or almost absent correlation between R&D 
and patents. Some industries have a high propensity to rely on the patent system but file much fewer 
patents than other industries with a weaker orientation towards patent protection (Levin et al. 1987). 
This conundrum is probably what led Zvi Griliches (1990) to conclude that it would be “misleading to 
interpret such [patent] numbers as indicators of either the effectiveness of patenting or the efficiency 
of the R&D process”. The tacit convergence amongst research scholars has been that patent data would 
reflect a propensity behaviour, rather than innovation performance or research productivity.
Despite this wide empirical scepticism of landmark contributions to the economic literature on patent-
based indicators, the latter are still intensely used nowadays to measure firms’ or countries’ innovation 
performance. In a recent contribution, de Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe (2009) produce cross-
country empirical evidence in favour of patent statistics. In particular, they show that some patent 
indicators are more reflective of a research productivity effect whereas others indicate more varying 
propensities to patent. The authors show that the R&D-patent relationship is affected by a “research 
productivity” component and a “patent propensity” component, as illustrated by the impact of three 
types of policies on countries’ patent performances: education, science and technology, and the design 
of patent systems. Yet, their study lacks a time dimension and is performed at the country level and 
therefore does not contribute to explaining the failures of the firm or industry-level attempts to identify 
a relationship between R&D and patents over time.
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The present paper aims at re-visiting the failure to establish a clear empirical link between patent 
counts and changes in R&D expenditures at the industry level. The intended contribution to the 
literature is both conceptual and empirical. In addition to differentiating the “research productivity” 
effect from the “patent propensity” effect, the conceptual contribution claims that the latter effect 
should be disentangled into two main components: the “appropriability propensity” and the “strategic 
propensity”, as illustrated in Figure 1. The appropriability propensity relates to the share of inventions 
that are patented by firms, as measured in classical surveys (e.g. Levin et al. 1987, Arundel and Kabla 
1998 or Cohen et al. 2000). The strategic propensity is defined as the number of patents filed to protect 
a given invention and has barely been measured so far. The failure to take into account both types of 
patent propensity is probably a major reason underlying the failure to identify a strong relationship 
between an increase in research activities and the evolution of patent applications at the industry level. 
The empirical contribution of this paper consists in evaluating the R&D-patent relationship with a 
unique panel dataset covering 18 industries in 19 countries over 19 years. In addition, several patent-
based indicators are used to test the robustness of the results: priority filings, “regional” filings and 
triadic filings.1 Priority filings are first applications at national patent offices, which are potentially 
converted into regional patents later on (such as the European patent office (EPO) for Belgian applicants 
or the US Patent Office (USPTO) for Canadian applicants) or into triadic patent applications (patents 
filed simultaneously at the USPTO, the EPO and the Japanese Patent Office (JPO)). The average quality 
or value of patent indicators increases from priority filings to triadic applications, as witnessed by a 
larger geographical coverage and higher expenses due to legal and attorney fees, as well as translation 
costs.













Our results confirm, first, that the research productivity dimension matters and explains part of the 
variation in the patent-to-R&D ratio over time. This productivity effect is captured by the share of basic 
research and of higher education in total R&D expenditures, and by an indicator of international-trade 
performance, which reflects the ultimate success of innovation efforts. Second, taking into account 
the two components of the propensity to patent – appropriability propensity and strategic propensity 
– helps to refine the relationship between R&D and patents at the industry level. If the long-term 
elasticity of patents with respect to R&D expenditures of about 0.12 is much lower than in cross-country 
or cross-firm estimates, it is nonetheless significant, suggesting that more R&D leads indeed to more 
patents. The low elasticity is probably due to the role of the strategic propensity, which is difficult to 
measure and is only partially captured by the strength of patent systems. The appropriability propensity 
has a positive and highly significant impact and sheds new light on the variability in the patent-to-R&D 
ratio across industries. A few industries (computers and communication technologies) and countries 
(South Korea, Spain and Poland) have strongly increased their propensity to file patents. The time 
dummies suggest that the propensity to file patents has increased much faster for regional applications 
(those at the USPTO or the EPO) and for triadic patents than for priority filings, suggesting that the 
current patent hype observed in regional patent offices is more the result of globalization than of a 
particularly stronger strategic propensity to file patents.
1    “Regional” filings are filings at either the EPO or the USPTO or a mix of both indicators as explained in Section 3.2. These 
two offices, indeed, attract a large number of applications from non-domestic applicants, about half the total number of 
filings in the two offices.
R&D expenditure is 
related to patents 
through research 
productivity and the 
propensity to file for 
patent protection.
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The paper is structured as follows. The next section summarizes the results of selected empirical 
analyses of the R&D-patent relationship and discusses the two components of the propensity to patent. 
Section 3 presents the empirical model, the patent indicators and the explanatory variables. The 
empirical results are presented and interpreted in Section 4. Section 5 concludes and puts forward 
policy implications.
2.  A missing link in the literature?
The estimated elasticity of patents with respect to R&D has been found to be large and significant in 
cross-sectional studies of firms, fluctuating around 1 (see Hall et al. 1986, Hausman et al. 1984, Jaffe 
1986, Duguet and Kabla 1998, Crépon et al. 1998, Brouwer and Kleinknecht 1999 or Cincera 1997). 
Similarly large estimates of the elasticity of patents with respect to R&D are observed in cross-country 
or cross-region estimates (see for instance de Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe 2009 at the country 
level and Bottazzi and Peri 2003 at the regional level). When within-firm time-series data are used, the 
estimated parameters fall sharply and become less significant (see e.g. Hall et al. 1986, Hausman et al. 
1984 or Czarnitzki et al. 2009). This low elasticity questions the relevance of patent measures as indicators 
of innovative output. 
There are several possible reasons why the estimated R&D-patent elasticity is so weak when within-
firms and/or time-series dimensions are taken into account. The first is that there are decreasing returns 
to research activities: the additional euro of research spent would be less “productive” than previous 
expenses. This explanation is problematic as it is not corroborated by the theoretical literature or by 
the existing evidence. The second potential explanation suggests that R&D indicators encompass 
much more than the very activity that consists in generating new ideas and inventions. In other words, 
R&D might not be a good indicator of innovative efforts. A third reason is related to the great randomness 
in the patent series, which greatly vary in their value, with most patents having low value and a few 
patents having very high value. Griliches (1990: p. 1678) clearly opts for the latter two hypotheses, 
arguing that “...the appearance of diminishing returns... could be an artefact of the incompleteness of 
the underlying data rather than a reflection of the characteristics of the innovation process itself.”
Industry level analyses lead to even less conclusive insights into the R&D-patent relationship. Cross-
industry differences in the patent-to-R&D ratio do not correlate with their R&D intensity or their 
perception of the effectiveness of patents as a protection mechanism. For instance, some R&D-intensive 
industries that systematically rely on the patent system such as the pharmaceutical industry show low 
patent-to-R&D ratios. In other words, it suggests that patent metrics do not correlate well with innovative 
efforts across industries. 
Scholars have long argued that patent counts reflect more the propensity to patent than innovative 
performance or research productivity. For instance, Scherer (1983, p. 116) explicitly assumes a constant 
productivity of research, for the sake of simplicity. While admitting the possibility of “differential 
creativity of an organization’s R&D scientists and engineers”, the author does not consider it important 
and chooses to concentrate on other “more systematic” factors. These more “systematic” factors which 
drive the patenting performance of firms are of two main types: strategic behaviour and alternative 
protection mechanisms.
Strategic patenting has been analyzed in-depth over the past 20 years (e.g. Teece 1998; Rivette and 
Kline 2000). Applying for a patent is indeed not always driven by the desire to protect innovation rents. 
Many facets of strategic patenting are listed in Guellec et al. (2007): Patents can be used as a tool for 
technological negotiations with competitors or with potential collaborators, to exclude rivals from a 
Why is the R&D-
elasticity of patents so 
low over time and across 
industries?
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particular technological area, for communication purposes, to increase revenues through license 
agreements, to ensure freedom to operate and to attract capital. These strategic considerations all 
influence the observed patenting performance of firms. Patents are therefore not only an indicator of 
innovation output and technological success but also an indicator of strategic behaviour (see Blind et 
al. 2006; Cohen et al. 2000; de Rassenfosse and Guellec 2009 or Hall and Ziedonis 2001 for detailed 
investigations in this field). 
The second reason that undermines the quality of patents as indicators of technological advance is 
embedded in the many alternative mechanisms of appropriation, such as secrecy, lead time, 
complementary sales and services, complementary manufacturing facilities, barriers to entry and the 
importance of tacit knowledge. Although all these mechanisms may coexist with patent protection, 
their availability might logically lower the need to rely on patent protection. According to the Carnegie 
Mellon Survey by Cohen et al. (2000) or the survey by Arundel and Kabla (1998), patents appear to be 
generally the last appropriability mechanism that is used, though its importance for some industries 
is noticeable, as reported in Table 1. This is particularly the case for medical equipment and drugs, 
special purpose machinery and computers. Secrecy and lead time are ranked overall as the two most 
effective appropriability mechanisms being top-ranked in 17 and 13 industries, respectively. Based on 
survey data of R&D executives in Switzerland, Harabi (1995) shows that the ability of competitors to 
“invent around” patents and the perception that patent documents disclose too much information 
are the most important factors that reduce the willingness to file patents. 
Table 1.  Share of product innovations that are patented (in percent)
Arundel and Kabla (1998) Cohen et al. (2000)
Mining 28 -
Food, beverages and tobacco 26 53
Textiles, clothing 8 43
Petroleum refining 23 73
Chemicals 57 77
Pharmaceuticals 79 74
Rubber and plastic products 34 65
Glass, clay, ceramics 29 50
Basic metals 15 54
Fabricated metal products 39 77
Machinery 52 74
Office and computing equipment 57 80
Electrical equipment 44 62
Communication equipment 47 59
Precision instruments 56 70
Automobiles 30 89
Other transport equipment 31 -
Power utilities 29 41
Transport and telecom services 20 -
Note:    The industry classification corresponds to that presented in Arundel and Kabla (1998). The shares are rounded to 
the nearest integer.
Patenting is only one 
way to appropriate 
the benefits from an 
invention and patents 
are used for other 
strategic purposes, too.
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In a nutshell, beside the innovation output that requires protection, the decision to file a patent is 
affected by alternative mechanisms of appropriation and by the strategic role that patents can play 
for a firm. These elements are typically industry-specific. It is striking that despite the many sources of 
variation and randomness in patent data, a strong increase in the use of patent-based indicators has 
been observed, including for economic and strategic analyses. The objective of this paper is to reconcile 
the a priori antagonism between the intensifying use of patent data and the pessimistic appraisal of 
these indicators in the academic literature. This reconciliation is done by identifying key milestones 
when dissecting the R&D-patent relationship.
A first distinction can be made with respect to two important factors: research productivity and patent 
propensity. This distinction is investigated by de Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe (2009) who find 
that patent indicators reflect both research productivity and the propensity to patent. The authors 
exploit the cross-country variation in macroeconomic patent indicators for the year 2003. They relate 
the number of patents to total-economy R&D expenditure and to proxies for research productivity 
(e.g. the share of basic research in total R&D) and propensity to patent (e.g. the cost of filing a patent) 
and the strength of the patent system). Unlike the present study, however, de Rassenfosse and van 
Pottelsberghe (2009) have limited insights into cross-industry differences in the propensity to patent 
and do not investigate the time dimension, including the dynamic adjustment of patent outcomes to 
changes in research efforts. 
The arguments made above as to why patent indicators are noisy, actually call for an additional 
distinction that should be made when conceptualising the R&D-patent relationship. The literature on 
this field has taken the implicit practice to define “patent propensity” in a (too) broad sense. We argue 
that it makes sense to split the propensity into two components: the “appropriability propensity” and 
the “strategic propensity”. The former captures the decision to protect an invention or not, and is 
proxied by the share of inventions that are patented, as reported in surveys like Levin et al. (1987), 
Cohen et al. (2000), or Arundel and Kabla (1998). The latter captures the patent-filing behaviour at a 
second stage. Once the decision is made to protect an invention, the applicant chooses the number 
of patents that are to be filed to protect it. These two dimensions surely affect the observed R&D-patent 
relationship. The failure to distinguish the appropriability propensity from the strategic propensity is 
probably what made Griliches claim that “the patent to R&D ratios appear to be dominated by what 
may be largely irrelevant fluctuations in the R&D numbers”. This paper argues – and provides empirical 
evidence of the claim – that taking into account these two dimensions provides a better understanding 
of the R&D-patent relationship.
Figure 2 illustrates somewhat the issue at stake. It depicts the appropriability propensity against the 
ratio of patents to R&D expenditure, with the former shown on the vertical axis and the latter on the 
horizontal axis. For instance, the instrument and the computer industries both have a high 
appropriability propensity but the latter has a much higher patent-to-R&D ratio than the former, 
probably due to a higher strategic propensity (patent thickets are known to be prevalent in this 
particular industry). Note that differences along the horizontal axis are probably not solely due to 
heterogeneous strategic propensities. The pharmaceutical industry has a very high appropriability 
propensity but a very low patent-to-R&D ratio due to the huge amount of R&D efforts devoted to a 
single invention. Similarly, the relatively low share of patented inventions in food and basic metals 
does not prevent these industries from having a relatively high number of patents per R&D. This 
should be borne in mind when interpreting statistics such as patents over R&D expenditures. The 
quantitative approach adopted in the next section aims at taking into account, and measuring, these 
three components of the R&D-patent relationship.
‘Appropriability 
propensity’ refers to 
whether or not a firm 
opts for patenting at 
all, while ‘strategic 
propensity’ captures the 
behaviour at the filing 
stage.
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Figure 2.  Appropriability propensity versus strategic propensity by industry










































































Source:  Arundel and Kabla (1998) and own calculations
Note:    The horizontal axis corresponds to the ratio of priority filings to R&D expenditures (in million of USD PPP at constant 
prices).
3.  Empirical framework
The aim of the empirical analysis is to investigate the link between R&D and patents at the industry 
level taking into account the factors that affect the propensity to patent and those that affect the 
productivity of research efforts. In an ideal set-up, one would be able to observe both the “raw” 
technology output (i.e. the number of inventions) and the number of patents. Yet, since the only 
observable measure of inventive output is the count of patents, one should be cautious in the 
interpretation of the parameters of the patent production function because differences in patent 
numbers reflect both productivity and propensity effects. 
3.1  Estimation methodology
The dataset has three dimensions: time, industry and country. The estimations, however, are performed 
on two dimensions: the time period (t) and the country-industry pair (ij) – each “individual” is thus an 
industry in a country.2 The patent production function is estimated in an error correction framework 
to differentiate short-run from long-run effects of the explanatory variables on the number of patents. 
More specifically, the following equation is estimated (see Box 1 for a detailed description of the 
model):
∆pijt =ψi +ψj +ψt +∆rijtγ +∆zijtβ +∆xijtα −(λpijt−1−c −rijt−1γl −zijt−1βl −xijt−1α l) +ν ijt
where p stands for the log of the number of patents, r is the log of the research efforts, x and z are vectors 
of variables capturing the productivity of research efforts (leading from research efforts to inventions) 
and the propensity to patent (leading from inventions to patents), respectively. Δ is the first difference 
operator, ν is the error term, ψi is the vector of country dummies (i=1, …, 19), ψj is the vector of industry 
dummies (j=1, …, 18), and ψt is the vector of time dummies for the years 1987 to 2005 (t=1, …, 19).   
2    An alternative approach would have been to estimate the parameters of a patent production function for each industry, 
thereby allowing for differentiated impacts across industries. The “pooled” approach is nevertheless chosen because it is 
based on a larger number of observations and provides averages across industries and countries. In addition, it is the very 
purpose of this paper to grasp cross-industry determinants of patent-to-R&D variations.
In analyzing the R&D-
patent link, we take into 
account determinants 
of research productivity 
and determinants of the 
propensity to patent.
VOL_1_07_EIB_Papers_Vol_14_Nr_1_POTTELSBERGHE.indd   176 23/12/09   14:50:17EIB  PAPERS           Volume14  N°1   2009            177
Note that since the dependent variable is the first difference of the log of patents (ln Pt – ln Pt-1), it is a 
rough approximation of the growth rate of patents.
The term in parentheses is usually referred to as the error correction term. It can be interpreted as the 
deviation from equilibrium in the previous period. The variables expressed in first difference (i.e. those 
preceded by the operator Δ) capture the short-term impact on the number of patents and indicate 
how a change in any explanatory variable contemporaneously affects the number of patents. The 
parameter λ usually fluctuates between 0 and 1 and measures the speed of adjustment to the long-
term equilibrium (the closer to 1, the quicker the adjustment process). The long-run elasticities are 
calculated by dividing each parameter associated with the lagged variables by the adjustment parameter 
λ. For instance, the long-run elasticity of the productivity variable is equal to −αl⋅ λ
−1 (for a discussion, 
see Alogoskoufis and Smith 1991).
The growth-rate-of-
patents equation is 
estimated with an error-
correction model.
Box 1.  Derivation of the estimation framework
Since research efforts (R) lead to inventions (I) which, in turn, may lead to patent applications (P), 
we can express the R&D-patent relationship for the N individuals in the sample as follows 
(forgetting momentarily the time dimension):
(B.1)  I =ΩR
γ  and  P =ΦI
where Ω and Φ are diagonal matrices of size N capturing the productivity and the propensity 
effects for each individual, respectively. In this framework, Φ captures both the appropriability 
propensity and the strategic propensity. The parameter γ is a scalar measuring the average return 
to R&D across individuals.1 Φ can be expressed as a function of the two propensity components 
(the appropriability propensity and the strategic propensity) but this would unnecessarily clutter 
the notation. If we let X and Z, respectively denote the matrices of variables that affect Ω and Φ, 
and α and β the column vectors of parameters, we can write:
(B.2)  i =c1 + xα +rγ  and  p=c2+zβ +i
where lower-case roman letters denote the log of the variables. Expanding the patent production 
function gives:
(B.3)  p=c +rγ +zβ + xα
where c equals c1 + c2 and is a scale parameter capturing the rate at which research efforts lead 
to patent applications (c1 reflects the average productivity of research across individuals and c2 
the average propensity to file patents). It is well documented in the literature (see references in 
the introduction and in Section 2) that the propensity to patent has most probably constantly 
increased since the eighties, due to an unobservable greater reliance on the patent system for 
various “strategic” reasons, i.e., c2 might have increased over time, even when accounting for the 
observable characteristics Z. In a similar vein, the productivity of research has also probably 
improved over the years (Kortum and Lerner 1999). Therefore, the extent to which the scale 
variable c would capture an average growth rate of the productivity of research or of the two 
propensity effects is unclear. It actually depends on the proxies for research productivity and 
the propensity to patent, respectively. As the variables used in the empirical analysis tend to 
better capture cross-industry and cross-country variations in the productivity of research, there 
are more reasons to suspect that unobserved changes are due to variation in the propensity to 
1  The expression R
γ indicates that each of the N elements ri of R is taken to the power of γ.
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3.2  The dependent variable: patent indicators
There exist many ways to count patents, each carrying its own meaning (see e.g. Dernis et al. 2001 and 
OECD 2009). It is therefore particularly important to carefully select the patent indicator that will be 
used to monitor countries’ innovation performance so as to reduce the potential biases as much as 
possible. For this reason, five alternative indicators are used in the empirical analysis in order to gauge 
There are many different 
ways of counting 
patents.
patent rather than in the productivity of research. It is therefore likely that the dummies would 
be more reflective of a change in propensity than a change in productivity. The patent production 
function for a given industry-country pair in a single point in time (ijt) to be estimated empirically 
can be written as:
(B.4)  pijt =cijt +rijtγ +zijt β+ xijtα +εijt
where εijt is the error term. It is good practice to estimate panel data in first-difference to avoid potential 
spurious-regression problems. Letting “Δ” denote the first-difference operator, we can write:
(B.5)  ∆pijt =∆cijt +∆rijtγ +∆zijtβ +∆xijtα +∆εijt
Assuming that c1 is constant,
(B.6)  ∆cijt =cijt −cijt−1 =(c1,ijt +c2,ijt) −(c1,ijt−1 +c2,ijt−1) ≈∆c2,ijt  
such that we can write
(B.7)  ∆pijt =∆c2,ijt +∆rijtγ +∆zijtβ +∆xijtα +υijt
with υijt = Δεijt. Since the variables are expressed in logs, Equation (B.7) is an approximation of the 
growth rate of patenting. The term Δc2,ijt is the growth rate of the propensity to patent that is 
not accounted for by the explanatory variables. Equation (B.7) implies that a change in any of 
the explanatory variable has a contemporaneous impact on the number of patents applied for. 
In other words, the parameters of the first-differenced variables capture the short term 
elasticities. 
However, past R&D expenditures might also influence current patenting activity because research 
projects usually require quite some time before leading to a patentable invention. In order to 
account for a gradual adjustment, the patent production function is estimated by means of an 
error correction model (ECM) with a one-year lag structure. The choice of a one-year lag is 
motivated by de Rassenfosse and Guellec (2009) and Hall et al. (1986). Using firm-level survey 
data, de Rassenfosse and Guellec (2009) notice that the lag between initial R&D expenditures 
and patent applications is of the order of one year, even though it can reach as much as five 
years. Hall et al. (1986) estimate several panel data models at the microeconomic level and obtain 
a strong contemporaneous relationship between R&D expenditures and patenting, and a small 
effect of R&D history on patent applications. This is consistent with the practice of filing patents 
early enough in the life of a research project.
ECMs allow estimating both the short-run and the long-run impacts that exist between the 
endogenous and the exogenous variables. It consists in estimating the model in first difference 
together with previous year’s deviation from equilibrium (in brackets), leading to the equation 
given in the main text.
(B.8)  ∆pijt =ψi +ψj +ψt +∆rijtγ +∆zijtβ +∆xijtα −(λpijt−1−c −rijt−1γl −zijt−1βl −x x ijt−1αl ) +ν ijt
Finally, remember that the individual is defined as a country-industry pair. The term Δc2,ijt of 
Equation (B.7) can be decomposed into a fixed country effect (ψi), a fixed industry effect (ψj) and 
with a common time-effect (ψt).
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the robustness of the results to the chosen dependent variable. These indicators are the number of 
national priority filings, the number of patents filed at the EPO, the number of patents filed at the 
USPTO, a measure combining EPO and USPTO patents, and the number of patents filed simultaneously 
in Japan, the US and Europe. Whereas the first indicator is composed of many patents with a much 
skewed distribution of value, the triadic filings are less numerous but are supposed to be of a much 
higher economic value. Figure 3 illustrates some of the differences between these indicators.
The patent indicators are computed from the OECD-EPO PATSTAT database (April 2009) for each 
manufacturing industry, following the International Standard Industry Classification scheme (ISIC, 
Revision 3) as indicated in Table A1 of Annex 1. Patents, however, are not characterised by the ISIC 
scheme, but rather by the codes of the International Patent Classification (IPC), representing different 
areas of technology to which they pertain. Patents have therefore been assigned to the appropriate 
industries using the concordance table between IPC and ISIC codes provided by Schmoch et al. (2003) 
who have estimated the empirical concordance table by investigating the patenting activity by 
technology-based fields (IPC) of more than 3,000 firms classified by industrial sector (ISIC). When a 
patent contains more than one IPC code, the industry allocation is performed on a fractional basis.3
The first indicator is the corrected count of national priority filings (NPFCORR) recently introduced by 
de Rassenfosse et al. (2009). It captures all the patents filed by the inventors based in a country, regardless 
of the patent office of application. The count for, say, Austria is thus equal to the number of priority 
filings by Austrian inventors filed at the Austrian patent office plus the priority filings from Austrian 
inventors directly filed at other patent offices such as the EPO, the USPTO or the German patent office.4 
The inclusion of these priority filings abroad allows reducing the bias against small countries such as 
Belgium and the Netherlands which file a higher share of their patents abroad as compared with, say, 
France and Germany. This indicator is a very broad measure of patenting, encompassing both low-value 
and high-value patents. It is biased in favour of Japan and South Korea, with the share of these countries 
in the total of national priority filings being much higher than their share in R&D expenditures (see 
Figure 3). This is due to the large differences in patent systems, particularly in South Korea and Japan, 
where patents are much smaller but more numerous (see de Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe 2008). 
For this reason, the count for Japanese and Korean priority filings has been divided by three (for a 
discussion, see Kotabe 1992 and Archontopoulos et al. 2007).
The second indicator is the count of patent applications filed at the EPO. It is composed of the patents 
that were filed directly at the EPO or that were later extended to the EPO as second filings. As the 
patenting procedure at the EPO is expensive, EPO patents are supposedly of a higher value. This 
indicator is nevertheless biased for two main reasons. The first is related to the home bias, which is 
well illustrated in Figure 3, whereby companies in Europe tend to rely more heavily on the EPO than 
companies from non-European countries. Second, the reliance on the EPO has increased over time, 
for all countries and especially European ones. De Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe (2007) show that 
a systematic bias in statistics based on European patents must be acknowledged: the share of priority 
filings transferred to the EPO is increasing with the age of membership to the European Patent 
Convention. This calls for a cautious interpretation of the evolution of the number of EPO patents over 
time. 
3    Some patents had no IPC codes, and some IPC codes were not in the concordance table. All these “unassigned” patents 
were allocated to the industries according to the observed share of successfully allocated patents.
4    The nationality of filings was identified by the country of residence of inventors so as to capture all the inventive output in 
a given country. That is, a patent from Austrian inventors is considered as an Austrian application even if it is filed by a US 
assignee (or patentee). This methodology assures the best match between R&D expenditures and patent applications. 
We use a corrected 
measure of national 
priority filings, 
applications filed at the 
EPO, …
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R&D  NPFCORR  EPO  USPTO  REGIONAL  TRIADIC 
374,106 104,230 218,673 231,927 50,504
JP-KR  US-CA  EU 
Source:  Own calculations. See Table A.1 for more details
The third indicator is similar to the second, except that the patent office of reference is the USPTO and 
that statistics are available for granted patents only. Given that a large number of countries in the 
sample are European countries, this indicator probably reflects the value of patents better (a European 
applicant will file more easily at the EPO than at the USPTO, and will seek for a US patent only for the 
most valuable inventions).5 However, this indicator is subject to an important, and logical, home bias 
for North American applicants (see Figure 3). 
The fourth indicator (REGIONAL) is a mix between EPO and USPTO patents. Since European applicants 
have a higher tendency to file at the EPO and other countries preferably file at the USPTO, the indicator 
is composed of EPO patents for European countries and USPTO patents for other countries. The approach 
mitigates the home biases characterising the EPO and the USPTO indicators, with a geographical 
distribution that is closer to the distribution of research efforts.
The count of triadic patent families is the fifth indicator (TRIADIC). It was developed a decade ago by 
the OECD to select patents of a high quality standard that were comparable across countries. According 
to the OECD definition, the triadic patent family is defined as a set of patent applications filed 
simultaneously at the EPO, the JPO, and granted by the USPTO, sharing one or more priority applications 
(OECD 2009a, p 71). The indicator is more robust to differences in patent regulations across countries 
and changes in patent laws over time. Triadic patents are of high value given the high cost incurred 
with patent applications in the three patent offices. On average, only between 10 and 15 percent of 
priority filings ultimately become triadic patents. The 19 countries included in the sample have a total 
of 374,106 priority filings in 2004 for 50,504 triadic patent applications. The absolute count of patents 
and the relative shares is presented in Tables A2 and A3 of Annex 1 for countries and industries, 
respectively.
Figure 4 represents the share of priority filings that eventually became triadic patents. De Rassenfosse 
and van Pottelsberghe (2009) have shown that triadic patents are a good measure of research 
productivity and are more suited than priority filings to capture the quality of research efforts. Yet, an 
increase in the share of triadic patents over time does not necessarily reflect an increase in patent 
quality, as other factors such as the internationalisation of economic activity and a higher familiarity 
5    To mitigate the effect of the grant lag on US patent statistics, which was especially strong in 2004 and 2005, the data are 
adjusted for each country-industry pair using the ratio of EPO patents to US patents for the year 2003.
…patents granted at the 
US patent office, a mixed 
EPO-USPTO measure 
and the count of triadic 
patent families.
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with international patenting procedures possibly play a role, too. The figure shows that the share of 
triadic patents has been slightly increasing in Europe and Japan and decreasing in the US. The increase 
in Europe and Japan could be more due to a higher tendency of applicants to seek protection in foreign 
markets than to an increase in the average value of inventions. As for the US, it is likely that the drop 
in the share of triadic patents is due to a strong increase in the number of priority filings that did not 
lead to many triadic patent applications. According to van Pottelsberghe (2009) this is due to the very 
low cost of patenting in the US and a weak rigour of the examination process. Cheap patents facing a 
soft examination practice would logically lead to a high propensity to file low value patents, which are 
not later translated into triadic applications.
Figure 4.  Share of triadic patents in total priority filings, in Europe, Japan and the USA
1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003








Source:  Own calculations
Figure 5 depicts the evolution over time of the share of triadic patents for a selected number of 
industries. On average, 10 to 15 percent of priority filings are extended in the Triad, but some industries, 
in particular the pharmaceutical industry have a much higher share of triadic patents. This figure should 
be contrasted with the low ranking achieved by the pharmaceutical industry in Figure 2. This industry 
typically produces a low number of patents per unit of R&D, but these patents are of a relatively high 
value. 
Figure 5.  Share of triadic patents in total priority filings, in Europe, Japan and the USA








PHAR CHEM PETR Average MACH FABM
Source:  Own calculations
Triadic patents tell 
more about research 
productivity than other 
patent counts but 
their faster increase 
also reflects the 
internationalization of 
production.
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To test whether a high propensity to patent is associated with a lower quality per patent, Figure 6 
presents the share of triadic filings in total priority filings by country as a function of the number of 
priority filings per million dollars invested in R&D. There is a clear negative relationship, indicating 
that countries with a high propensity to patent have portfolios that are of lower average quality or 
economic value.
Figure 6.  Quality of applications versus propensity to file, by country, (2004)


























R y = -0,0375x + 0,2
R￿ = 0.16;  p-value of slope coefficients = 0.13
Source:  Own calculations
3.3  Explanatory variables
The most important explanatory variable is R&D expenditures by industry (“R&D”) as a measure 
of the industry’s research efforts. It is taken from the OECD’s ANBERD database (2009), and is 
expressed in constant US dollars (USD) at purchasing power parity (PPP). The estimated patent 
elasticity with respect to R&D provides an incomplete evaluation of the research productivity. A 
more complete picture would be easy to draw if inventions (not patents) could be measured with 
accuracy and if the two types of propensity to patent were properly measured across countries 
and over time. Since there is no such indicator, an indirect approach such as the one developed 
by de Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe (2009) is needed. It consists in finding variables that 
arguably reflect (or induce) differences in the productivity of research activities and variables that 
arguably affect the propensity to patent.
Finding potential explanatory variables affecting the propensity and the productivity components 
for a large group of countries, varying over industries and available over a long period is a 
challenging task. Three candidates that could affect the productivity of research and two 
potentially affecting the propensity to patent are identified. Some vary over time and across 
countries and industries whereas some others vary only across countries or industries, as indicated 
in Table 2. 
The key explanatory 
variable is R&D 
expenditure as a 
measure of an  
industry’s research 
efforts.
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Table 2.  Overview of the explanatory variables
  Component   Variation   Number of 
observations Propensity (z) Productivity (x) Country Industry Year
R&D x x x 4937
APPROPRIABILITY x x 4131
IP INDEX x x x 4937
INTL COMP x x x 4451
SHARE BASIC x x x 1811
SHARE HIGHER EDU   x   x   x   4353
Source:    OECD STAN R&D Expenditure in Industry (ISIC Rev. 3) ANBERD ed2009 for R&D; Arundel and Kabla (1998) for 
APPROPRIABILITY; Park (2008) for IP INDEX, with yearly data computed on the basis of a compound annual growth 
rate two available data points; OECD (2009b) for INTL COMP; and OECD (2009a) for SHARE BASIC and SHARE HIGHER 
EDU
The three variables that are supposed to affect – or to correlate with – research productivity are defined 
and measured as follows. The variable “SHARE BASIC” is the basic-research expenditure as a percentage 
of gross domestic expenditure on R&D (OECD 2009a). The variable is expected to lead to a greater 
productivity of research efforts as basic research typically pushes forward the knowledge frontier and 
generates new opportunities for further development. The second productivity variable is “SHARE 
HIGHER EDU.” It is defined as the percentage of gross domestic expenditure on R&D performed by the 
higher education sector (OECD 2009a). The expected impact on the number of patents is mixed. On 
the one hand, the higher education sector develops and uses frontier knowledge that companies can 
use, suggesting a positive relationship. On the other hand, the propensity to patent is lower among 
universities, such that a negative impact is possible, too. The third productivity variable is “INTL COMP” 
and captures an industry’s exposure to international trade. It is defined for each country-industry pair 
as the ratio of net exports to the sum of imports and exports (OECD 2009b). The higher the variable, 
the more the industry exports in comparison to its imports, hence the more it is internationally 
competitive. A positive impact is expected as internationally competitive industries must be innovative 
in terms of new product performance or reduced production costs. In analyzing the determinants of 
patenting across a set of OECD countries, Furman et al. (2002, p. 899) find that “an extremely important 
role is played by factors associated with differences in R&D productivity [such as] openness to 
international trade.”
Two proxies are available for the propensity effects. As for the strategic propensity, the variable “IP 
INDEX” is a measure of the strength of the intellectual property (IP) system at the country level developed 
by Ginarte and Park (1997). We expect countries with a stronger IP regime to have a higher strategic 
propensity to patent as a strong protection increases the value of patent rights. This is an imperfect 
proxy however, as it is only published every five years.6 The second variable, “APPROPRIABILITY”, 
captures the appropriability propensity and is based on Arundel and Kabla (1998) who have surveyed 
the share of innovations that were patented in the French manufacturing industry. This observation 
allows reducing the noise in the R&D-patent relationship by directly correcting for a fundamental link 
between inventions and patents. This data source is preferred over others because it is the closest to 
the industry classification of the ANBERD database. 
6  We compute annual data on the basis of the compound annual growth rate.
The shares of basic and/
or university research 
and international 
competitiveness 
matter for research 
productivity.
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It is worth mentioning that those variables that supposedly influence (or correlate with) the productivity 
of research are more diverse and comprehensive than the propensity variables: the exposure-to-trade 
variable varies across countries, industries and over time and the other two variables vary over time 
and across countries). By contrast, the proxy for the appropriability propensity varies only across 
industries, while the proxy for the strategic propensity varies essentially across countries and slightly 
over time. It is therefore fair to assume that the fixed effects in the regression mainly capture changes 
in the propensity to patent across the various dimensions of the panel (industry, country and time).
4.  Empirical results
The empirical results are analyzed and interpreted in three main stages. First, the basic R&D-patent 
model is estimated with the alternative patent indicators. Then the productivity and propensity variables 
are added simultaneously to the model. The third stage consists in analyzing the various sets of dummies 
(industry, country and time), as they witness the remaining “dynamic” propensity to patent.
4.1.  The basic R&D-patent model
The estimated parameters of the error correction model described in Equation (B.8) are presented in Table 3 
for the five patent indicators. The only explanatory variable taken into account is R&D expenditure.
Table 3.  Results of the error-correction model of the R&D-patent relationship
Δ log(#patents)
NPFCORR   TRIADIC   EPO   USPTO   REGIONAL
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)
Δ log(R&D)
0.009 0.013 0.009 -0.013 0.014
(0.007) (0.015) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
log(#patents) (t-1)
-0.119*** -0.290*** -0.155*** -0.145*** -0.149***
(0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
log(R&D) (t-1)
0.014*** 0.032*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.019***
(0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Country dummies Yes ***   Yes ***   Yes ***   Yes ***   Yes ***
Industry dummies Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** Yes ***
Time dummies Yes ***   Yes ***   Yes ***   Yes ***   Yes ***
Number of observations 4943 4943 4943 4943 4943
Adjusted R-squared 0.197 0.187 0.156 0.171 0.129
Long-run impact of R&D 0.118   0.110   0.116   0.123   0.128
Notes:    Standard errors in parentheses; ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10-percent levels, respectively. The rows 
“country dummies”, “industry dummies” and “time dummies” report the significance level of the joint effect of these 
dummies. The long-run impact of R&D is computed by dividing the coefficient of log(R&D) (t-1) by the coefficient 
of log(#patents) (t-1).
The short-term elasticity is not significantly different from zero (see the coefficient of ∆log(R&D)). This 
result confirms that patents are a poor indicator of short-term changes in the output of inventive 
activity. The long-term elasticity of R&D fluctuates around 0.12, regardless of the patent indicator that 
is used. In other words, a 10-percent increase in R&D outlays leads to a 1.2-percent increase in patent 
applications, on average. These point estimates are strikingly low but compatible with estimates 
performed with firm-level panel data sets. The adjustment parameter λ (coefficient of variable 
log(#patents)) is lowest for priority filings and highest for triadic patents indicating greater inertia of 
On average, a 
10-percent increase in 
R&D expenditure leads 
to a 1.2-percent increase 
in patent applications.
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priority filings. In other words, the R&D history matters more for priority filings whereas changes in 
R&D expenditures have a faster impact on triadic patents. 
Depending on the patent indicator that is used, R&D expenditures and the three sets of dummy variables 
explain between 13 and 20 percent of the growth in patent applications. The best fits are achieved 
with priority filings and triadic patents, i.e. the patent indicators that are at the opposite ends on the 
average-value scale: for these specifications the adjusted R-squared is 20 percent. This explanatory 
power is quite satisfactory given the nature of the data and the simplicity of the patent production 
function considered. Country, industry and time effects are all jointly significant. They are described 
and analyzed at the end of this section. Note that tests for autocorrelation of residuals reject the 
presence of correlated errors.7
4.2.  Productivity
The low estimated elasticity of patents with respect to R&D raises the question whether other factors 
may help to explain industry or country variations in patent applications. This issue is investigated in 
Table 4 where the productivity and the two propensity components are jointly included in the model. 
The estimations are presented only with indictors NPFCORR, the TRIADIC and the REGIONAL as 
dependent variables. Regressions based on EPO and USPTO lead to similar results.
Table 4.  Results of the full error-correction model
Δ log(#patents)
NPFCORR   TRIADIC   REGIONAL

























SHARE HIGHER EDU (t-1)
0.0002 -0.002 0.005***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Countries dummies Yes ***   Yes ***   Yes ***
Industry dummies Yes *** Yes *** Yes ***
Time dummies Yes ***   Yes ***   Yes ***
Number of observations 3696 3696 3696
Adjusted R-Square 0.237   0.190   0.140
Notes:    Standard errors in parentheses; ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10-percent levels, respectively. Each of 
the rows “country dummies”, “industry dummies” and “time dummies” report the significance level of the joint effect 
of the respective dummies.
7  Tests for autocorrelation are available upon request from the authors.
Given this low R&D-
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Three indicators likely to affect (or to be correlated with) research productivity are used. They include 
the share of higher education in total R&D expenditure, the share of basic research in total R&D 
expenditure and an indicator of international competitiveness. The first two indicators are not perfect 
because they only vary across countries and over time but not across industries. The third fluctuates 
in the three dimensions. The impact of the share of total R&D performed by the higher education 
sector (SHARE HIGHER EDU) has a positive and significant impact on the regional patent indicator 
only, suggesting that university-performed R&D leads to more valuable patents in the long-run. The 
negative short-term impact of this variable is probably due to a transitional effect caused by the 
diversion of resources towards less patent-minded entities. It can also be explained by longer delays 
in the R&D process at universities as compared with the private sector. In any case, it suggests that 
allocating more resources to academic research is a long-term policy aimed at securing the seeds of 
future innovations.
The share of basic research, an indicator of potential breakthrough inventions, is tested separately. 
It is not included in the main specification due to a much smaller number of data points available. 
The results are presented in Table A4 of Annex 1. The share of basic research has a strong productivity 
effect on all patent indicators, with a long-term premium of about 11 percent. In other words, the 
higher the share of basic research in total R&D expenditures, the higher the number of patent 
applications induced by an increase in the productivity of research efforts.
The exposure to international trade (INTL COMP) has a positive and significant impact on the number 
of patent filings, both in the short run and in the long run. This result confirms the impact on research 
productivity that Furman et al. (2002) obtain with their variable OPENNESS. Note that the effect is 
twice as high with international patents as with priority filings. 
4.3.  Propensities
The distinction between appropriability and strategic propensities put forward in the present paper 
is not easy to implement empirically. The two proxies that are used to gauge these propensities are 
imperfect measures because they only vary across countries or across industries and are quite stable 
over time. Still, the appropriability propensity variable (APPROPRIABILITY) is highly significant and 
confirms the relevance of using information on the share of inventions that are patented in order to 
better understand how an increase in R&D efforts would translate into more patents. This is evidence 
of the key role of the appropriability propensity in the R&D-patent relationship.
The variable that aims at capturing some facets of the strategic propensity is the strength of the 
patent system (IP-INDEX). It turns out to be a significant determinant of the number of patents. 
Countries with a higher IP-INDEX are also likely to have more patent filings per unit of R&D effort. 
For instance, the US has a very high index because there are many patentable subject matters (as 
opposed to Europe where many restrictions apply) and because the enforcement system is well 
developed and historically supporting patented inventions.
This propensity variable is only one factor influencing the strategic propensity to patent. Despite its 
significant impact, which validates the intuition expressed in this paper, we recognise that “strategic 
propensity” is imperfectly measured since no indicator with cross-industry variations is available to 
the best of our knowledge. A similar criticism can be made on the appropriability variable.
4.4.  Remaining “dynamic” propensity
The country, industry and time effects from the full model can be used to assess the average evolution 
of the propensity to patent along the three dimensions (see Annex 2 for methodological details). Since 
The number of patents 
tends to be higher 
in countries with 
stringent IP protection 
and in industries with 
high appropriability 
propensity.
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the model explains the growth rate of patent filings, the control dummies capture the increase in the 
propensity to patent – or the “dynamic” propensity – net of the impact of all other observable 
characteristics. The fixed effects probably capture unobserved changes in productivity and in the two 
measures of propensity. But since the R&D productivity component is definitely better measured than 
the two propensity components, it is fair to assume that the fixed effects capture more the propensity 
than the productivity components. 
Figure 7 shows the normalized coefficients of the country dummies. The rankings for the international 
indicators (TRIADIC, EPO and USPTO) are roughly similar and clearly underline a strong catching-up 
effect for South Korea, Poland, Norway and Spain. Countries such as France, Canada, Great Britain and 
the US rank last on triadic and regional patent statistics (EPO and USPTO), suggesting that they have 
lost some ground in their patenting performance as measured by international indicators. 





































































































































































Source:  Own calculations
Note:    The values are coefficients of country dummies taken from the full model and are normalized from 0 to 1. They 
are interpreted as normalized dynamic propensity to patent. See Annex 2 for details.
The change in the propensity to patent varies as well across manufacturing industries, and to a 
significant extent, as illustrated in Figure 8. The industries including communication, computers 
and instruments are associated with the strongest increase in the propensity to patent whereas 
fabricated metals or rubber and plastics products had the lowest increase. There is a clear ICT 
(information and communication technologies) effect here. The industries in this area already scored 
high in at least one of the two propensity components (see Figure 2), and they have apparently 
further increased their willingness to patent. This observation is true for all patent indicators. Contrary 
to the country dummies, which illustrate a catching-up effect from newcomers, the industry dummies 
seem to reinforce the trends towards a higher propensity to patent. As we control for the industry-
specific appropriability propensity, this effect is most probably due to a sharp increase in the strategic 
propensity to patent in the two industries.
The remaining 
propensity to patent 
is dissected into its 
country, industry and 
time dimensions.
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Source:  Own calculations
Note:    The values are coefficients of industry dummies taken from the full model and are normalized from 0 to 1. They are 
interpreted as normalized dynamic propensity to patent. See Annex 2 for details.
Finally, Figure 9 depicts the evolution of the propensity to patent over time for the principal patent 
indicators. The most striking observation is that the propensity to file priority filings has been roughly 
constant over time whereas the propensity to file international/regional applications has steadily 
increased. Taken together, these trends lead to the conclusion that there has been no particular “burst” 
in the underlying inventiveness (beyond the increase in R&D efforts and beyond the improvement in 
research productivity measured in the empirical analysis) and that the “patent warming” observed at 
major patent offices is mostly due to a globalization effect: companies do not file particularly more 
patents, but have a higher willingness to extend them abroad. The USPTO (and to a lesser extent the 
EPO) is particularly intensely targeted in this respect.
Figure 9.  Evolution of the propensity to patent over time








USPTO EPO TRIADIC NPFCORR
Source:  Own calculations (see Annex 2 for details)
The global ‘patent 
warming’ is mainly 
due to companies’ 
willingness to extend 
patent protection to 
foreign markets.
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5.  Concluding remarks and policy implications
The literature on the R&D-patent relationship reports a weak correlation between R&D efforts and 
patents in two main configurations: time-series analyses and cross-industry investigations. This weakness 
has not reduced the emerging hype towards the use of patent statistics for many purposes, including 
economic research on technological progress and knowledge diffusion. The objective of this paper is 
to provide further conceptual and empirical insights into the apparent failure to find a strong relationship 
between R&D efforts and patent applications. The empirical investigation relies on a unique panel 
data set composed of 18 manufacturing industries in 19 countries over the period 1987 to 2005, for 
which three broad patent indicators are developed. Six main methodological and policy implications 
summarize the main contributions of this paper. 
The first is conceptual. The literature has implicitly or explicitly assumed that the patent-to-R&D ratio 
is driven by a research productivity stage (the extent to which additional units of R&D generate 
additional inventions) and a propensity-to-patent stage. This paper claims that in order to better 
understand how an increase in R&D expenditure translates into patent applications, the propensity to 
patent must be split into two main components: the “appropriability propensity” which indicates 
whether or not an invention is protected with patents; and the “strategic propensity” which measures 
the number of patents used to protect the invention. While the former component can be proxied by 
existing survey data on the share of inventions that are patented (e.g. Arundel and Kabla 1998) in each 
industrial sector, the latter can so far be gauged only with quantitative analysis. This theoretical insight 
has a major implication: Large-scale surveys like the Community Innovation Survey in Europe should 
regularly assess the two propensity components for many countries. Data on the evolution of the share 
of inventions that are patented as well as on the average number of patents used to protect an invention 
would drastically improve our understanding of the R&D-patent relationship. So far only single-country 
information is available for a given year or period.
Second, the econometric results based on the cross-industry, cross-country and time series dataset 
confirm that the patent elasticity with respect to R&D is positive and significant but small. It fluctuates 
around 12 percent and is very robust to the patent indicator used as dependent variable (national 
priority filings versus the more restrictive and valuable triadic patents). R&D and the various fixed effects 
(country, industry and time dummies) explain about 20 percent of the variance in the growth rate of 
patents. The results therefore confirm the existing dynamic time series estimates at the microeconomic 
level: The elasticity is much smaller than “hoped” for (Griliches 1990) and captures only a small share 
of the patent variance, which is arguably due to two important missing links unrelated to the productivity 
of research, namely appropriability and strategic propensities. 
Third, the empirical analysis confirms that a significant productivity effect takes place and does explain 
part of the variations in the R&D-patent ratio, as witnessed by the positive and significant premium 
associated with basic research and academic research, or by the noticeable impact of the international-
competitiveness variable, an indicator of ultimate innovation performance. The positive impact of 
basic and academic research suggests that allocating more resources to university-performed research 
and to basic projects is a long-term policy aimed at securing the seeds of future innovations.
Fourth, the empirical results lead to the conclusion that the appropriability propensity plays a positive 
and highly significant role in the patent production function, despite the fact that its measure only 
varies across industries. The implicit assumption that it is similar across countries and does not vary 
over time is probably too strong, but there is no convincing alternative to the best of our knowledge. 
The strategic propensity to patent is measured by one variable supposed to affect it, the strength of 
the patent system in the inventor country. This variable has a positive and significant impact on the 
propensity to patent, but probably only partially captures the strategic propensity to patent. 
The number of patents 
depends on R&D efforts, 
research productivity, 
the wish to appropriate 
inventions and on 
strategic behaviour.
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Fifth, the country and industry dummies allow to identify in some depth the origins of the increase in 
the propensity to file patents. This “dynamic propensity” is logically composed of an appropriability 
component and a strategic component. Two manufacturing industries, which were already characterized 
by a high patent-to-R&D ratio, communications and computers, turn out to be associated with the 
sharpest increase in the propensity to patent. This is precisely the technological area where a patent 
“paradox” was identified by Hall and Ziedonis (2001). In this respect our result shed some additional 
light on the R&D-patent relationship and its industry dimension. The pharmaceutical industry has a 
high appropriability propensity but is not associated with a particularly strong increase in its propensity 
to patent. The countries that are associated with the sharpest increase in their propensity to patent 
are South Korea, Poland and Spain, which witnesses a clear catching up effect. These results exemplify 
the pitfalls and advantages associated with patent data. Whereas they witness fundamental economic 
changes such as catching-up effects, they are also greatly impacted by nations’ industrial structure, 
hence the need to improve our understanding of the “propensity” components. 
Finally, the time dummies provide a broad measure of the dynamic increase in patent propensity, net 
of country and industry specificities, and of R&D expenditure. Here the results depend on the patent 
indicators that are used. The sharpest increases are associated with regional patent offices (EPO and 
USPTO) followed by triadic applications. As far as national priority filings are concerned, hardly any 
increase in the unaccounted propensity to patent is observed. In other words, the “global patent 
warming” that is currently taking place is essentially the result of a stronger internationalization of 
national patent applications, and not a consequence of increased propensity to rely on patent systems 
with national priority applications. Innovating firms are increasingly targeting global markets and 
hence have a higher tendency to seek for protection in regional patent offices, world-wide. This 
tendency would justify a stronger coordination of patent offices at the global level, provided their 
views of how a patent system should be designed converge noticeably, as suggested in van Pottelsberghe 
(2009). 
The global ‘patent 
warming’ would justify 
stronger coordination of 
national/regional patent 
offices if their views on 
patent system design 
converged.
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Country NPFCORR % TRIADIC % EPO % USPTO % REGIONAL %
AT 2,356 0.6 284 0.6 1,259 1.2 825 0.4 1,259 0.5
BE 1,742 0.5 394 0.8 1,265 1.2 927 0.4 1,265 0.5
CA 5,569 1.5 381 0.8 1,147 1.1 3,750 1.7 3,750 1.6
CH 3,480 0.9 988 2.0 2,656 2.5 1,874 0.9 2,656 1.1
DE 49,502 13.2 6,865 13.6 24,130 23.2 17,126 7.8 24,130 10.4
DK 1,579 0.4 311 0.6 1,015 1.0 906 0.4 1,015 0.4
ES 2,525 0.7 177 0.4 886 0.9 519 0.2 886 0.4
FI 2,640 0.7 314 0.6 1,175 1.1 1,199 0.5 1,175 0.5
FR 14,635 3.9 2,675 5.3 7,839 7.5 5,541 2.5 7,839 3.4
GB 19,665 5.3 1,944 3.8 5,181 5.0 5,782 2.6 5,181 2.2
IE 559 0.1 82 0.2 237 0.2 282 0.1 237 0.1
IT 10,007 2.7 696 1.4 3,962 3.8 2,195 1.0 3,962 1.7
JP* 113,488 30.3 19,890 39.4 25,382 24.4 56,968 26.1 56,968 24.6
KR* 33,282 8.9 2,736 5.4 4,573 4.4 16,084 7.4 16,084 6.9
NL 5,742 1.5 2,329 4.6 3,879 3.7 3,362 1.5 3,879 1.7
NO 1,045 0.3 127 0.3 356 0.3 410 0.2 356 0.2
PL 2,226 0.6 13 0.0 135 0.1 99 0.0 135 0.1
SE 3,599 1.0 685 1.4 1,817 1.7 1,491 0.7 1,817 0.8
US 100,465 26.9 9,613 19.0 17,336 16.6 99,334 45.4 99,334 42.8
Total 374,106 100 50,504 100 104,230 100 218,673 100 231,927 100
Source:  Own calculations
Notes:    * The number of priority fillings for Japan and Korea has been divided by 3. The “%”columns report the share of each 
country in the total of each patent count, expressed in percent.
Table A3.  Absolute and relative number of patents by industry (2004)
Industry NPFCORR % TRIADIC % EPO % USPTO % REGIONAL %
FOOD 7,939 2.1 997 2.0 2,172 2.1 4,156 1.9 4,258 1.8
TEXT 2,521 0.7 268 0.5 613 0.6 1,258 0.6 1,369 0.6
WPAP 4,698 1.3 605 1.2 1,324 1.3 2,418 1.1 2,649 1.1
PETR 4,632 1.2 739 1.5 1,496 1.4 2,497 1.1 2,664 1.1
CHEM 37,325 10.0 6,307 12.5 12,306 11.8 20,427 9.3 22,077 9.5
PHAR 21,229 5.7 4,872 9.6 8,762 8.4 13,831 6.3 14,734 6.4
RUBB 7,282 1.9 840 1.7 2,030 1.9 3,410 1.6 3,878 1.7
MINE 6,654 1.8 810 1.6 1,767 1.7 3,380 1.5 3,695 1.6
META 7,774 2.1 1,003 2.0 2,148 2.1 3,948 1.8 4,319 1.9
FABM 10,142 2.7 925 1.8 2,579 2.5 4,532 2.1 5,239 2.3
MACH 44,986 12.0 4,741 9.4 11,938 11.5 22,169 10.1 24,578 10.6
COMP 53,304 14.2 7,012 13.9 12,922 12.4 36,830 16.8 37,443 16.1
ELEC 14,209 3.8 1,794 3.6 3,736 3.6 8,527 3.9 9,016 3.9
COMM 81,450 21.8 11,453 22.7 21,622 20.7 55,051 25.2 56,313 24.3
INST 15,260 4.1 2,148 4.3 4,211 4.0 9,400 4.3 9,821 4.2
AUTO 34,274 9.2 4,088 8.1 9,983 9.6 16,838 7.7 18,995 8.2
TRAN 10,916 2.9 1,329 2.6 3,112 3.0 5,893 2.7 6,441 2.8
MISC 9,511 2.5 573 1.1 1,510 1.4 4,107 1.9 4,439 1.9
Total 374,106 100 50,504 100 104,230 100 218,673 100 231,927 100
Source:  Own calculations
Note:  The “%”columns report the share of each country in the total of each patent count.
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∆ log(#patents)
NPFCORR   TRIADIC   EPO   USPTO   REGIONAL
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)
∆ log(R&D)
0.019   -0.004   0.007   -0.031*   0.020
(0.013) (0.029) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018)
∆ SHARE BASIC
0.016*** -0.0002 -0.008* 0.028*** -0.005
(0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
log(#patents) (t-1)
-0.114*** -0.365*** -0.191*** -0.207*** -0.192***
(0.011) (0.019) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
log(R&D) (t-1)
0.016*** 0.041*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.022***
(0.005) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
SHARE BASIC (t-1)
0.019*** 0.029*** 0.026*** 0.021*** 0.023***
(0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Countries dummies Yes ***   Yes ***   Yes ***   Yes ***   Yes ***
Industry dummies Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** Yes ***
Time dummies Yes ***   Yes ***   Yes ***   Yes ***   Yes ***
Number of observations 1811 1811 1811 1811 1811
Adjusted R-Square 0.331   0.241   0.192   0.245   0.170
Notes:    ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10-percent levels, respectively. The rows “country dummies”, “industry 
dummies” and “time dummies” report the significance level of the joint effect of theses dummies.
Annex 2.  Construction of the dynamic propensities
The variables presented in Figures 7, 8 and 9 are based on ψi, ψj and ψt in Equation (B.8) that is, the 
industry, country and time-effects, respectively. Since the dependent variable is the difference of the 
log of patent filings, the fixed effects can be interpreted as the growth rate in propensity to patent 
taking into account all the potential explanatory variables. We refer to these parameters as the dynamic 
propensities.
Note that the fixed effects cannot be recovered immediately from Equation (B.8). Indeed, the fact 
that that error correction term is left open in Equation (B.8) of Box 1 means that the estimated fixed 
effects also include the parameter c (recall from Equation (B.3) that c captures the rate at which 
research efforts lead to patent applications). For this reason, the fixed effects presented in Figures 7, 
8 and 9 have been recovered in the following way. We have first estimated the residuals from 
Equation (B.4) and injected them into Equation (B.7) in lieu of the lagged long-term relationship (the 
expression in parentheses in Equation (B.7)). The fixed effects of this modified specification can be 
interpreted as the country, industry and time components of the change in the propensity to patent. 
Figures 7, 8 and 9, respectively, present the parameters ψi and ψj , which are normalized to lie between 
0 and 1 for ease of readability. Figure 9 presents the cumulative growth of the time dummies, net of 
industry and country effects.
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